

The DTIC Review

Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence in a Changing Political World

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Foreward

This is the first issue of *The DTIC Review*. For this inaugural issue, the editors have selected the topic: Nuclear Proliferation and Deterrence in a Changing Political World. *The DTIC Review* brings its readers the full text of selected technical reports as well as a bibliography of other references of interest under one cover. For the first time, our readership is being provided with a sampling of documents from our collection on a particular topic of current interest. The editors hope that you find this effort of value and appreciate your comments.



Kurt N. Molholm
Administrator

Introduction

This collection of selected documents from the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) addresses the formidable issue of protecting the United States and its people from potential nuclear destruction. With the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and, concomitantly, the end of the Cold War, new strategies for nonproliferation and deterrence must be devised and implemented.

Potential threats from countries not previously seen as a danger, the escalation of regional conflicts and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are but a few of the considerations to be addressed. This shift from a bipolar to a multipolar political world requires the development of innovative ideologies and unparalleled diplomacy. The authors of the following papers propose various plans and tactics to ensure United States national security and maintain world peace.

These documents are only a sampling of the information available on nuclear proliferation and deterrence from DTIC's extensive collection on the subject. In depth literature searches may be requested by contacting the Reference and Retrieval Division at the Defense Technical Information Center on (703) 767-8274, DSN: 427-8274, FAX: (703) 767-9240, DSN: 427-9240, Email: reference@dtic.dla.mil.

Document 1

Operational Nuclear Deterrence

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.



"OPERATIONAL" NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

by

David F. Bedey
Major, U.S. Army

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College.
in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department
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
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the Department of the Navy.

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"OPERATIONAL" NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

During the Cold War the superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union produced nuclear strategy based upon a now familiar concept, strategic nuclear deterrence. As we adjust to a remarkably different global security environment, one characteristic of which is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, a natural question arises: can deterrence play a part in nuclear strategies focused on regional foes possessing small nuclear arsenals? This paper examines the viability of "operational" nuclear deterrence employed in the resolution of regional conflicts. The object of operational nuclear deterrence is to persuade an adversary not to use nuclear weapons. To be effective, a deterrent strategy must be credible; the enemy must perceive that we possess the means, will, and commitment to severely retaliate. The relative invulnerability of the United States versus regional opponents should give us greater flexibility in developing deterrent options. At the same time, the failure of operational deterrence will not be cataclysmic, as was the case when "mutual assured destruction" reigned. This implies that the long-term consequences of our retaliatory strike must be considered, both on a regional and on a global scale. Finally, as decisions are being made on arms control and ballistic missile defense, we must be careful that policies which enhance strategic deterrence do not significantly reduce our capacity to practice operational deterrence.

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"OPERATIONAL" NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

That nuclear weapons represented a radical discontinuity rather than a logical extension in armament was apparent to most observers after Hiroshima. . . .¹

The Problem. Nuclear weapons occupy a special place in contemporary culture. Our thinking on these weapons has been molded by the well-publicized devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, terrifying film footage of a H-bomb tests in the atmosphere, and prognostications on the environmental catastrophe attending nuclear exchange (e.g., nuclear winter). Given this psychological conditioning, the use of nuclear weapons has become virtually unthinkable (perhaps as much a function of denial, as of rational contemplation). However, since nuclear technology cannot be "uninvented" and the world is not populated with altruistic players, disarmament remains an idealist's dream. To cope with this dilemma, the nuclear superpowers "fought" the Cold War with a strategy which emphasized the non-use of nuclear weapons, i.e., deterrence.

The concept of strategic deterrence defined the fundamental relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Although the specific form of the strategy and how it was implemented changed over time, there came into being an uneasy, yet relatively stable,

accommodation between the two superpowers. Deterrence of the use of nuclear weapons seems to work--at least in a bipolar world.

While our attention was riveted on the Soviet Union, the technology for nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles steadily spread to other nations. It will most likely continue to do so, despite the existence of such international accords as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Indeed, the rate of proliferation may accelerate due to the possibility of direct transfer of (former) Soviet weapons to third parties, as well as the loss of the arguably stabilizing influence the Soviet Union exerted on its clients.

With the breakup of the Soviet Union, we live in an increasingly multipolar world. Neither the causes of war, nor the weapons to fight them have diminished. In the not too distant future we may face a nuclear adversary during a regional crisis. Is the concept of nuclear deterrence still relevant? If so, how might the regional CINC exercise "operational" nuclear deterrence to reduce the risk of nuclear weapon employment in his theater?*

*I will use the term operational nuclear deterrence to distinguish deterrence targeted against a regional adversary from the more familiar strategic deterrence which aims at preventing global nuclear war with a highly capable enemy like the former Soviet Union.

Purpose. If deterrence is deemed *a priori* to be irrelevant when dealing with regional contingencies, then by default one is either resigned to fight on a nuclear battlefield (with all of the tactical ramifications that implies), or to not intervene at all (to avoid the use of, and casualties caused by, nuclear weapons). Neither of these options is appealing. If, on the other hand, the enemy can be deterred from using his nuclear weapons, then the conflict can be resolved by conventional means.

This paper examines the viability of nuclear deterrence employed in the resolution of regional conflicts. I assert that operational nuclear deterrence can play an important part in development of regional strategy. However, its practical application will likely be strongly influenced by theory developed during the Cold War, and by the public (American and world) aversion to the use of nuclear weapons. These factors will constrain how deterrence is put into practice.

Approach. The only historical case study available for studying nuclear deterrence is the Cold War. As policy was developed, much intellectual effort went into devising deterrent theory, a theory devised primarily by political scientists for civilian policy makers in response to the Soviet threat.² Understanding this theory is not a merely academic exercise, for it will likely continue to influence policy makers, even as the security situation changes. The

impact on the military planner is obvious. Policy decisions ultimately determine military objectives, constraining military activities in the pursuit of those objectives. In Chapter II, the intent is to understand which parts of the "old theory" of deterrence remain valid in a regional context, and which do not.

Chapter III briefly reviews the emerging threat in terms of military capabilities and political intentions. Motivations for acquiring nuclear arms are discussed, since the reasons for which one seeks to join the nuclear club can provide clues as to whether and how those weapons might be used. An understanding of the enemy is crucial for devising an effective deterrent strategy--if the enemy is "detractable" at all.

Chapter IV is an exposition of how nuclear deterrence can be applied as a natural part of adaptive planning to support regional objectives.* The aim of operational deterrence is to dissuade adversaries from using nuclear weapons within the region (against either American forces, or the forces and populations of our friends). This differs from the concept of strategic deterrence which primarily seeks to prevent nuclear attack on the territory of the United States. The ideas upon

*Adaptive planning is described in the National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, p. 12. It provides for preplanned options for dealing with potential crises within a region.

which this theory of operational deterrence is based are: the target for a deterrent policy must be the enemy's mind, he must be receptive to the message; effective deterrence depends on possessing a credible warfighting capability, coupled with the will to employ it; and given the nature of nuclear weapons, political control will always prominently figure into deterrent strategies.

The paper concludes with Chapter V, which contains recommendations for policies which will allow deterrence to be practiced on a regional basis. Political decisions on security policy and military force structure are now being made in response to the changing strategic environment, and the reality of the federal budget deficit. The nature of these decisions could well determine whether or not effective operational deterrence will be an option as we confront a potentially dangerous future.

CHAPTER II

LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR

In the earliest years of the nuclear age the rules of conduct were themselves at issue. Actions became practices; practices became precedents; precedents took on the appearance of tacit agreements. . . .¹

Because of the absence of evidence on bilateral nuclear war, or of proof of the success of nuclear deterrence, speculative theory reigns supreme in debates over nuclear strategy.²

When contemplating the use of past experience to devise strategies for dealing with future threats, one must always proceed with caution. This is no less true when considering the applicability of strategic deterrence theory--devised during the Cold War--to the question of operational deterrence. That being said, history can provide valuable insights into current situations, so long as careful consideration is made of significant differences in conditions.

The quotations given above point out two such considerations. First, the nuclear relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union matured over time. Thus, the final state of bilateral superpower deterrence will not likely be an accurate model for understanding emerging regional nuclear threats. Second, a universally accepted theory of deterrence does not exist--one can find well reasoned arguments attacking or defending virtually all aspects of deterrent thinking (since the arguments differ in

their inherently unprovable underlaying assumptions, their ultimate resolution is not possible).

At this point, one might feel pessimistic about the worth of examining strategic nuclear deterrence theory in conjunction with the problem at hand--operational deterrence. Do not despair. From a practical standpoint, the "old" theory will continue to strongly influence policy makers, since a *strategic* threat still exists, and most academic study of nuclear deterrence remains focused on this issue. The relationship of strategic theory to operational theory must be understood, so that decisions on strategic nuclear strategy do not unintentionally degrade our capability to implement deterrence in a regional setting.

When evaluating deterrence during the Cold War, it is useful to consider two distinct situations: the superiority the United States initially possessed; and the parity that obtained thereafter. The intent is not to present a detailed discourse on nuclear strategy, but rather to concentrate on lessons relevant to operational deterrence.

Nuclear Superiority. The United States will enjoy overall nuclear superiority when confronting regional nuclear adversaries. The territory of the United States will virtually invulnerable to attack, while that of the enemy technically could be devastated at our leisure. At first glance, this appears to be the situation that prevailed during

the early years of the Soviet-American rivalry. However, closer examination reveals that the correspondence is far from perfect.

Through the late 1960s, the United States had nuclear superiority over the Soviets in terms of offensive power. However, it must be noted that the United States never enjoyed the combination of territorial invulnerability and massive offensive strength which defines our superiority over regional adversaries. Before the Soviets developed the means to threaten the territory of the United States, our arsenal was too small to annihilate the Soviet Union.³ Thus, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, nuclear weapons were seen to be useful for strategic bombing, but not decisive in and of themselves. By the time our arsenal was powerful enough to pose a threat of devastation, the Soviets had acquired weapons and the means to deliver them; the United States was no longer free from attack. Public and governmental concern over the bomber gap (1955-56) and the missile gap (1958-61), stands in testimony to the sense of vulnerability felt by a nation which maintained numerical superiority of nuclear weapons.⁴

Did deterrence work during the era of American superiority? Here it is important to note that two levels of deterrence were at work. One, deterrence of *nuclear* war, seems to have been effective. The resolution of the Cuban missile crisis can be offered as an example of successful nuclear deterrence. Although the Soviets had a nuclear

capability, it did not save them from diplomatic defeat when faced with American superiority. A second concept, *extended deterrence* (prevention of *conventional* war by the threat of nuclear retaliation), appears to have worked in some cases, e.g., preventing the Soviets from overrunning Berlin in 1948-50, and persuading the Red Chinese (a non-nuclear enemy) from taking Quemoy and Matsu (1954-55, 1958).⁵ On the other hand both the Korean and Vietnam Wars were not prevented. The effectiveness of extended deterrence is directly related to the geopolitical context of the crisis. Plainly put, the stakes must be high enough that the enemy understands we will use nuclear weapons to attain our goals. During the Cold War when containment of Russian and Chinese communism was the focus of American security policy, this may have been the case. It is doubtful that regional conflicts in the future will be of such vital interest to the United States that the threatened use of nuclear weapons would be credible to deter strictly conventional threats.

Parity. By the late 1960s, it became apparent to American policy makers that, regardless of a numerical lead in nuclear forces held over the Soviets, the returns from maintaining superiority were diminishing.⁶ Parity was accepted as a means to increase stability, and control the spiralling costs of the arms race. Stability under parity is based upon mutual assured destruction (MAD). Both parties

must remain vulnerable to devastating nuclear attack. Consequently, arms control agreements must be structured to preserve MAD, and ballistic missile defenses must be strictly limited so that each side remains vulnerable to the other.⁷

The parity regime is not a model for our nuclear relationship with regional opponents--we clearly will enjoy virtually absolute superiority. The importance in understanding it resides in how actions to maintain parity with Russia, e.g., arms reductions and continued strict adherence to the ABM Treaty, will complement (or detract) from our capability to exercise effective operational deterrence. For example, arms control agreements limiting theater nuclear weapons could degrade our capacity to generate a credible nuclear threat during a regional crisis. Our flexibility in dealing with regional crises would also be limited by failure to go ahead with global defense against limited strikes (GPALS), a program whose detractors claim violates the ABM Treaty. The point here is that there is a linkage between strategic and operational deterrence--policy decisions concerning one will impact the other.

Implications. Some conclusions to be drawn from this review of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War include:

1. The degree of nuclear superiority which the United States will enjoy when confronting regional threats will be much greater than that ever experienced with the Soviets. In a very real sense, we will be breaking new ground when devising strategies for operational deterrence.

2. Since our regional enemies lack the capability to launch attacks on the United States itself, we should enjoy flexibility in choosing deterrent postures.

3. Operational deterrence will center on preventing the use of nuclear weapons (and perhaps other weapons of mass destruction). The geopolitical factors that led to strategies of extended deterrence will probably be absent during most regional crises (the Korean problem might be an exception to this rule).

4. The consequences of the failure of operational deterrence are not the assured destruction that characterized the parity regime established with the Soviet Union. Thus, planning of retaliatory measures must consider both immediate and long-term effects on our security situation. This theme is expanded upon in chapter IV.

5. Although some "relics" of the Cold War may need to be retained in recognition of the continuing strategic nuclear problem, reconsideration of such parity-producers as the ABM Treaty is in order, given the emerging regional threat.

CHAPTER III

THE THREAT

. . . any state wanting to launch an aggressive campaign may now, after witnessing what happened to Iraq in 1991, move to acquire nuclear weapons before it tries its hand at aggression.¹

Proliferation and Intentions. We live in a world where nuclear weapons continue to spread. Why do states seek nuclear weapons? One reason might be defensive in nature--to deter a regional adversary who possesses superior conventional forces or a nuclear weapons capability of its own. As an example of the former, faced with hostile Arab neighbors, Israel is thought to have an undeclared nuclear capability. On the other hand, fearing nuclear intimidation by China, India has developed weapons (and Pakistan in turn seeks nuclear weapons to deter India).²

Another reason why a nation might seek nuclear weapons is to attain "superpower" status. A more convincing corollary to this somewhat nebulous proposition is the desire to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons in the pursuit of regional objectives, i.e., gain the weapons for essentially offensive purposes. Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea would seem to fit this mold. Lest one thinks this threat is not real, contemplation of recent North Korean obstruction of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections is sobering.³

Understanding why a country initially decides to acquire weapons may be of some value in determining intentions, which as will be discussed later, is a key factor in crafting a deterrent response to a crisis. However, even if a nation's motivations can be divined, caution is warranted, since "goals and motivations are subject to change. . . so the problem of their assessment is a dynamic one."⁴

Threats to U.S. Operations. As was mentioned in the first chapter, the aim of operational deterrence is to persuade the enemy not to employ nuclear weapons to impede friendly forces responding to a regional crisis. How might an adversary use nuclear weapons to thwart American operations during a regional crisis? Generic enemy options are given below:⁵

1. threaten attack on countries hosting (or planning to host) U.S. forces to intimidate them from providing bases or other support.
2. destroy host facilities needed to support deployment of U.S. forces.
3. attack U.S. forces after deployment, but before they have moved out of their staging areas or bases.
4. attack U.S. forces on the battlefield.

The first clearly threatens alliance cohesion, the second diminishes our strategic agility, the third and fourth target forces, and all could be employed to weaken our resolve.

Thinking back to the Persian Gulf War, it seems clear that had Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons, he could have seriously complicated Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Would the Saudis have been willing to provide bases? If not, was the operation feasible at all? Attacks on U.S. forces (even with a low yield weapon) would generate significant casualties. How would the public respond?*

The national security objectives of the United States include: global and regional stability; open, democratic, and representative political systems worldwide; an open international trading and economic system; and a global perception that the United States will lead in the collective response to the world's crises.⁶ Adversaries armed with nuclear weapons could seriously compromise our ability to meet these objectives. Effective regional nuclear strategy is necessary to cope with the problem. In the next chapter I will show how operational deterrence can fit into such a strategy.

*Some might argue that in horror the American people would have demanded immediate withdrawal; I think the reaction might be just the opposite. Asymmetrical response could well have been public's demand. The President would be faced with a terrible dilemma either way.

CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONAL DETERRENCE

The immense destructive capability and grave consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, make the decision to employ them one which requires careful consideration of many factors. One key factor to consider is the political ramifications of such a decision.¹

Nuclear weapons. . . are not "just another bullet" to be used.²

As indicated from the above quotations from the initial draft of Joint Publication 3-12, *Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations*, there is an acknowledgment of the unique character of nuclear weapons, and of the need for strong political control of their employment. As might be expected, the manual is primarily concerned with fighting a nuclear war. Deterrence is discussed only in general terms. This is only natural, since to this point deterrence has been strategic in nature--fundamentally a political problem.

With changes in the strategic environment causing the United States to shift from focus on a global threat to deterring and fighting regional wars,³ military commanders must broaden their approach to conflict resolution. Indeed, the *National Military Strategy of the United States* tasks regional CINCs through a process of "adaptive planning" to develop preplanned options for decisionmakers which incorporate all instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, as well as military).⁴ This mandate,

coupled with the emergence of regional nuclear threats, will require regional CINCs to enter the nuclear deterrence arena.

Regional Nuclear Strategy. Before examining operational deterrence in detail, it is worthwhile to note that deterrence is only part of the overall response to nuclear weapons within a region. In addition to deterrence, a comprehensive regional nuclear strategy should consider *prevention*, *preemption*, and *warfighting*.

Prevention of the proliferation of weapons into the region is the most desirable option--deterrence then becomes moot. Diplomatic moves to support the NPT, and other actions (e.g., security guarantees) which alleviate the legitimate security concerns of the nations in the region may well persuade those with primarily defensive motives for acquiring nuclear weapons not to do so. Prevention is not likely to work for states with aggressive intentions (though support of technology control arrangements like the MTCR may retard proliferation).

Preemption refers to active measures taken to destroy weapon production facilities of an adversary in the process of developing weapon technology. The Israeli attack on Iraq's Osirak facility is one example of such an action. Another is Operation Desert Storm.⁵ Preemptive strikes may well have desirable immediate consequences, but unless the opponent's

rationale for acquiring weapons changes, the long-term proliferation threat will remain.

If prevention and preemption are not feasible, and deterrence fails, then the United States must be prepared to fight on a nuclear battlefield. I explicitly mention this for two reasons related to the connection between deterrence and warfighting. First, effective deterrence requires a *credible* warfighting capability. Thus, a prudent nuclear strategy will not include deterrence if warfighting capability is lacking. Second, sometimes deterrence may not even be an option--some adversaries may be "irrational."* If this is judged to be the case, then immediate attack, perhaps with nuclear weapons, might be our only option, short of yielding to our opponent. Note that this does not devalue the general concept of deterrence, it only renders it irrelevant in this particular situation.

Characteristics of an Effective Deterrent. The purpose of nuclear deterrence is to convince an enemy not to use nuclear weapons by the threat of severe retaliation. In any

*Reference to "illogical" or "irrational" enemy decisionmakers often arise in discussions of the utility of deterrence against such opponents as the North Koreans, Libyans, or Iraqis. Perhaps this is true. However, we should guard against declaring an opponent irrational simply because we do not understand his culture, or cannot accept his apparent cold-blooded pragmatism. Glen Doten's paper is an interesting treatment of Islamic jihad in this context.⁶ The point is that deterrence may be made to work even against the irrational actor (albeit with considerable risk), if we can threaten destruction of something that he truly values.

situation the effectiveness of deterrence will depend on three interrelated factors: possessing the physical means to threaten the enemy with unacceptable destruction; having the political will to retaliate; and having a strong political commitment to the regional issue at stake.⁷

Since the United States has an enormous nuclear arsenal relative to a regional opponent, the first factor might seem to be trivial. But the possession of the means to retaliate will be insufficient to deter, unless the adversary plainly sees that he is a target. The existence of weapons is not enough, their deployment and posture must send an unambiguous signal of national will and commitment.

Political will and commitment are perhaps the most important parts of a deterrent strategy. Simply put, if the enemy perceives that we will not follow through with retaliatory threats, or that the regional interests at stake are not vital to us, then he will not be deterred from taking action. In the end, it must be remembered that deterrence is a condition imposed upon the minds of the enemy leadership. It is not enough that we know that we have will, commitment, and capability--the enemy must know, too. After all, "candidate deterrees have to choose to be deterred."⁸

What deters? An analysis of this question is extremely valuable for devising a deterrent strategy, as well as for indicating *whether* deterrence is a viable option at all. Its

answer will depend upon the enemy--a product of his fear and of his fervor. It becomes a question of determining what an enemy values to the extent that the threat of its destruction will persuade him not to escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. This must be balanced against the strength of the enemy's commitment to the regional issue at hand, e.g., if the opponent feels that he is on Sun Tzu's "death ground," deterrence may be impossible to achieve.⁹ Good intelligence is the key to making this assessment, but determining enemy intentions and understanding his value system can be extremely difficult to accomplish. Thus, estimation of the minimum level of threat necessary to deter the enemy is difficult. As a hedge against this uncertainty, one might argue for threatening extremely vigorous retaliation. But what is the purpose of retaliation?

Here our thinking can become clouded by notions conceived during the Cold War, when the threat posed by strategic nuclear exchange was absolute--the assured destruction of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The situation is now much different. The use of nuclear weapons by a regional adversary will not be "the end of the world." There will be a future. Thus, retaliation associated with the failure of operational deterrence must be calibrated to achieve several effects. First, retaliation can persuade the enemy to cease using nuclear weapons during the current conflict. Second, moderation, esp., the limitation of collateral damage, can

have a positive impact on foreign and domestic public opinion. Third, retaliation can have a deterrent effect on future nuclear-capable adversaries. Finally, our retaliation should be connected to the campaign plan--supporting operations while not overly complicating war termination.

What the foregoing discussion indicates is that selection of the appropriate level of threatened retaliation is a complicated matter. The significance of the threat we hold over the enemy depends upon his evaluation of that threat--something we cannot know with certainty. Thus, the idea of a precise deterrent threshold must remain a theoretical construct. The practical problem is to select a retaliatory scheme severe enough to coerce, but at the same time one which can be executed with generally positive long-term effects.*

Deterrent Strategies. Putting operational deterrence into practice is obviously dependent on the situation. Below are some general considerations for developing flexible deterrent options for regional contingencies involving nuclear-armed opponents. Remember that the intent is to convince the enemy that he should not use nuclear weapons,

*This analysis does not rule out the selection of threat of retaliation by conventional weapons to deter a nuclear adversary. I would argue, though, that the psychological impact of the threat of nuclear retaliation is so much greater than that of a conventional response, that as a practical matter, nuclear weapons will generally be the choice for deterrent strategies. Human history is punctuated by the failure of conventional deterrence.

because we have the means, will, and commitment to severely punish him for it.

Physical means to execute operational deterrence include deployment of theater ballistic missile defenses (TMD), introduction of theater nuclear weapons into the region, and retargeting of strategic nuclear weapons. While TMD do not possess an intrinsic retaliatory capability, they may produce a deterrent effect by reducing the expected effectiveness of an enemy attack--the enemy may judge that the benefits gained by a nuclear strike no longer outweigh the costs. Deployment of TMD could also counteract the adverse influence of nuclear blackmail upon our friends in the region. Retaliatory capability could be demonstrated by deploying nuclear-armed attack submarines and surface vessels, or by declaring that we had retargeted ICBMs. However, the existence of military means to retaliate cannot by themselves deter the enemy. He must perceive that we have the will and commitment necessary to retaliate.

Will could be evidenced in several ways. The deployment of the military means is one way--essentially a show of force. Another, albeit more dangerous and politically costly, option is a demonstration. This could take the form of a limited preemptive strike, nuclear or conventional. In general, proof of will is shown by concerted political, diplomatic, and military initiatives. But our efforts will utterly fail

unless the enemy leadership both receives and understands the message.

Of means, will, and commitment, the hardest to signal to the enemy is the last. A sense of commitment is not produced by simply making a declaration, rather it is something which develops over time. A history of engagement within the region is helpful. Forward presence operations lend a great deal of support to showing commitment. However, if we haven't demonstrated it before the crisis, then deterrence will be extremely difficult to put into practice.

Execution of operational deterrence will be a challenging matter. Its effectiveness will depend upon communicating our resolve to the enemy. A danger always exists that he may misinterpret deterrent measures as preparations for attack. Or he may calculate that the benefit of striking is worth the risk of retaliation. If deterrence fails, our retaliatory options must punish, yet at the same time contribute to long-term stability both in the region and beyond. The regional CINC will play a major role in planning and executing operational deterrence, but given the world-wide implications of its possible failure, he can expect a great deal of centralized control by the National Command Authority.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

There may be little more to say than nuclear proliferation will produce new methods of nuclear deterrence around the world. . . Sad to say, nuclear deterrence does have a future.¹

The purpose of this paper was to examine the viability of nuclear deterrence employed in the resolution of regional conflicts. *Operational* deterrence is indeed a valid concept, but is significantly different from strategic nuclear deterrence which originated during the Cold War. The primary reasons for this difference are: the relative nuclear invulnerability of the United States compared to regional adversaries; and the fact that the failure of operational deterrence would not be cataclysmic on a global scale. These factors provide additional flexibility in devising deterrent options, but also require consideration of the long-term impacts of retaliatory options, both in the region and beyond.

The intent of operational deterrence is to persuade an opponent not to employ nuclear weapons during a regional crisis. To be effective, it requires that we possess the means, will, and commitment to severely retaliate should the enemy opt to use nuclear weapons. But deterrence will fail if we do not communicate our resolve to the enemy, or if he misunderstands us. Thus, the execution of operational deterrence will be extremely challenging.

The global security environment is undergoing radical transformation. The strategic nuclear threat is diminishing. However, we must be sure that policy decisions on arms control and ballistic missile defense be evaluated not only for their strategic consequences, but also for how they impact our capability to practice operational deterrence.

Another consideration when developing strategies of operational deterrence is the need to consider how actions taken in a region are perceived by Russia. There is a danger that signals intended for a regional foe may be misinterpreted by the Russians as threatening, thus jeopardizing strategic deterrence. This argues for careful communications with the Russians during regional nuclear crises. It perhaps goes without saying that confidence building accomplished during peacetime will likely serve us well during a crisis.

Although this paper concentrated on *nuclear* deterrence, its analysis can be extended to the more general problem of deterring attack by any weapon of mass destruction, including chemical or biological weapons. The threat of nuclear retaliation may well deter a regional adversary from employing these weapons. The governing factor will be a consideration of the long-term consequences of nuclear retaliation on both domestic and global opinion. A nuclear response may be judged as too severe. This entire subject merits further study. It is hoped that this paper contributes to a better understanding of this difficult, yet crucial, problem.

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Document 2

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EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE AND CONFLICT DETERRENCE

by

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
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


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The world has changed since the demise of the former Soviet Union. Although threats to the U.S. homeland have lessened, global security issues are becoming increasingly challenging and complex in the emerging multipolar world. The President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) reflects that concern: "The unitary threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges, and our nation's strategy for defining and addressing those challenges is still evolving."

Deterring or preventing conflict is clearly one of the strategic objectives of the NSS. Additionally, the new national security strategy is more selective and regionally focused than its predecessor in its attempt to address the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment.

As strategic vision and budget reduction measures evolve, Expeditionary Warfare has emerged as a topical form of warfare. Several initiatives attempt to address how Expeditionary Warfare supports evolving national security objectives. As an example, The Chief of Naval Operations established OPNAV 85 as Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the Navy Staff. Several conferences and symposia related to Expeditionary Warfare have been conducted within the past two years that have looked at various facets of Expeditionary Warfare.

The aim of this project was to explore how Expeditionary Warfare specifically related to conflict deterrence. Methodology required the following considerations: first, certain assumptions were made about the ramifications of the new security environment; second, to provide a starting point and facilitate research focus, it was necessary to develop definitions of both conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare; third, developing a chart that reflected the exploitation of force (depicted in Figure 1) provided a visual representation of the contextual scope of the area of concern adding further precision to the research effort; and finally, conclusions were based on an examination of concepts and relationships that do not lend themselves well to empirical research. It was determined that there is a connection between Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence and that the connection depends upon the extent that Expeditionary Warfare could be made relevant to influence events ashore.

Three principal conclusions have emerged as a result of the project's research. The following conclusions are supported by findings that emerged during exploration of the relationship between conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare, and as such, reflect a syntheses of the two subjects:

- Effective deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment that will most likely incur political cost.

- Deterrence rules to prevent interstate conflict may not be directly relevant to prevent intrastate conflict.
- Forward military presence does not necessarily deter.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APA	- Army Prepositioned Afloat
CINC	- Commander in Chief
C + 15	- The day a contingency was declared plus 15 days
D + 10	- The day an assault began plus 10 days
JFC	- Joint Force Commander
MEU/SOC	- Marine Expeditionary Unit/Special Operations Capable
MPF	- Maritime Prepositioning Force
MPS	- Maritime Prepositioning Ship
MRC	- Major Regional Contingency
OOTW	- Operations Other Than War
RMA	- Revolution in Military Affairs
XW	- Expeditionary Warfare

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Challenge

Challenges to our national interests did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Today we face a world in which threats are both widespread and uncertain, and where conflict is probable but often unpredictable.¹

Taken from a draft copy of the 1994 National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS), the statement above reflects how the world has changed since the demise of the former Soviet Union. Although threats to the U.S. homeland have lessened, global security issues are becoming increasingly challenging and complex in the emerging multipolar world. The President's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (NSS) reflects that concern: "The unitary threat that dominated our engagement during the Cold War has been replaced by a complex set of challenges, and our nation's strategy for defining and addressing those challenges is still evolving."²

Detering or preventing conflict is clearly one of the strategic objectives of the NSS.³ Additionally, the new national security strategy is more selective and regionally focused⁴ than its predecessor in its attempt to address the

challenges of the post-Cold War security environment.

As strategic vision and budget reduction measures evolve, Expeditionary Warfare has emerged as a topical form of warfare. Several initiatives attempt to address how Expeditionary Warfare supports evolving national security objectives. As an example, the Chief of Naval Operations established OPNAV 85 as Director of Expeditionary Warfare on the Navy Staff. Several conferences and symposia related to Expeditionary Warfare have been conducted within the past two years that have looked at various facets of Expeditionary Warfare.

The aim of this project was to explore how Expeditionary Warfare specifically related to conflict deterrence. Methodology required the following considerations: first, certain assumptions were made about the ramifications of the new security environment; second, to provide a starting point and facilitate research focus, it was necessary to develop definitions of both conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare; third, developing a chart that reflected the exploitation of force (depicted in Figure 1) provided a visual representation of the contextual scope of the area of concern adding further precision to the research effort; and finally, conclusions were based on an examination of concepts and relationships that do not lend themselves well to empirical research. It was determined that there is a

connection between Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence and that the connection depends upon the extent that Expeditionary Warfare could be made relevant to influence events ashore.

Assumptions

The following major assumptions frame the context of this paper:

- The United States is concerned with promoting democracy, is supportive of peaceful, nonviolent change, and is generally opposed to violence as a means of changing the status quo.

- The United States will deliberate carefully before becoming involved in situations that are not considered in its national interest.

- Regional diversity is relevant to how the threat of military force is applied in conflict deterrence situations.

- The United States will continue to extend deterrence to other nations.

- The United States will be deterred from using its full military capability against an opponent.⁵

- The United States prefers multilateral solutions to international problems.

Definitions

Conflict is considered in this paper to be a hostile confrontation in which the parties concerned resort to violence to resolve differences or change the status quo. In some literature, a distinction is made between the terms conflict and crisis. For example, Snyder and Diesing consider a crisis to consist of two elements--deep conflict between the parties, and the initiation of conflict behavior--and describe crises as lying at the "nexus of peace and war."⁶ In this context, therefore, deterring conflict relates more to the initiation of armed conflict than to non-violent conflict.

Deterrence is defined here to mean the way in which an opponent is dissuaded from pursuing a particular course of action because the perceived benefits do not justify the costs. This definition is adapted from an extensive review of deterrence theory which enjoys broad consensus on the key elements of *prevention, dissuasion, perception* and *cost-risk assessment*.⁷

Thus, in combining the concepts of conflict and deterrence, this paper defines *conflict deterrence* as:

the process by which one party attempts to dissuade another party from resorting to armed conflict through the threatened application of force.

The next chapter will elaborate on this definition of conflict deterrence.

Several organizations have attempted to define Expeditionary Warfare, and so far there is no consensus on a universal definition. Some consider that meaningful discussions of Expeditionary Warfare require an exact definition to permit its further evaluation. Others believe the definition should be based on context and application, while still others support positions somewhere between these two. Even within various organizations, there is little agreement on what Expeditionary Warfare is, or even why such a definition would be relevant. It is safe to assume that Expeditionary Warfare, although understood as a general idea, will probably continue to elude a consensual definition for the foreseeable future.

Establishing an acceptable definition of Expeditionary Warfare is not the aim of this paper; instead, the relationship--and relevance--of Expeditionary Warfare to conflict deterrence is explored. Accordingly, the following definition is used:

Expeditionary Warfare is the application of military force (or threatened application of military force) outside the United States short of a Major Regional Contingency (MRC). It can be characterized as flexible, adaptable, limited in objectives, sustainable, and tailored for specific regional requirements. It also entails committing forces on another country's territory, under U.S. command, to

control or influence events.⁸

Chapter III provides a detailed analysis of this project definition.

Exploitation of Force

The chart that follows was developed to organize research and put emerging issues into context. It addresses the exploitation of military force--here divided into the threatened application of force, and the application of force.

FIGURE 1

EXPLOITATION OF FORCE

	THREATENED APPLICATION OF FORCE		APPLICATION OF FORCE	
	REGIONAL STABILITY	REGIONAL INSTABILITY	ARMED INTERVENTION	WAR
<u>OBJECTIVE</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PROMOTE STABILITY NON-VIOLENT CHANGE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CONTAIN AGGRESSION REDUCE TENSION RESOLVE CRISIS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> RESTORE STATUS QUO RETALIATE/PUNISH 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> END CONFLICT ON FAVORABLE TERMS
<u>STRATEGY</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT NON-COMBAT ACTIVITY ENVIRONMENT SHAPING OVERSEAS PRESENCE REASSURANCE DETERRENCE (GENERAL) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CONFLICT PREVENTION DETERRENCE (SPECIFIC) COMPELLANCE PEACE KEEPING? CREDIBLE COMMITMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> COERCION COMPELLANCE PUNITIVE SANCTIONS PEACE ENFORCEMENT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FIGHT TO WIN
<u>MEANS</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FWD DEPLOYED/STATIONED FORCES XW CAPABLE JOINT/COMBINED MIL-MIL CONTACT 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FWD DEPLOYED/STATIONED FORCES XW CAPABLE JOINT/COMBINED 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> EXPEDITIONARY JOINT/COMBINED TAILORED FORCE 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> REINFORCED JOINT/COMBINED

The chart comprises essential elements taken from the 1994 NSS and the draft NMS of the United States.

The draft NMS discusses three strategies: *peacetime engagement, conflict prevention and fighting to win wars*, to accomplish the strategic objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression.⁹ Preliminary research suggested a difference between preventing conflict through applied force (intervention), and preventing conflict through the *threatened application of force (deterrence)*. Understanding the difference between use and "non-use" of force is fundamental to exploring the relationship between military force and conflict deterrence.

Strategic objectives reflected in the chart were synthesized from the NSS and the draft NMS with the exception of those that appear in the intervention column in Figure 1, which were conceived separately.

The transition from "Forward Deployed/Stationed Forces" to "Expeditionary" in the "Regional Instability" and "Armed Intervention" columns acknowledges the contrast between the general nature of forward deployment with the objective-oriented forces that would be committed to deal with specific contingencies. "Expeditionary Capable" becomes "Expeditionary" upon the receipt of explicit objectives.

"Compellance" appears in both the "Regional Instability" and the "Armed Intervention" columns due to its nature. The

relationship between compellance and deterrence will be amplified in Chapter II.

Expeditionary Warfare can be applied to a wide range of roles and missions and expeditionary forces could operate in contingencies across the spectrum depicted in the table. However, for the purpose of visually representing the area of project focus, the "Regional Instability" column is the area of concentration.

Research topics

Initial research revealed that both conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare have been the subjects of exhaustive examination, however, relating them specifically to each other is something that has not been significantly undertaken. In attempting to do so, the following topics emerged as especially relevant and warranted further development to focus research:

- There is a relationship between military force and conflict deterrence.
- To be effective, deterrence needs to be relevant to situations that are *sui generis*.
- Given the nature of conflict, deterrence must therefore be applicable across the entire spectrum.
- As a means of applying the threat of military force, Expeditionary Warfare is relevant to certain types of

conflict and not others.

Since conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare have been subjected to thorough academic evaluation and research, simply synthesizing what is already known would serve no useful purpose. However, examining the relationship between them and the relevance of Expeditionary Warfare to deterring conflict *is* useful, especially in light of the recent security strategy espoused by the current Administration. Accordingly, Chapters II and III will provide overviews of conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare, respectively. Chapter IV will then present conclusions regarding the relationship between the two.

CHAPTER II

CONFLICT AND DETERRENCE

An Evolving Security Environment

For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.¹⁰

Deterring or preventing conflict is one theme woven into the fabric of the U.S. national security strategy of enlargement and engagement.¹¹ This new national security strategy is selective and regionally focused¹² and clearly attempts to address the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. Containment appears to have been replaced by what President Clinton calls "preventive diplomacy."¹³

A major assumption of this paper is that the United States is concerned with promoting democracy, is supportive of peaceful, nonviolent change, and is opposed to violence as a means of changing the status quo. It also assumes that the United States will be selective rather than "reflexive"¹⁴ in how it deters conflict for reasons of national interest.

The years ahead will not be free of conflict. In *The Fighting Never Stopped*, Brogan identifies at least eighty wars that have occurred since 1945 and concludes that conflict is an immutable condition of world affairs.¹⁵

Additionally, this period also marked unprecedented U.S. military involvement. Blechman and Kaplan identified 215 incidents between 1946-1975 involving the use of U.S. military force;¹⁶ Zelikow similarly identified seventy-one incidents between 1975 and 1984,¹⁷ while Siegel identified 207 incidents involving the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps between 1946-1990.¹⁸ The use of military force has demonstrably been a vital component of American foreign policy in the past: it will continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

The end of the Cold War presented the United States with two new realities: first, the United States is no longer constrained by a strategy of ideological containment--it can afford not to become involved globally without fear of yielding ground; and second, as a result of the devolution of the former Soviet Union's power, the United States can intervene without provoking a superpower confrontation.¹⁹

Notwithstanding the "CNN-effect"²⁰ that has arguably contributed to the increasing democratization of U.S. foreign policy,²¹ the American public evidently does not want the United States to become involved in protracted, expensive quagmires. It would be difficult in today's environment to imagine a U.S. president invoking John F. Kennedy's vision of an America willing to "pay any price, bear any burden" to support and defend liberty. In fact, President Clinton's

Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) reinforces a U.S. predilection for exercising caution and selectiveness in peace support operations.²²

Conflict deterrence as a means of averting military intervention makes good sense. Interventions (here considered to be the application of force to alter the status quo)²³ usually incur costs that may be measured in terms of lives, scarce defense dollars, and increased political obligations. Combined with the continuing U.S. military draw down, additional costs may be incurred in the form of increased burdens on military personnel and equipment trying to respond to global "9-1-1" tasking.

From the perspective of avoiding cost, intervention may be considered when other avenues to resolve crises have been exhausted. If crises are allowed to escalate into conflict--following Schelling's observation that "the probability of war rises with a crisis"²⁴--the international community may have to bear the cost of conflict resolution. Conflicts tend to be difficult to terminate once started. Similarly, getting participants in a conflict to disengage is difficult and may require physical intervention by third parties. Conflicts may escalate and spread, dragging in outside nations. They can create massive outflows of refugees seeking shelter in bordering states and generate internal problems there. In short, therefore, intervention may be

required to contain conflict from threatening international security. As Ambassador Albright stated, "we live in a world not without conflict, but strive for a world where conflict is contained."²⁵

How then is the United States to carry out "preventive diplomacy," and how can it try to control or shape events to prevent certain kinds of conflict from occurring? In its most basic form, diplomacy has elements of both carrot and stick, of reassurance and coercion.²⁶ If used properly, reassurance and coercion can be effective in achieving a satisfactory end state.

Coercive diplomacy has two "levers": one is *deterrence*, and the other *compellance*. Deterrence and compellance may be differentiated in terms of how force is either threatened or applied. Schelling provides insight on the difference: "a useful distinction can be made between the *application* of force and the *threat* of force. Deterrence is concerned with the exploitation of potential force."²⁷ Thus *applied* military force is not considered deterrence but rather a form of compellance. Where deterrence seeks to convince an adversary that he is better off by not pursuing a particular course of action,²⁸ compellance requires the targeted party to act in ways that are "usually highly visible."²⁹ It is said that the difference between deterrence and compellance is slight, and that the two are theoretically "often just two

sides of the same coin."³⁰ As this paper is concerned with exploring the relationship between the threatened application of force and deterring conflict, *this distinction is important, however.*

Some deterrence theorists argue that the only effective threat is one underwritten by the threatened application of military force. In Mearsheimer's opinion "a potential attacker's fear of the consequences of military action lies at the heart of deterrence."³¹ In its most abstract form, however, deterrence theory does not specify that threats must be underwritten by military force, merely that whatever underwrites the threat is credible to the deterree.³² Additionally, the deterree should be able to distinguish the threat from other "noise" that sometimes accompanies confrontations.³³

Rethinking Deterrence

The intent of this chapter is not to provide a summary of the evolution of deterrence theory. Instead, it will examine what the end of the Cold War signifies for U.S. deterrence objectives, and explore what options might be applicable to deter conflict. While the evolution of deterrence theory--and strategic nuclear deterrence in particular--is interesting, the focus of this paper is to provide a fresh approach to a new security environment.³⁴

As discussed earlier, the international security environment has experienced a fundamental shift that also requires rethinking how the United States plans to carry out its national security strategy. The deterrence concepts that appear to have deterred the Soviet Union for forty years need to be overhauled.

In "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?," Allan lists three ramifications that the new security environment has for deterrence: first, that the end of the Cold War has caused a de-emphasis in the central role that nuclear deterrence once played; second, that U.S. deterrence strategy can no longer focus on a single opponent but must now consider a number of regional powers; and third, that the concept of extended deterrence will continue to be important in protecting U.S. interests far from the United States.³⁵

Rethinking the U.S. deterrence issue was the topic of a high-level Pentagon workshop held in July 1994 which concluded that "U.S. deterrence thinking needs to be updated and broadened, to take account of the unique features of diverse and complex regional planning environments. . . ." ³⁶ A revised deterrence concept that stresses the threatened use of conventional force to deter aggression is a topic that deterrence theorists have now turned to. This does not imply that strategic nuclear deterrence is no longer relevant,³⁷

nor does it imply that the ideas of nuclear and conventional deterrence are mutually exclusive, but that conventional deterrence may be more important in addressing the post-Cold War security environment.³⁸

Key Deterrence Components

A broad review of conventional deterrence theory was conducted to establish a set of key deterrence concepts that are applied in an exploration of the relationship between Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence. Research revealed a consensus on the following key components that constitute deterrence.³⁹

The first deterrence component, *credibility*, is considered the probability that a particular threat will be carried out, and is perceived by the targeted party to be a reliable threat. This involves perception that the deterrer has both capability and resolve to back up his threat.⁴⁰ An example of how a lack of credibility can lead to deterrence failure is the 1982 Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. In its post-invasion analysis, the *Falkland Islands Review* determined that whatever signal the military commitment--represented by the armed research vessel H.M.S. *Endurance* and a forty-two man contingent of Royal Marines garrisoned ashore--was supposed to send, other non-military signals convinced Argentina that the British commitment to

the defense of the Islands was not credible. These non-military signals included the British government's failure to expand the island's runway (a requirement to accommodate long haul civilian aircraft flying from countries other than Argentina)⁴¹ and the failure of the British Nationality Act to extend British citizenship to Falkland Islanders.⁴² Inconsistent signals can negate a commitment's credibility and it is important to recognize that deterrence does not necessarily operate in a purely military vacuum, but must be integral to economic, diplomatic, and political objectives.⁴³

An additional consideration is that a threat must be relevant to the deterree to be credible. This may mean that the deterrer will have to know the value structure that he is operating against--knowing what Snyder and Diesing define as "the net value each party places on each outcome, including war"⁴⁴--and be able to threaten force within this context. As an illustration, Cable, in *Gunboat Diplomacy*, discusses the issue of relevance concerning naval force:

. . . Limited naval force is only applicable in particular and rather unusual circumstances. It is not an all-purpose tool, but a screwdriver and, as such, can be a miserable failure in hammering home a nail. The same is true of most diplomatic expedients, each of which is suited to some situations and useless in others.⁴⁵

Value structures present a twofold problem in deterrence

planning: first, the process of identifying an opponent's value structure is filtered by political, cultural and ethnic differences; and second, in trying to predict how an opponent will react to a given threat based on rational behavior models, the deterrer may misunderstand his opponent's decision-making process. Deterrence theory, as Lebow and Stein state, does not predict that actors will be rational, but specifies conditions under which "rational" actors will consciously not attack.⁴⁶ An actor may be considered "irrational" if he does not adhere to his value hierarchy when presented the option to do so. In a multipolar world with different value structures, knowledge of regional actors is important; "what constitutes a credible threat and (conversely) unacceptable damage may differ from theater to theater, and contingency to contingency."⁴⁷

The second deterrence component deals with the deterrer's *capability*, which relates to the deterrer's means to carry out a threat. This is partly a function of weapon capability (such as the accuracy of U.S. cruise missiles) and partly of operational reach (the ability to project sustained power, for example). As it relates to conventional deterrence, however, this component has experienced a significant paradigm shift caused by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that has opened up the potential for non-nuclear options in deterrence planning.⁴⁸ RMA has

enhanced conventional weapon lethality, accuracy, and ability to target an aggressor's value structure, while reducing the potential for friendly force casualties, enemy collateral damage and concomitant political costs. The importance of RMA to deterrence is therefore that it enhances both the capability of the military deterrent and its credibility. In making a conventional force (such as Expeditionary Warfare) more usable by reducing some of the intervention costs discussed earlier (for example, military and civilian casualties), RMA may influence how potential aggressors perceive U.S. will to resort to force. Thus, if one accepts the premise that conventional force has become more punishing and more usable, the use of conventional force as a deterrent becomes more credible.⁴⁹

The third component, *communication*, provides the articulation of a credible and capable threat to the potential aggressor.⁵⁰ The defender has to be able to communicate his force's capability, his resolve in using it, and what he wants the potential aggressor *not* to do. For example, a naval expeditionary force steaming at the twelve mile limit needs to have its presence communicated if it is to affect an aggressor's calculus. Not only should the deterrent threat be visible, or seen to exist, but it also should be communicated in such a way that the signal will be received as the deterrer intended. If the defender intends

to signal his commitment with a token military force, he should understand that unless his token force incurs political cost, it may contribute little to an effective deterrence. A potential aggressor's calculus of the situation may therefore involve his estimation of the defender's willingness to incur political costs as a yardstick against which he can measure his opponent's resolve, rather than the symbolism that the force presents. If this is true, then the actual deterrent signal received by potential aggressors sent by forward deploying forces may well be different from that originally intended by the deterrer.

In addition to the key deterrence components discussed above, it is useful to look at some related concepts that will be revisited in the final chapter of this paper. Counterforce and countervalue are two useful concepts that help to define the context in which the threat of force is applied. Counterforce embraces all measures which degrade an enemy's military capabilities. Countervalue, on the other hand, connotes operations to destroy or degrade selected civilian population centers, industries and other components that make up the fabric of the enemy society. Countervalue deterrence was particularly applicable during the Cold War for its relevance to the destructive potential of nuclear weapons.⁵¹

Denial and *punishment* are terms that are often associated with counterforce and countervalue. Denial of a potential aggressor's objectives can be applied to concrete or abstract situations. A defender can seek to deter an aggressor from seizing territory, or he can deny objectives in a more abstract way. For example, a state can attempt to deter terrorism by refusing to accede to objectives that terrorists want--a case in point is the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and subsequent conviction of the terrorists involved, with the intended signal that future terrorist acts would be denied their objective. Deterrence by denial seeks to convince an aggressor that his attack will fail and be fruitless. Deterrence by punishment on the other hand, seeks to deter through the threat of pain, suffering or attack on the aggressor's value structure. For example, in response to an aggressor's threat to seize an objective, the defender might declare that he will retaliate by destroying something of value to the aggressor, and not necessarily related to the aggressor's military force. In looking at the concepts of counterforce, countervalue, denial, and punishment, it is important to understand that deterrence should not necessarily be exclusively counterforce, or that it should attempt to deter through denial and not punishment. Quester concludes that deterrence will have to entail some suffering (or cost) to be effective.⁵² Conventional

deterrence may thus require a tailored mix of counterforce and countervalue options in order to apply the most leverage against an opponent.

Measuring deterrence effectiveness is difficult for deterrence analysts. As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of compellance is easier to measure since it usually requires the target to move or react in some visible way. To appreciate the difficulty in determining if a particular deterrent was effective, consider the following questions:

- Did the potential aggressor intend to attack?
- Did the deterrer communicate a threat to the potential aggressor, and did the deterrer act accordingly?
- Did the potential aggressor receive the threat as the deterrer intended?
- Was the resultant inaction on the potential aggressor's part caused by his calculation of the deterrent?⁵³

Under the kinds of conditions listed above, empirical deterrence analysis becomes difficult to conduct; a favorable outcome does not necessarily mean that deterrence worked. The only objective method would be to establish the actual intentions of each actor involved--and who would be open about admitting that he was successfully deterred from pursuing a course of action?

The 1961 British intervention in Kuwait to prevent Iraqi

annexation of the sheikdom provides an excellent example of the difficulty in attempting to discern intent from action. Kuwait was a British Protectorate from 1899 until 19 June 1961 and under terms of the agreement ending its status as a Protectorate, Kuwait requested British help if threatened. On 24 June 1961 the Iraqi premier, Abdul Karim Kassem, announced that Kuwait was "an integral part of Iraq" and he considered Kuwait part of the Province of Basra. Kuwait's ruler Sheik Abdullah al-Salah, asked for British protection, and the first British forces disembarked from the amphibious ship H.M.S. *Bulwark* (600 Royal marines from 47 Royal Marine Commando) on 1 July. Within days, the British forces had grown to over 5,000 troops, reinforced with heavy armor, artillery, and eight Canberra bombers to counter the perceived Iraqi threat of invasion.⁵⁴ The British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, said that the British action would "deter any aggression against Kuwait."⁵⁵

What was Iraq's real intention? On 2 July 1961, Sir Patrick Dean, in his address to the U.N. Security Council, said that there were "indications during the past few days that reinforcements, particularly tanks, [had] been moved down southward from Baghdad."⁵⁶ In the end, Iraq did not annex Kuwait and British forces were withdrawn from the territory by 11 October 1961 when they were replaced by an inter-Arab peace force.⁵⁷ Although this example illustrates

unambiguous action and intent by the defender, as well as open communication of the defender's intentions, Iraq's intentions were unknown. Dr. Adnan Pachachi, Iraqi delegate to the U.N., insisted that Iraq never had any intention of using military force against Kuwait (although he may have meant that Iraq expected Kuwait to capitulate without a fight).⁵⁸

Similarly in October 1994, when Saddam Hussein deployed his Republican Guards toward the Iraq-Kuwait border, provoking a show of force from the United States, Iraq claimed that it had no intention of invading Kuwait. Whether Saddam Hussein was deterred from doing so by the threat of American force is impossible to determine. However, as with the earlier British incident, this one ended with a favorable outcome for the defender (and protege).

Self-deterrence is another concept that has to be factored into a deterrence situation. An August 1994 report prepared for the U.S. Congress identified several factors that have contributed to U.S. self-deterrence: first, the threats to vital U.S. interests are limited; second, Americans believe that the United States should not use force unless vital interests are threatened; third, the U.S. military's insistence on having clear objectives and end state; fourth, the reluctance by the U.S. Congress to intervene; and fifth, a reduced tolerance to U.S. war

casualties.⁵⁹

Self-deterrence may also involve a situation confronting a military force in which it is unable to apply its full military capability against an opponent. For example, the United States might be self-deterred from responding to a chemical or biological attack with nuclear weapons since it cannot respond in kind to chemical or biological weapons, and might be unwilling to use nuclear weapons in a situation in which the survival of the United States was not in question.⁶⁰ Another example is the reluctance of the United States to use nuclear weapons during the Korean and Viet Nam conflicts. Additionally, because of the self-deterrence aspects of nuclear weapons use in practically all situations other than an attack on the United States itself, the issue of what constitutes an extended deterrence "umbrella" in the post-Cold War world is a relevant concern for U.S. allies.⁶¹

There is an important distinction to be made between *immediate deterrence* and *general deterrence*. Immediate deterrence, defined by Morgan as, "the relationship between opposing states where at least one side is seriously considering an attack while the other is mounting a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it," differs from general deterrence, which "relates to opponents who maintain armed forces to regulate their relationship even though neither is anywhere near mounting an attack."⁶² Additionally,

immediate deterrence tends to focus on crisis stability--unlike general deterrence that is more concerned with the sources of crises.⁶³

Immediate deterrence can therefore be viewed as situational-specific: time, location, issue and adversary are relevant.⁶⁴ Immediate deterrence is usually associated with situations of imminent conflict, in which the actors, issues, and threats are known. Contextually, this situation might be represented by the "Regional Instability" block of Figure 1, where the intended strategy is conflict prevention. The deterrer's threatened application of force in this instance should be relevant, unambiguous, and be enhanced by the key deterrence components discussed earlier--credibility, capability, and communication. Immediate deterrence might be characterized by threats to use force that directly influence a potential aggressor's calculus: in most cases this will most likely involve a credible commitment on the deterrer's part.

General deterrence on the other hand, applies to situations where actors, threats, and issues may not be known--a type of deterrence that Morgan calls "fuzzy, amorphous [in] nature."⁶⁵ Contextually, general deterrence might be applicable to the situation under the "Regional Stability" block in Figure 1. This situation is characterized by regional stability, where cooperative

diplomacy supports the strategy of peacetime engagement.

General deterrence may be characterized by military preparedness and "showing the flag"--for example, maintaining forward deployed general forces.⁶⁶ It may also be characterized by a country's military capability--such as nuclear forces, strategic bombers, or aircraft carriers. A limitation of general deterrence is that an ambiguous and unspecific signal may result when attempting to deter unknown or general threats.

Deterrence may therefore be seen to span a continuum ranging across the spectrum of situations discussed above; from general to immediate deterrence. As a situation escalates towards crisis, an effective deterrent threat also needs to adapt to become more specific, clear, and immediate.

Defining the Target

The discussion thus far has been limited to general deterrence concepts. At this point, defining the target of deterrence--who and what that the United States might consider deterring--needs to be amplified. The draft NMS envisions a strategic environment threatened by regional instability, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and transnational dangers.⁶⁷ It outlines other threats such as acts of terrorism against the United States and its citizens,

acts of aggression against U.S. allies and interests and arms proliferation. What does the draft NMS have to say about how these threats will be deterred? In fact, it says very little.

In applying deterrence theory to this question, it becomes apparent that the strategic environment outlined in the draft NMS needs to be further defined in terms of who and what the threats are. This is based on the premise that the deterrer needs to identify who and what he wants to deter to make his deterrent relevant. When the United States decides to threaten to use force, the target of the threat is an actor or actors capable of choosing between alternatives. This fundamental assumption of deterrence theory recognizes that there is a relationship between the deterrer, the nature of the threat that he wishes to express, and the deterree. This is why knowing *who* the actors are is so important in deterrence. A representative sample of some actors that the United States is concerned about includes the states of Syria, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Serbia, and Cuba.

What of non-state actors? This is where identification of individuals whom the United States might want to target becomes challenging: these individuals do not possess the same attributes that state actors do (sovereignty, territoriality, and diplomacy).⁶⁸ The Somali warlords and the leaders of the various Lebanese factions are illustrative

of the types of non-state actors that the U.S. has had to deal with--largely unsuccessfully.

Clearly, the spectrum of potential actors inherent in transnational situations probably defies establishment of a relevant deterrent strategy without resorting to a "strategic Swiss army knife--a device that is versatile but never the precisely correct tool for a given job."⁶⁹ Seeking to apply the "precisely correct tool" is important in deterrence situations that require specificity and unambiguity to be effective. A general deterrent applied to an immediate deterrence situation may result in a ends-means mismatch, with subsequent deterrent failure.

This paper posits that conflict falls into three broad categories: *interstate conflict* by which is meant conflict between nation-states, *intrastate conflict* which relates to conflict within a state, and *transnational conflict* which deals with conflict that extends beyond national boundaries--such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, arms proliferation and piracy.⁷⁰ (See Figure 2.)

In *interstate* situations, the deterrer's objectives are straightforward--to dissuade the aggressor from taking action--and are usually related to issues of sovereignty and territoriality. Knowledge of the actors involved, while imperfect, is used in the defender's calculus and applied against what is known about the aggressor's value structure.

The deterrer's play book may include deterrent options that maximize his military capability to ensure that the aggressor will incur unacceptable cost if he chooses to ignore the defender's warning.

In intrastate situations, the deterrer's task is more complex, not only because there may be many actors that require deterring, but also because each side may have different objectives and value structures--especially if the situation fractures along ethnic or religious lines. The source of conflict may be intractable and be beyond the deterrer's ability to apply a relevant deterrent option.

Transnational situations may lie outside the realm of effective military deterrence even though they may affect the fabric of the security environment. Williams and Black note that states are at a disadvantage when trying to combat transnational threats because the agencies used are fundamentally different from their opponent's that operate in a more flexible and responsive structure.⁷¹ For example, drug cartels and transnational criminal organizations continue to thrive in the international community, despite efforts to curtail both. They tend to be more flexible and adaptive than the state bureaucracies that oppose them.⁷²

FIGURE 2
CATEGORIES OF CONFLICT

Category	Example
Interstate	Iran-Iraq Iraq-Kuwait U.K.-Argentina
Intrastate	Sri Lanka Bosnia Somalia Algeria Liberia Rwanda
Transnational	Narco-trafficking Terrorism Piracy Criminal cartels Weapons proliferation

Source: Adapted from Henry H. Gaffney, *Power Projection, Peacekeeping, and the Role of the U.S. Navy in the Post-Cold War Age*, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 43.

Transnational value structures may also lie outside the scope of military deterrence because their value structures may not relate to sovereignty, territoriality, or organizational structure that a military threat can target. Relevant deterrent options against transnational actors may need to resort to targeting of the actors themselves. However, the United States tends to be self-deterred from resorting to this option: applying military force against transnational actors in the form of direct threats against them is not an acceptable option under the current "play

book".

Observations

Four principal observations can be made with regard to conflict deterrence: first, the new security environment has been transformed from a bipolar to a multipolar, regionally oriented one in which the United States faces fresh challenges. Threats to vital U.S. national interests are limited; the emergence of intrastate and transnational situations may be more widespread than interstate conflict; and the United States may be self-deterred from committing ground forces to deter any but very specific conflicts.

Second, regional conflicts do not lend themselves easily to Cold War nuclear deterrence policies for a number of reasons. Notwithstanding the effect that the Revolution in Military Affairs has had on enhancing the destructiveness of conventional warfare, conventional warfare may not provide the desired general deterrent effect that nuclear weapons offered. An appreciation of the *contextual setting* of conflict both in terms of the type of actors involved, and the type of security situation is crucial to the policy maker trying to make deterrence relevant. This contextual setting frames the ends of a strategy of conflict prevention, and focuses the means through which this can be accomplished.

Third, the limitation of determining deterrence

effectiveness through empirical analysis brings a caveat that policy makers should be wary of using deterrence alone as a guideline for when deterrence is appropriate, and when it is not.

Finally, in considering how to enhance the effectiveness of a particular deterrent, relevance is important. The more relevant--and more immediate--a deterrence is, the more effective it may become.

CHAPTER III
EXPEDITIONARY WARFARE

Introduction

Conflict deterrence was contextually developed as the threatened application of conventional force. A further definition of Expeditionary Warfare is necessary in order to explore not only the relationship between it and conflict deterrence, but to examine whether it has relevance to a potential aggressor's calculus.

As provided in Chapter I, the project definition of Expeditionary Warfare has several essential force elements. They are: outside the United States, short of an MRC, flexible, adaptable, limited in objectives, sustainable, tailored for specific regional requirements, capable of being committed on another country's soil, and under U.S. command. Elaboration on these is important in understanding what makes Expeditionary Warfare different from other forms of warfare.

"Over There"

. . . alternating enthusiasm and dejection observed in the organization and preparation of the expeditionary forces, show the diversity of political ideology in the group of leaders of our country. . . One of the consequences of this anomaly in the governmental sphere was the resentment of the country to the indispensable psychological preparation for

the conflict.⁷³

Although this quotation pertained to the reluctance by the Brazilian populace to embrace preparations for the Brazilian Expeditionary Force participation in Italy in 1945, it is representative of the general diffidence of democratic nations towards conflict that is, in essence, "over there." "Over there," however, is just one of the elements of Expeditionary Warfare.

Historically, nations have dispatched forces "over there" to influence events or obtain objectives. The known history of fighting on or from the sea dates back to 1210 B.C., when the first recorded sea battle, the clash between the Hittite and Cypriot fleets, took place.⁷⁴

"Time and time again the geography, politics and the global focus of the United States has mandated that it possess forces of an expeditionary nature."⁷⁵ Being a maritime nation, the history of the United States is rich with examples of expeditions that were formed and sent "over there" to influence events and accomplish limited political objectives.

The historical underpinnings of the expeditionary nature of the United States Armed Forces date back to the early 1800s when the fledgling country's pride was questioned by the actions of the Bashaw of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli. Karamanli was allegedly so aggrieved by the President of the

United States, John Adams, that ". . . he ordered his men to chop down the flagpole (May 14, 1801) that stood before the United States Consulate in Tripoli--the accepted way in the Barbary States of declaring war."⁷⁶ Although littered with minor successes, the nineteen-month conflict with the pirates of the Barbary States was not an overwhelming demonstration of maritime strength by the new nation. The United States ultimately bought off Yusuf Karamanli with \$60,000.00--less than he demanded, but still a tribute.⁷⁷ The war, however, demonstrated to the world that the United States did have the capability to project power and that it would fight when it felt it must.

An interesting analogy might be to relate the deterrent effect of the United States during the Barbary War to that of the current era. The Barbary States were not deterred by the United States because they were largely unaware of the new state's capabilities, sensitivities, and willingness to become engaged. Since the United States had not ventured outside of its immediate geographic area other than to trade, it was an unproven entity in global politico-military affairs. So, although capability to assert itself was present, any deterrent effect was minimal because that capability was largely unknown.

Today, however, it can be argued that there is little doubt that the United States maintains the capability to

literally annihilate any country that it chooses.⁷⁸ The perception of reluctance to use this capability--or the credibility of its use--is the problem. Furthered by the image of former President Carter's "peace at all costs" trips to Korea and Haiti in 1994, there is an impression of domestic and political aversion for the United States to apply force.⁷⁹ Hence, the lack of a deterrent effect is grounded in perceptions of reservation--not as in the Barbary War era in lack of knowledge regarding capability.

It is important to understand that contingency operations involving U.S. military forces within the United States are not considered expeditionary. An example of this type of use of military forces was evident during the crisis created by Hurricane Andrew in Jacksonville, Florida, in August of 1992.⁸⁰ Although the military responded and provided outstanding service, its efforts would not be considered expeditionary since that contingency was within the United States. Expeditionary Warfare gains no deterrent effect when U.S. military forces respond to U.S. disasters. There is a distinction between U.S. military forces being used for non-Expeditionary Warfare situations and the application of U.S. military force.

Short of a Major Regional Contingency

Bearing in mind that this project is an exercise in

examining conceptual relationships, the statement "short of an MRC" connotes that entering into an MRC is beyond the contextual scope of Expeditionary Warfare. The National Security Strategy indicates that a major regional contingency could be represented by the forces required to fight and defeat aggression by countries such as North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. "Such states are capable of fielding sizable military forces that can cause serious imbalances in military power within regions important to the United States, with allied or friendly states often finding it difficult to match the power of a potentially aggressive neighbor."⁸¹

It is acknowledged that some, most likely a significant portion, of Expeditionary Warfare-capable forces would continue to prosecute operations upon crossing the threshold into the realm of a major regional contingency. However, in the interest of narrowing the focus for meaningful analysis of the conceptual relationships noted earlier, examination of Expeditionary Warfare force conduct during the prosecution of an MRC is better left to follow on research.

Flexible

Being able to perform a variety of actions, produce a wide range of effects and influences, and effectively react to changing circumstances and environments are some of the essential characteristics of flexibility.⁸² Flexible

expeditionary forces enable national command authorities to shift focus based on evolving situations, reconfigure force requirements, and to realign forces to react to a range of possible contingencies. Based on current and projected equipment capability such as the LCAC, AAV, and the V-22 for the Marine Corps and the inherent insertion capability of the contingency forces of the Army, the United States maintains the flexibility to go abroad and apply force that is unequalled among other nations. Innovation is an essential component of developing methods that capitalize on flexibility. The combat art of maneuver warfare is ideally suited to take advantage of many of the principal strengths of U.S. forces.

Almost fifty-one years ago, the United States participated in the last great opposed landing during the forceful seizure of Beito Island, Tarawa Atoll, Gilbert Islands. Few battles have ever matched the concentrated violence evidenced in such a compressed time-frame.⁸³ With the possible exception of a second Korean War, it is difficult to imagine a situation that would require the type of battle that was apparent in Tarawa. Dr. James Tritten noted that a forte of maneuver warfare is that it pits strength against a principle objective at a decisive time.⁸⁴

Admiral Raoul Castex of the French Navy (1878-1968) was a pioneer in the art of maneuver.⁸⁵ According to Admiral

Castex:

Strategic manoeuvre is a key element in the conduct of operations. It is a *method* used by strategy to improve the conditions of the struggle, to multiply the return on her efforts, and to obtain the greatest results, whether in the duel between the principal forces themselves or to the benefit of particularly important non-maritime requirements. It is therefore necessary to devote a special study to this method.⁸⁶

Operational maneuver as espoused by the Marine Corps, results in an effort to remove the seam at the high water mark that has traditionally separated naval and land combat. In this new approach, sea and land are both used as maneuver space for a single fluid operation.⁸⁷ Marine Corps Major General Cushman supports this by saying: ". . . its inshore and onshore geography form a single environment. . . [which] by exploiting technology and operational ingenuity, can bring ashore in a seamless continuum well-supported maneuver power that hits the enemy fast and hits him hard, but hits him where he ain't."⁸⁸

Maneuver warfare enables a quantitatively inferior side to exploit its potential for qualitative superiority.⁸⁹ As forward basing rights diminish, end strength decreases and OP/PERS TEMPO reach critical stages, flexibility will be the underpinning of successful military employment.⁹⁰ Maneuver warfare may portend a capability that the potential enemy must be wary of--and include in his calculus: that he is

vulnerable to attack from any direction, at any time.

Adaptable

Adaptability connotes the synergistic effect of exploiting the combined potential of aircraft, ships, ground battalions and information structure (e.g., an entire C4I network) as performance platforms.⁹¹ The effective employment of an eclectic force across the entire peace/conflict continuum is the essence of adaptability. It is important to recognize that Expeditionary Warfare includes both joint and combined forces.⁹² We will briefly examine both (joint and combined) forces in order to establish their relevance to Expeditionary Warfare.

Since the Goldwater/Nichols act of 1986, the United States has placed heavy emphasis on training and operating with joint forces. The incontrovertible reality is that Expeditionary Warfare is--and will stay--a joint venture. Admiral William Crowe, a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the following:

I am well aware of the difficulty of shedding . . . individual service orientations and addressing the broader concerns of the joint arena. The fact is, however, that the need for joint operations, joint thinking, and joint leadership has never been greater as we meet the global challenges and in order to get the most of our finite resources.⁹³

Necessarily situation-dependent, the level of

"jointness" will vary from operation to operation.

Outstanding examples of joint forces formed to prosecute operations abroad and that could serve as blueprints for future expeditionary endeavors were those relating to the crises in Haiti in September of 1994 and Iraq in October of 1994.

Admiral Paul D. Miller, commander of the U.S. Atlantic Command, ordered two of the Navy's centerpieces--the carriers U.S.S. *Eisenhower* and U.S.S. *America*--to deploy in an unprecedented manner: the two steamed south toward Haiti without their air wings and without surface or submarine escorts. Instead, the two ships were loaded with 2,500 Army troops each, supported by army helicopters. Admiral Miller's "adaptive force packaging" concept, in which multi-service task forces are deployed in new and different ways, tailored specifically to the mission at hand, was tested in impressive fashion.⁹⁴ Although Admiral Miller's "packaging" has come under critical review, it is most likely a harbinger of joint efforts to come.⁹⁵

When Iraq's Hussein began amassing his forces on the border with Kuwait in October of 1994, the world watched to see if the United States would respond. It did so, with a joint force that sent a strong signal to Hussein and to the world. The following represents some of the forces that were dispatched to the region by President Clinton and they serve

to underscore the joint flavor of the response:

U.S. Navy

U.S.S. *George Washington*
U.S.S. *San Jacinto*
U.S.S. *Leyte Gulf*

U.S.S. *Hewitt*
U.S.S. *Davis*
U.S.S. *Reid*

U.S. Marine Corps

Over 2,000 embarked in the ARG
Tripoli AMPHIBIOUS READY GROUP
U.S.S. *Tripoli*
U.S.S. *Cleveland*

U.S.S. *Fort McHenry*
U.S.S. *Rushmore*

U.S. Air Force

F-15E
F-16
F-111

Tankers
F-117A
AWACS

U.S. Army

3,900 ground forces initially
40,000 scheduled to be dispatched to the region
2 Patriot missile batteries in the region⁹⁶

Additionally, the Marine Corps had plans to dispatch the Diego Garcia MPS.

The joint mixture provided a formidable and credible force that was dispatched with haste. "The rapid deployment of thousands of Army troops from Georgia to Kuwait to join up there with their tanks. . . marks the first real test of a system put in place only after the 1991 Persian Gulf War."⁹⁷ The immediacy of the response that was directed at Iraq's transgressions was necessary in order to have a dramatic and immediate deterrent effect. Placing the forces on the ground

signalled commitment and capability and was necessary to influence Hussein's calculus. A general and disjointed threat of moving an aircraft carrier into the region or threatening to use U.S. based forces would not have had the same immediate results.⁹⁸ Specific transgressions call for immediate deterrent actions. The swift U.S. response could serve as an example for future Expeditionary Warfare operations.

The international security environment also demands that we continue to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems. Historically, coalitions and alliances have been created for these basic reasons:

- To provide sufficient power to resist or carry out aggression.
- To make known to potential adversaries an alignment of powers as a form of deterrence.
- To transform common goals to formal commitments.⁹⁹
- To legitimize U.S. military action.¹⁰⁰

The United States has become involved with coalitions and alliances at different times for different purposes. Although multinational forces increase adaptability, it is important to understand that there are both capabilities and limitations that are inherent to coalitions.

There are few instances that exemplify a rapid capability of a combined force. One example, however, is

again the combined force that assembled quickly and converged on the Middle East in response to Hussein's October 1994 force buildup on the border between Iraq and Kuwait. In addition to the joint forces that were discussed earlier, the following combined forces were immediately assembled:¹⁰¹

British Royal Air Force

Squadron of GR-1A low level reconnaissance Tornados and
GR-1 fighter-bombers
4 VC-10 tankers
8 Jaguar strike jets

French Air Force

10 Mirage 2000 fighters
8 Mirage F-1 fighters
KC-135 tankers

British Royal Navy

1 Type-42 destroyer (*H.M.S. Liverpool*)
1 Broadsword-class frigate (*H.M.S. Cornwall*)
1 Supply ship (*R.F.A. Brambleleaf*)

The combined forces could have supported the ground arm of a multi-national effort.

In most cases, coalition partners have a better understanding of the cultural, religious, and historical underpinnings of the various nations across the different regions. As U.S. human intelligence assets continue to decrease due to reductions in manning, there will be more reliance on the part of our partners to provide better understanding of the regional political and military

considerations. This coalition capability can only increase in importance.

With the exception of NATO and the forces that gathered recently in the Middle East, assembling a multi-national force to pursue expeditionary operations is beset with difficulty. As the modus operandi of combined operations becomes more ad hoc due to the nature of the changing international situation, the time to assemble a credible fighting force would normally be considered outside the time requirements of Expeditionary Warfare. This statement is not intended to lessen the importance of fostering multi-national relationships, however, there are specific areas of difficulty when operating with combined forces, including: doctrine, intelligence, language, training, equipment, logistics, differences in culture, and national sensitivities.¹⁰² Dependence upon forces from an ad hoc coalition could result in problems.

The Naval Doctrine Command is examining the types of capabilities that the allies and potential coalition partners might, at some point, bring to Expeditionary Warfare. The ultimate goal would be the development of readily available forces capable of routinely responding on short notice in support of multi-national expeditionary operations. Specifically, the Naval Doctrine Command is exploring combined supplementary capabilities (e.g., covering hard-to-

reach areas that the United States cannot routinely cover) and complementary capabilities (e.g., augmenting U.S. efforts with additional forces).¹⁰³ Adapting these types of capabilities with U.S. joint forces could result in a formidable multi-national force capable of demonstrating might to potential aggressors.

The United States has the unparalleled capacity to respond unilaterally to contingencies with formidable swiftness and fury. A unilateral expeditionary response, although very capable, could be perceived as a foray. That same response coupled with multinational forces and/or diplomatic underpinnings could lend coalition legitimacy that would result in a permanent solution to a crisis. The immediate deterrent effect is significantly enhanced by combining joint and multinational forces.

Limited in Objectives

To be designated as expeditionary, the objectives of the expeditionary forces must be limited. Vague or general objectives are not consistent with the precision required by Expeditionary Warfare.¹⁰⁴ The Santiago Campaign of the Spanish-American War provides an excellent example of the detrimental impact of ill-conceived objectives.

With the sinking of the U.S.S. *Maine*, the lassitude of the Navy and the nation disappeared and the United States

entered into a war with Spain. Lacking clear national objectives from national authorities, the Navy and the Army set out to determine their own views on national objectives and formulated their respective plans accordingly.¹⁰⁵ With no overall commander, the Army envisioned a limited expedition of 6000 men and the Navy forged ahead with plans for a blockade of Santiago harbor. President McKinley ultimately intervened and determined that the invasion force should be a large one and that its objectives should be to either "capture or destroy the garrison inland. . . or with the aid of the Navy capture or destroy the Spanish fleet."¹⁰⁶ With fractured command and control and with conflicting--or at least ambiguous--objectives, the Santiago Campaign moved forward.

The breakdown of cooperation between the Navy, Army and insurgents was nearly immediate. In spite of the difficulties, the United States prevailed and the Spaniards surrendered. Inter alia, Santiago provided the following important lessons that were learned regarding joint/combined expeditionary operations:¹⁰⁷

- There was a need for superior authority and diplomatic adjustment in the intercourse between the services.

- Placing responsibility for the ocean transport and supplies with the Army did not work.¹⁰⁸

- The breakdown of cooperation between the Cubans and

Americans was unfortunate and unnecessary. The insurgents could have been better used as guerilla warfare attacking forces to disrupt Spanish relief or resupply routes instead of being expected to fight alongside U.S. soldiers. Being under-equipped, they could also have been better suited for scouting or guide functions. They were not consulted, and after the initial skirmish, were largely distrusted by the Americans.¹⁰⁹

- Lack of clear objectives caused deep-rooted animosity between the Army and the Navy that lasted long after hostilities ceased.

Increasingly, the U.S. public has an input into the selection of what crises or contingencies the United States will become involved.¹¹⁰ Concise objectives with termination and extrication policies clearly stated are required prior to gaining public support. Prospective aggressors are aware of the internal debate that takes place in the United States before there is a decision to commit forces. Broad or ill-defined objectives have little value in deterrence overseas and will gain little U.S. domestic support.

Sustainable

The term "sustainable" is a difficult one to bound. Again, several organizations are attempting to develop the

concept of sustainment pertaining to Expeditionary Warfare that would satisfy a majority of constituents. For analytical purposes, Expeditionary Warfare might usefully be considered in terms of geography, intensity, and time. Examining Expeditionary Warfare in this framework should bound the issues more concretely.

Largely as a function of geo-strategic reality, the United States has historically operated in those geographic areas that can be operationally reached by maritime or maritime-supported forces. Factors regarding deployment include resupply, reinforcement, and equipment limitations that affect operational reach. U.S. Army contingency forces could be inserted anywhere in the world, but reach is limited and support is necessary for sustainment. The Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit can be inserted into almost any littoral on short notice via an Amphibious Ready Group, but is then constrained by the operational reach of its equipment and the tether to resupply by maritime assets which equates to approximately fifteen days. Assumptions regarding future reach may be influenced by equipment procurement that is dependent on budget considerations.¹¹¹

Intensity and time can best be addressed by examining current operational time-phased force employment planning. To illuminate this point, one might consider three complementary, but distinct phases of troop deployments.

The first phase would be represented by those troops, Army and Marine mentioned earlier, that could respond on short notice in support of national command authority tasking. The Army Airborne and Marine MEU/SOC are examples of those kinds of forces. Although swift to respond, the intensity of combat that they could become involved in would necessarily be limited due to their relatively light nature and the small total numbers of personnel involved.

The second phase could begin commensurate with the first and would entail dispatching the nearest available Marine Corps Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) Squadron to the crisis area. Phase I forces could be used to prepare ports and airfields for the arrival of a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF). Within ten days, the resultant Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) could be in place and ready to accomplish the following missions: "preemptively occupy and defend key choke points along strategic sea lines of communication, reinforce an ally with credible force prior to hostilities, support or reinforce an amphibious operation, establish a sizeable force ashore in support of a land campaign, and other missions assigned by CINCs and JFCs."¹¹² Using crisis action modules, the MPF could support missions that cover a full range of operations. The MPF package comes with thirty days' sustainment. Beyond the thirty day point, Expeditionary Warfare becomes a major regional conflict or a

protracted presence mission such as the case in Haiti in September 1994.

The third phase of deploying armed forces would be dependent upon equipment brought from CONUS to the crisis area aboard the Large Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (LMSRs). These are mentioned to demonstrate the sequential force deployment packages.

Without belaboring the point, the geographic scope, intensity, and time of Expeditionary Warfare are unsettled and are largely dependent upon factors such as size and quality of enemy force, U.S. equipment procurement, depth of inland reach, and allied participation. They are mentioned here to underscore the importance of sustainment and also to point out that sustainment is a moving target. As it *pertains to Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence, sustainment does not include anything beyond the 30 day point.*

Regionally Focused

The National Security Strategy examines the applicability of the strategy to specific regions. Although some would argue that the United States has always had a regional focus, the NSS clearly states that ". . . policy toward each of the world's regions reflects our overall strategy tailored to their unique challenges and

opportunities."¹¹³ Hence, Expeditionary Warfare reflects the NSS emphasis to facilitate collective, comprehensive security across the divergent regional spectrum. The respective CINCs know what their specific requirements are-- tailoring expeditionary forces to meet those requirements is the key.

Another Country's Soil

Committing forces on the ground to influence events abroad is the essence of Expeditionary Warfare. The United States and its allies maintain the capability for swift response that would be ideally suited for retaliation or for other short-fused requirements (e.g., bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April 1986).¹¹⁴ Placing U.S. and coalition forces on foreign soil in order to obtain objectives, however, is critical to Expeditionary Warfare. The efficient insertion of U.S. forces was evidenced at Vera Cruz in 1914.

Although operationally insignificant and politically ill-conceived, the 1914 Landing at Vera Cruz provides an example of the beginning of rapid deployment in support of expeditionary operations.¹¹⁵ Woodrow Wilson, on the eve of his inauguration said, "It would be the irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs."¹¹⁶ With the detaining of a group of American sailors by Mexican soldiers in Tampico, Mexico, on 9 April, 1914, President

Wilson's irony of fate was taking form as he set out on a collision course with General Victoriano Huerta and the expedition to intervene in Mexico was launched.

Vera Cruz is discussed here because of its important contributions and lessons related to expeditionary operations. Specifically, it proved invaluable in developing the following principles:¹¹⁷

- Forward Deployment. Because of the prepositioning of forces, the assault elements of two advance base regiments were ashore and fighting within the first twenty-four hours.¹¹⁸

- Time-phased Force Deployment Planning. By D+10, five regiments of Marines were either ashore in Mexico or on station offshore. Although depleting the barracks in the United States, the impressive phased deployment for prosecution in Mexico revealed significant planning and mastery of the importance of bringing forth troops and capabilities in an orderly and timely manner.

- Strategic Lift. Unit integrity was significantly degraded due to the haphazard manner that troops were transported. In view of the limited operations, transport was ultimately satisfactory, but the sealift shortage was acknowledged as being especially significant for larger-scale operations.

- Unit Integrity. Beginning with embarkation, unit

integrity was an essential characteristic of successful expeditionary operations. Although a considered strategic victory, there were numerous tactical and operational setbacks caused by the associated breakdown in unit integrity.

Of note, Vera Cruz was also the catalyst for the Navy's departure from the large raiding party operations that had been one of its hallmarks from the beginning.¹¹⁹ Although they fought heroically, Navy personnel took disproportionate casualties. As a result of the Vera Cruz landing operation, the Marines were on their way toward becoming the Navy's choice as its power projection force.

As was the case in Vera Cruz, forces on the ground are instrumental in fighting or in sending a strong signal. Although the types of forces that can be placed abroad has changed, the impact is largely the same. Inserting a fighter wing on the ground in friendly territory adjacent to a potential aggressor's country is a powerful sign of commitment. Whether the troops on the ground come in the form of a fighter wing, a Patriot battery, or ground combat forces, the signal sent by the United States is that it is strongly underwriting its deterrent with a credible commitment.

Under U.S. Command

The final premise is that the forces inserted would be under U.S. command. Being a superpower, the United States expects that in any situation that it determines to be in the realm of its national interests, the United States will assume a leadership position. In May of 1994, President Clinton signed PDD-25, which, inter alia, lays out the "three levels of criteria" that would be required in order to commit U.S. forces to peacekeeping.¹²⁰ Among the second level criteria is the necessity for "acceptable command and control" arrangements. It specifically states that U.S. troops will remain under U.S. command but does allow for operational control of those forces by a non-American "competent UN commander."¹²¹ Although related specifically to peacekeeping, this can be applied to all involvements requiring U.S. force participation. By assuming a preeminent position, the United States could signal the depth of its resolve to potential aggressors.

Observations

Many military forces and capabilities fit one or more of the elements of the project definition. In order to be considered as Expeditionary Warfare capable, they should fit all of the characteristics.

Forward presence can reduce reaction time. However,

forward presence, for Expeditionary Warfare purposes, must include an ability to insert forces onto foreign shores. An aircraft carrier is not considered Expeditionary Warfare-capable unless it is tethered to an Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit.¹²² The carrier air wing that supports Marines going ashore connotes a formidable force. Relatedly, a bomber wing in the continental United States must be in support of U.S. ground forces "over there" in order to pertain to Expeditionary Warfare.

Expeditionary Warfare has been an evolutionary, not revolutionary process. From its very beginning, the United States has agonized over sending troops "over there" in order to protect its interests or to influence events on foreign shores. From the Barbary War to Santiago, Gallipoli to Guadalcanal, the United States and its allies have learned the lessons of influence.¹²³

Expeditionary Warfare and conflict deterrence enjoy a unique relationship. It is a relationship based on relevance. The Expeditionary Warfare forces must be relevant to events ashore in order to have a deterrent effect. As discussed, relevance results from a combination of capability, credibility, and communication. The deterrent effect of Expeditionary Warfare will be diminished if any of the three are disregarded.

There is a danger of examining Expeditionary Warfare and

conflict deterrence in a vacuum. Expeditionary Warfare is a subset of military force that in turn is a subset of foreign policy which must also include diplomatic, economic, and political underpinnings. Too much dependence on any one tool can lead to a policy that has marginal effect.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Principal Conclusions

Three principal conclusions have emerged as a result of this project's research. The following conclusions are supported by findings that emerged during exploration of the relationship between conflict deterrence and Expeditionary Warfare, and as such, reflect a synthesis of the two subjects:

- Effective deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment that will most likely incur political cost.
- Deterrence rules to prevent interstate conflict may not be directly relevant to prevent intrastate conflict.
- Forward military presence does not necessarily deter.

Findings

Deterrence theory does not indicate when we should and should not use it. While deterrence theory possesses what George and Smoke call "internal logical consistency"¹²⁴ that in its most abstract form is simple and elegant, it becomes problematic when operationalized. Using deterrence theory to establish causality is challenging--in this respect Achen and

Snidal note that, "the most substantial body of empirical evidence leads to the conclusion that [deterrence theory] is seriously deficient."¹²⁵ Subsequent research confirmed the conundrum facing deterrence theorists--that there is an imperfect connection between abstract theory on the one hand, and verification of the theory on the other. Applying deterrence theory to explain why individuals pursue one particular course of action as opposed to another, is fraught with analytical difficulties and this fact was important to note early in the course of background research.

Further research indicated that there is broad consensus on the key components that comprise deterrence: credibility, capability, and communication. These were expanded upon in Chapter II to show why they are crucial and why deterrence should be underwritten by a credible commitment to be effective. However, it was also noted that these factors alone may not be sufficient to decisively influence a potential aggressor's calculus of the situation--Lebow and Stein assert that in the deterrence failures cases¹²⁶ they examined, the aggressor's actions resulted from factors other than those of deterrence.¹²⁷

It was found that caution should be exercised when using deterrence as a policy guideline: deterrence theory does not provide criteria for when it should or should not be used.¹²⁸ George, Smoke, Lebow, and Stein agree that a major

limitation of deterrence theory occurs when it attempts to provide criteria for when deterrence should be used in foreign policy. "Leaders can get no guidance on when an attempt at deterrence is appropriate, when it is likely to fail, and when it is likely to provoke an incautious adversary."¹²⁹ Failure to understand this could result in the misapplication of force and vitiate the deterrent effect.

*Deterrence effectiveness is difficult to prove. This is perhaps one of the most controversial aspects facing empirical deterrence analyses. Seminal works on deterrence that attempt to categorize actions in terms of deterrent success or failure such as Huth and Russett's *What Makes Deterrence Work*, Zelikow's "The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary," or Blechman and Kaplan's *Force Without War* have been criticized.¹³⁰ Part of the difficulty stems from a selection bias in case study analyses. Achen and Snidal observe that "analysts who want to know how often deterrence fails and how often it succeeds can be badly misled by consulting only wars and crises." They go on to assert that studies of crises and wars give no information about the success rate of rational deterrence.¹³¹ It is impossible to determine every instance where deterrence has worked for the following reasons: a successful deterrent may exact invisible concessions from a potential aggressor and are therefore impossible to measure; the deterrer may have*

issued a threat when there was no intention on the part of the deterree to pursue a proscribed course of action; and finally, documented evidence about successful deterrence may not exist. The fundamental objective of deterrence is to dissuade an opponent from not taking action--subsequent inaction on the opponent's part does not necessarily mean that he was deterred.

Research also noted the distinction between deterrence and compellance is important when examining the subject of threatened application of force.

Expeditionary Warfare means inserting ground forces overseas. Forces ashore on foreign soil connote commitment. In order to be perceived as a commitment, they should incur political cost. The forces can come in various forms such as a fighter wing, a Patriot battery, or ground combat forces. Whatever the form, they send the signal that the United States is committed to that particular situation and that an attack against host country forces and/or U.S. forces connotes something to follow. A perception of something to follow should dissuade a potential aggressor from conduct contrary to U.S. national interests.

From the Boxer Rebellion to Somalia, infantrymen largely determined success or failure. R. Scott Moore, in his examination of seventy expeditionary operations that were conducted by the United States, Great Britain, and France

between 1898 and 1992, concluded that although operations were conducted for various political reasons, committing forces on the ground was the overriding mechanism of influence.¹³²

Expeditionary Warfare is unique in its capability to place U.S. joint and combined forces on foreign soil to influence events. Marine Corps Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith in his "Development of Amphibious Tactics in 1946," noted that in spite of technical improvements, new methods, and logistical skill, the fundamental characteristics of Expeditionary Warfare remained largely the same.¹³³ Expeditionary Warfare is still "over there" and still requires insertion of troops ashore.

Conversely, the carrier battle group over the horizon does not incur the same level of political cost. This does not mean that the aircraft carrier is irrelevant; it is a valuable instrument of foreign policy. Its strength of being autonomous and outside territorial limits has benefit. There will be times that the United States cannot or will not incur the cost of placing troops on foreign shores. Having the capability to strike anywhere in the world is an excellent form of reassurance to allies and of might to potential adversaries.¹³⁴ Additionally, a carrier battle group that is tied to an Amphibious Ready Group with a Marine Expeditionary Unit that is capable of being inserted ashore

does have utility to Expeditionary Warfare.

How the United States applies deterrence needs rethinking. The new security environment has created a fundamental shift that requires the United States to rethink its deterrence concept. Three important ramifications have materialized in the post-Cold War era: first, there is a de-emphasis in the central role of nuclear deterrence; second, deterrence strategy must now consider a greater number of regional powers; and third, the concept of extended deterrence is still valid.¹³⁵ Nitze argues, for example, that nuclear weapons are unlikely to be useful in deterring threats of regional aggression, and that a more credible deterrent is one based in part on enhanced conventional weaponry.¹³⁶

The impact that the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has had on deterrence thinking is significant: with enhancements in the destructive potential of conventional forces and reduced risk of U.S. casualties RMA advocates suggest, conventional deterrence may become more flexible, usable and more attractive to policy makers concerned with reduced political costs. This preference for "stand-off solutions" that minimize risks to U.S. ground forces by relying on technological superiority, however, may adversely impact U.S. deterrence credibility.¹³⁷ Ultimately, committing Expeditionary Forces in support of a deterrent

objective reinforces the notion that effective commitment incurs cost.

The new security environment requires adaptive U.S. forces. The new international security environment is more complex and requires adaptation of both policy and force structure. Understanding diverse regional planning environments is critical to developing deterrent measures that are relevant to events overseas.

Conflict can originate for many reasons and take many forms. The three forms of conflict discussed in Chapter II include interstate (between nation states), intrastate (within a state) and transnational (beyond national boundaries). Each form of conflict may require different deterrent measures. It is important to recognize that Expeditionary Warfare may not be relevant to each form of conflict or that it might not be possible to apply it even if it is relevant.

It has been demonstrated that the United States, either unilaterally or in concert with other nations, can swiftly respond to the potential aggression by one state upon another. The cases involving Iraq (July of 1961 and October 1994) cited earlier are evidence that joint and combined forces could rapidly respond overseas on short notice. Hence, Expeditionary Warfare appears to be well-suited for a deterrent role in interstate conflict. It is important to

determine which interstate conflicts comprise U.S. national interests and are worthy of U.S. force commitment. There is a danger, however, of applying interstate conflict paradigms to intrastate conflict situations.

In the post Cold-War security environment, intrastate conflict has emerged as the most widespread and yet complex type of conflict. Sri Lanka, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda are examples of intrastate conflict. Expeditionary Warfare has little value in deterring these types of conflict. Outside influence is not very relevant to intrastate concerns.¹³⁸ Military measures associated with intrastate conflict do not often bring about the political changes that are necessary for long term conflict resolution.¹³⁹ Intrastate conflict often requires the restoration of order. As Moore states, "significantly, those whose mission involved restoring order tended to extend for more than a year."¹⁴⁰ It was determined in Chapter III that protracted situations such as those inherent to intrastate conflict are beyond the scope of Expeditionary Warfare.

Expeditionary Warfare has minimal deterrent effect on transnational conflict; however, punishing a transnational organization (such as a terrorist organization) may be within the capability of Expeditionary Warfare forces. The irrationality, unpredictability and demonstrated immunity to military deterrence makes transnational organization actors

difficult to deter by the use of Expeditionary Warfare forces.

The evolving security environment requires constant adaptation. Understanding the origins of conflict is paramount in developing the necessary deterrent measures. Recognizing the limitations of Expeditionary Warfare in deterring some types of conflict is important.

Expeditionary Warfare is limited. As discussed in Chapter III, Expeditionary Warfare is limited in geography, intensity, and time, and its limitations are largely a factor of sustainment. Hence, Expeditionary Warfare is ideally suited for the short duration operations. Keeping Marines at sea in an Amphibious Ready Group for long periods of time diminishes their war-fighting potential. Navy Secretary Dalton remarked: "Our ability to establish the nation's presence, at the crisis site but without active intervention, will become increasingly important to the protection of security and economic needs."¹⁴¹ However, reduced numbers of military personnel, fewer overseas bases, and fewer ships and aircraft, result in less staying power. Expeditionary Warfare forces cannot linger indefinitely in a crisis area without experiencing a reduction in readiness.

Increasingly, U.S. military forces have become involved with Operations Other Than War (OOTW). According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September of 1994:

"About 48,500 military personnel are currently serving in humanitarian and peacekeeping operations including Iraq, Bosnia, Macedonia, the Adriatic Sea, Rwanda and the Caribbean Sea."¹⁴² Expeditionary Warfare forces have been engaged in these operations. Admiral Owens, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indicated that " . . . fighting men may be somewhat out of place in humanitarian missions."¹⁴³ He also noted that the U.S. leadership must consider the impact on readiness that the humanitarian missions exact. It is a near zero-sum situation--for every dollar or hour spent on using the military forces for humanitarian missions, there is at least some portion of a dollar or hour unavailable to train to fight and win our nation's wars. The perception of a hollow Expeditionary Warfare force could result in a reduced deterrent effect.

The United States will be self-deterred in some situations. U.S. willingness to use force appears to be constrained by several factors, as noted in an August 1994 special report to the U.S. Congress:

- There are fewer threats to vital U.S. interests.
- Americans apparently believe that the United States should only use military force unless vital interests are threatened.
- A low tolerance for U.S. casualties.
- Insistence by the U.S. military on clear objectives

and end state (such as Weinberger's six criteria).

- The apparent unwillingness by the U.S. Congress to intervene overseas.¹⁴⁴

The short-term effect of this self-deterrence phenomenon appears to be an unwillingness to incur political costs associated with intervention, and a much more rigorous appraisal of when the United States will become involved overseas, (PDD-25 exemplifies this methodological approach).

Expeditionary Warfare works best in compellance situations. The United States has demonstrated an unparalleled ability to insert troops and war-fighting material anywhere in the world. In that respect, the ends and means are in synchronization. As such, Expeditionary Warfare forces are inherently suited for a compellance role. There is a need to translate the compellance capability into a deterrent message. There are examples that demonstrate what happens when the United States does not incur political cost or does not compel. One such example was the situation in Haiti in October of 1993.

The turning away of U.S.S. *Harlan County* by armed thugs in October of 1993 from Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, provides an interesting example of the relationship between several of the concepts related to Expeditionary Warfare. The small, lightly armed force of U.S. and Canadian personnel embarked in *Harlan County* were part of an international peacekeeping

force acting on behalf of the United Nations.¹⁴⁵ The leaders of Haiti at that time realized that allowing foreign forces on Haitian soil would allow the United States to incur political cost and result in foreign leverage--something the leaders wanted to avoid. With resistance evident on the pier, the ship turned away and the forces were not sent ashore. In essence, the United States did not incur the political cost of following through and inserting the troops. Since it did not incur that cost and did not compel the Haitian leaders into accepting the international force (which was certainly within its capability to do), the United States ultimately had to pay much greater costs when it intervened in October of 1994.

Expeditionary Warfare should be employed in an immediate vice general deterrent role. Expeditionary Warfare is best suited for immediate vice general deterrence. In order to become relevant across the diversified regions, forces must be tailored to specific situations. Regional actors should be aware of a capability that specifically targets them, should perceive willingness to use the capability against them, and should consider this capability in its calculus before acting. Expeditionary Warfare can provide that capability.

Chapter III discussed the Expeditionary Warfare requirements of flexibility. Being able to produce a wide

range of effects and influences and effectively react to changing circumstances and environments are but a few characteristics that are inherent to Expeditionary Warfare. The flexible force attributes in Expeditionary Warfare allow for a wide range of operations and options, and can be tailored for specific situations and actors.

The adaptive nature of Expeditionary Warfare exploits the combined potential of aircraft, ships, ground battalions and information structure and is ideally suited for specific situations. Although retaining the capability for unilateral action, combining U.S. Expeditionary Warfare force strength with complementary combined capabilities can provide a potential aggressor with a strong signal of commitment to a specific course of action.

Expeditionary Warfare is context specific. The use of Expeditionary Warfare forces is contingent on limited objectives. Secretary Weinberger's six criteria to determine the conditions under which the use of military force was warranted were similar to General Powell's four propositions on when it is appropriate to use force.¹⁴⁶ Weinberger's Six were developed during the cold war and held prominence until 1991. Powell's were formed after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Both specifically address the requirement for military objectives to be clearly identified and defined.

Forward deployed forces showing the flag are excellent for reassurance to friends and allies. A force such as a carrier battle group that is ideal for showing the flag, maintains the capability for swift response well-suited for retaliation or compellance (such as the U.S. intervention involving Libya).¹⁴⁷ However, largely operating over the horizon as a general purpose force with the broad objective of forward presence, the carrier battle group has marginal utility in Expeditionary Warfare/conflict deterrent matters. Once a situation develops that results in clear and limited objectives, the carrier battle group can then perform invaluable support to operations to accomplish limited objectives ashore.

Expeditionary Warfare is comprised of general purpose forces that are conducive to being tailored for specific missions. When used in the proper context as defined in Chapter III (limited in geography, intensity and time), Expeditionary Warfare can offer an effective deterrent, especially for immediate deterrence situations.

NOTES

1. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, (draft), (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994), p. 2.
2. U.S. President (July, 1994: Clinton), A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994), p. 5.
3. Ibid., p. 1. There are at least 19 instances in which the National Security Strategy discusses the prevention or deterrence of conflict.
4. Ibid., pp. 21-27.
5. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Neimeyer, USMC, Strategy and Policy Department, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI, September 2, 1994. There are numerous instances of the self-deterrent nature of democratic nations. Lieutenant Colonel Neimeyer's "paradox of unused power" is an illuminating way to look at the problem. As evidenced in Viet Nam, the United States tends to commit to a certain level, then backs off.
6. Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 3, 7.
7. Research included works by John Mearsheimer, Thomas Schelling, Robert Jervis, Richard Lebow, Janice Stein, Paul Huth, Bernard Brodie, George Quester, Patrick Morgan, Alexander George, Richard Smoke and others.
8. The project definition of Expeditionary Warfare resulted from a review of numerous source documents provided by several organizations. The writers acknowledge the ongoing efforts of both the Naval Doctrine Command and the N85 Expeditionary Warfare Directorate of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for their respective efforts toward bounding the scope of Expeditionary Warfare.

9. U.S. Joint Chiefs Of Staff, pp. 5-6.
10. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 77.
11. U.S. President (July, 1994: Clinton), p. 1.
12. Ibid., p. 21.
13. Ibid., p. 5.
14. Madeleine K. Albright, U.N. Ambassador, address to the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: October 26, 1994.
15. Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped, (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. viii. See Thomas P.M. Barnett and Linda D. Lancaster's Answering the 9-1-1 Call: U.S. Military and Naval Crisis Response Activity, 1977-1991, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1992), a summary of U.S. military involvement between 1977 through 1991 in which the authors note that the U.S. military has responded to international crises or incidents at least eighty-three times--or an average of about four to five per year.
16. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, eds., Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978), p. 516.
17. Philip D. Zelikow, "The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary," Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, George K. Osborn, ed., et al., (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), p. 34.
18. Adam B. Siegel, The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era: U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity 1946-1990, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1991), p. 13.
19. Although the United States may no longer be concerned about superpower rivalry, there is some evidence to show that the United States is sensitive to "regional" power concerns--for example, Russian sensitivities in the Balkans and the "near abroad" countries--which may in part explain U.S. reluctance to become more deeply involved in Bosnia.
20. The impact of television and in particular the type of on-scene reporting of international conflict characterized by CNN on policy makers is discussed by Frank J. Stech in "Winning CNN Wars," Parameters, Autumn 1994, pp. 37-56. In

an interesting counterpoint, Stech cites Ambassador Albright's statement expressing concern about "what happens in the non-CNN wars," for example, Angola, Sudan, Mozambique, and Ngorno-Karabakh. It has been said that the reason the United States decided to intervene in Somalia and not elsewhere in Africa was driven more by public pressure caused by media influence than by impartial policy making decisions.

21. Polls seem to indicate however, that Americans generally are not fully conversant with fundamental facts about foreign affairs--for example, Donald C.F. Daniel in U.S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in Context, (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1994), p. 13, cites the results of a 1994 Times Mirror poll which indicated that of eight countries polled about public knowledge of current events, the United States ranked next to last. (Time, March 28, 1994, p. 22.) What may be more important is how the American public reacts to media presentation of crises, for example, the mortar bomb attack of a crowded marketplace in Sarajevo, starvation in Somalia, or genocide in Rwanda.

22. U.S. President (May, 1994: Clinton), The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, Presidential Decision 25, (Washington, DC: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994).

23. Daniel Y. Chiu, Anne M. Dixon, and Henry H. Gaffney, The Contexts of Military Interventions, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993) p. 5.

24. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 188.

25. Madeleine K. Albright, October 26, 1994.

26. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), p. 18.

27. Thomas C. Schelling, p. 9.

28. Roger W. Barnett, Deterrence Theory for the Coming Decade, (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1993), p. 1.

29. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence: the Elusive Dependant Variable," Journal of World Politics, Vol. XLII, No. 3, 1990, p. 351. In looking at the outcomes resulting from deterrence or compellance actions, Lebow and Stein argue that it is easier to achieve visible (and therefore measurable) results with compellance compared with

deterrence, which may require exacting "invisible concessions." See also Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd ed., Vol. 40, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), p. 33.

30. Adam Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises: The Role of U.S. Naval Forces, Working Paper, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 4. Additionally, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, p. 352, state that their research shows that the two strategies are practiced "in tandem" where deterrence sometimes reinforces compellance, and vice versa.

31. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p.23; Patrick Morgan, pp. 23-24.

32. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," Journal of World Politics, Vol. XLI, No. 2, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 151.

33. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 558-561.

34. For a useful summary of early deterrence theory see Robert Jervis, Deterrence Theory Revisited, (ACIS Working Paper No. 14, Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 1978).

35. Charles T. Allan, "Extended Conventional Deterrence: In from the Cold and Out of the Nuclear Fire?," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1994, p. 203.

36. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept: Summary of a High-level Workshop Discussion, (Washington, DC: National Security Planning Association, 1994), p. i.

37. Ibid., p. 19.

38. Charles T. Allan, p. 208. See also George H. Quester, "Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence," in Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence, Third Annual Conference on Strategy, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992, pp. 1-4.

39. A sampling of references researched on this subject include: Robert P. Haffa, Jr., "The Future of Conventional

Deterrence: Strategies and Forces to Underwrite a New World Order," in Conventional Forces and the Future of Deterrence, p. 8; Roger W. Barnett, pp. 4-7; and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 64.

40. Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), p. 4.; Thomas C. Schelling, p. 6.

41. U.K. Committee of Privy Counsellors, The Falkland Islands Review, Report, (London: H.M.S.O., 1983), p. 31.

42. Ibid., pp. 32, 76.

43. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 10. See also Linton F. Brooks, Peacetime Influence Through Forward Naval Presence, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), p. 8.

44. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, pp. 183-184.

45. James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: 1919-1979, 2nd ed., (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 25.

46. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think therefore I Deter," Journal of World Politics, Vol. XLI, No. 2, 1989, p. 212.

47. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 10.

48. Ibid., p. i.

49. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., p. 11.

50. Ibid., p. 10.

51. As differentiated by John Collins in his testimony to the U.S. Congress on 20 May 1976. See also George H. Quester, pp. 31-50., and Charles T. Allan, pp. 205-206.

52. George H. Quester, p. 50.

53. Adapted from Adam B. Siegel, To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises, pp. 4-5, and Patrick Morgan, p. 38.

54. Dana A. Schmidt, "British Landing Forces in Kuwait to Counter Iraq," The New York Times, July 2, 1961, pp. 1, 3.

55. "British Warships to Transit Suez," The New York Times, July 5, 1961, p. 6. In a follow-up article, Kathleen Telch, "U.A.R. and Soviet, in U.N. ask British to Quit Kuwait," The New York Times, July 6, 1961, p. 3, observed that:

For the British to have merely brought up a naval force to stand guard was not deemed sufficient in view of the economic value of Kuwait's oil to Britain and in view of the area's topography. The Iraqis might have sent an armored force to the city of Kuwait sixty miles from the Iraq border in a few hours. Then Britain would have faced the far more difficult task of throwing the Iraqis out.

56. Sir Patrick Dean, "An Address to the U.N. Security Council," New York Times, July 3, 1961, p. 2.

57. E. Lauterpact and others (eds), The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents, Cambridge International Documents series, Vol. 1, (Cambridge, UK: Grotius Publications, Ltd., 1991), p. 55.

58. Adnan M. Pachachi, "An Address to the U.N. Security Council," The New York Times, July 3, 1961, p. 2.

59. Stanley R. Sloan, "Report," U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Deterrence?, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994), pp. 1, 25.

60. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 7.

61. During an interview with Dr. J.R. Blaker, Special Assistant to the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 27, 1994, he expressed the belief that the nuclear "umbrella" no longer has much credibility, and postulated that the United States can provide a "high-tech umbrella" instead. If the United States does not like to take casualties, then neither do U.S. allies who are keen to take advantage of the U.S. military's superiority in this area.

62. Patrick M. Morgan, p. 30. See also Robert Haffa, Jr., p. 8.

63. Jack S. Levy, "Quantitative Studies of Deterrence Success and Failure," Perspectives on Deterrence, Paul C. Stern et al. eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 99.

64. Roger W. Barnett, p. 4.
65. Patrick M. Morgan, p. 44.
66. Ibid., p. 43.
67. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, pp. 2-4.
68. James N. Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 186-191 and 260-271.
69. Rethinking the Deterrence Concept, p. 1.
70. Henry H. Gaffney, Power Projection, Peacekeeping, and the Role of the U.S. Navy in the Post-Cold War Age, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), p. 43; James N. Rosenau, pp. 12-16.
71. Phil Williams and Stephen Black, "Transnational Threats: Drug Trafficking and Weapons Proliferation," Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.15, No.1, (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 150.
72. Phil Williams and Stephen Black, p. 150.
73. Marshal J. B. Mascarehnas de Moraes, The Brazilian Expeditionary Force by its Commander (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 5. Mascarehnas De Moraes goes on to say that instead of cultivating unity among the general populace for the expeditionary effort, complacency by governmental leaders almost doomed the expedition prior to its departure. Ultimately Brazil had the distinction of being the only Latin American nation whose participation abroad was represented by division strength.
74. Jan S. Breemer, "Naval Strategy is Dead," Proceedings, February 1994, p. 49.
75. Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Neimeyer, USMC, "The Past is Prologue: Historical Marine Corps Roles and Missions," Unpublished research paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 1994, p. 8.
76. Donald Barr Chidsey, The Wars in Barbary, (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1971), p. 68.
77. Ibid., p. 70.

78. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, "Thunder and Lightning: Joint Littoral Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, p. 46.

79. Daren Elliott House, "The Wrong Mission," Wall Street Journal, 8 September 1994, p. 18. Specifically related to the mission in Haiti, Ms. House puts forth the following question regarding U.S. military forces: "Are its troops warriors or welfare workers?" She maintains that the public rebels at the first casualties because of a loose connection to national security interests.

80. In an undated briefing package provided by N85, Hurricane Andrew (Florida) operations of August-October 1992 and Hurricane Iniki (Hawaii) operations of September-October 1992, were included in a slide entitled "Recent Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare Operations." The project definition does not include these types of operations. It is acknowledged that there is debate on the relationship between Expeditionary Warfare and Operations Other Than War.

81. U.S. President (July, 1994: Clinton), National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1994), p. 7.

82. General Russell E. Dougherty, Opening Statement, Defense Policy Panel, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings (Washington, DC: 27 March 1990), p. 2.

83. Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret.), "Tarawa: The Ultimate Opposed Landing," Marine Corps Gazette, November 1993, p. 53.

84. James J. Tritten, "Outline of a Concept for Manoeuvre Warfare Doctrine," Unpublished, Naval Doctrine Command (Norfolk, VA: July, 1994), p. 3.

85. Admiral Raoul Castex, French Navy, Strategic Theories, trans. Eugenia C. Kiesling, ed., (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994), pp. 103-104.

86. Ibid., p. 101.

87. Commander Terry C. Pierce, USN, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea. . . Making it Work," Marine Corps Gazette, October 1993, p. 61.

88. Major General John H. Cushman, "Maneuver. . . From the Sea," Proceedings, April 1993, p. 48.

89. Commander Walt Johanson, USNR, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea," Briefing, U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: 18 August 1994).

90. Peter Grier, "Pentagon Speeds Forces to Hot Spots Quickly, Efficiently," Christian Science Monitor, 19 October 1994, p. 1. Grier raises the specter of fewer people, weapons systems, spare parts, strategic mobility and logistic support. He indicated that there will be further reliance on pre-positioned equipment.

91. Admiral Paul D. Miller, "USACOM in a Changing Security Environment," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 19 April 1994.

92. Major William S. Huggins, USAF, "Forcible Entry in the Age of Jointness," Marine Corps Gazette, March 1994, p. 34-35. Major Huggins praises the Marine Corp's innovation in the development of amphibious warfare, but contends that labeling a service too narrowly detracts from the joint capabilities that they all bring.

93. Jason B. Barlow, "Interservice Rivalry in the Pacific," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, p. 77.

94. Ernest Blazar and Gidget Fuentes, "Navy Carriers Turn Into Troop Ships," The Navy Times, 14 September 1994, p. 4.

95. Ibid. Vice Admiral Tony Less said: "It is clearly not the optimum war-fighting configuration for an aircraft carrier, but it certainly demonstrates the ultimate in carrier flexibility." However, Admiral Jeremy Boorda, while Commander in Southern Europe, contended that Marines embarked in the carrier Roosevelt resulted in " . . . lost flexibility without a full air wing." Others maintained that the benign area of operations in Haiti would allow such an experiment, but cautioned against its use for all occasions.

96. Associated Press, reprinted in The New York Times, from Defense Department Sources, 13 October 1994, pp. 1, 15.

97. Bradley Graham, "Rapid Deployment Plans in the Crucible," Washington Post, 11 October 1994, p. 12.

98. Major Maxwell O. Johnson, "The Role of Maritime Based Strategy," Marine Corps Gazette, February 1984, p. 64. Johnson discusses the "unobtrusive nature" of maritime strategy. He also discusses the carrier as a "tangible but tactful reminder of U.S. power." These attributes are good

for reassurance, but do not have much use in an immediate deterrence situation that would require placing troops ashore.

99. Major General Waldo D. Freeman, U.S. Army, Commander Randall J. Hess, U.S. Navy, and Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Faria, Portuguese Army, "The Challenges of Combined Operations," Military Review, November 1992, p. 3.

100. Charles Krauthammer, "Our Sphere, Their Sphere," The Washington Post, 7 October 1994, p. 1.

101. Associated Press, reprinted in The New York Times, from Defense Department Sources, 13 October 1994, pp. 1, 15.

102. Freeman, Hess, and Faria, "The Challenges of Combined Operations," pp. 6-10.

103. The supplementary and complementary capabilities being explored by the Naval Doctrine Command were informally discussed at an Expeditionary Warfare Symposium held at the Naval War College 19-23 September 1994.

104. After the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon, several high-level officials, including Secretary Weinberger and General Powell have reiterated the importance of clearly specified objectives before committing force.

105. Lieutenant Colonel Peter S. Kindsvatter, U.S. Army (Ret.), "Santiago Campaign of 1898: Joint and Combined Operations," Military Review, January 1993, p. 5.

106. Ibid.

107. Ibid., pp. 11-13.

108. Ibid., p. 13. Admiral Sampson, the commander of the U.S. flotilla during the Santiago Campaign, noted that "until the embarkation, transport, and disembarkation of troops and supplies come under the control of the navy as in England, this muddle will continue."

109. Ibid. The breakdown of trust between the Cubans and Americans caused unnecessary difficulties. The U.S. must get better at working with/getting the most out of coalition capabilities brought to the force.

110. George Stewart, Scott M. Fabbri, and Adam B. Siegel, JTF Operations Since 1983 (Alexandria, VA: Center For Naval Analyses, July 1994), pp. 23-31. Operation Urgent

Fury in Grenada was an exception to the rule. There was no public debate and the operations that were conducted came as a total surprise to most of the nation. Today, however, the trend appears to indicate that prior to committing force, public support will be solicited.

111. Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon, Buoying Troops, Will Cut Arms Development," The New York Times, 23 August 1994, p. 18. Deputy Secretary Deutch announced the consideration of program cuts that included the Marine Corps V-22, the Army Comanche helicopter, and the Air Force F-22.

112. Robert A. Chilcoat and David S. Henderson, "Army Prepositioned Afloat," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, p. 53.

113. U.S. President (July, 1994: Clinton), p. 21.

114. Patrick Brogan, The Fighting Never Stopped, p. 43.

115. Colonel James H. Alexander, USMC, "Roots of Deployment--Vera Cruz, 1914", America's Cutting Edge, U.S. Marine Corps Roles and Missions, ed. Colonel John E. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) and Lieutenant Colonel C. P. Neimeyer, USMC, (New York: American Heritage Custom Publishing Group, 1994), p. 161.

116. Jack Sweetman, The Landing at Veracruz: 1914 (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1968), p. 21.

117. Colonel James H. Alexander, pp. 158-161.

118. It is important to note that the forward deployed aspect of the force contained the capability to place troops ashore. Conversely, a carrier battlegroup that is not with an ARG/MEU does not qualify for Expeditionary Warfare.

119. Jack Sweetman, p. 182.

120. Donald C. F. Daniel, "U.S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Putting PDD 25 in context." U.S. Naval War College, Strategic Research Department Research Memorandum 3-94, p. 1-3.

121. Ibid., p. 3.

122. Commander Terry Pierce, USN, "The Naval Expeditionary Force," Proceedings, November 1993, p. 35.

123. Colonel James B. Agnew, U.S. Army (Ret.), "From Where Did Our Amphibious Doctrine Come?", Marine Corps Gazette, August 1979, p. 53-54. Gallipoli, although it did not include U.S. forces, was the catalyst for the development of U.S. amphibious doctrine. The development of the doctrine during the twenty-five year period that followed was operationally tested at Guadalcanal in 1942.

124. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," Journal of World Politics, Vol. XLI, No. 2, p. 175.

125. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," Journal of World Politics, Vol. XLI, No. 2, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 144.

126. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependant Variable," p. 344, define deterrence failure as "when a challenger commits the action proscribed by the defender, or the defender backs away from a commitment in the face of the challenger's threats and demands." Another perspective on deterrence failure is provided by Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War, p. 27.

127. Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein, p. 211. See also Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, p. 177.

128. George and Smoke, pp. 181-182. See also Stephen M. Walt, Causal Inferences and the Use of Force: A Critique of Force Without War, (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1980), pp. 48-49.

129. Richard N. Lebow and Janet G. Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," p. 213. For additional discussion on the limitations in applying deterrence policy to guide policy making, see Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," p. 181; and Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, p. 54.

130. For example, Richard N. Lebow and Janice G. Stein's critical examination of Paul K. Huth in "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependant Variable,"; and Stephen Walt's review of Blechman and Kaplan in Causal Inferences and the Use of Force.

131. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, p. 161.

132. Major R. Scott Moore, "Looking Back at the Future: Practices and Patterns of Expeditionary Operations in the 20th Century," America's Cutting Edge (New York: American Heritage, 1994), p. 339.

133. Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, "The Development of Amphibious Tactics," Part I, Marine Corps Gazette, June 1946, p. 13.

134. Captain Charles R. Girvin, III, U.S. Navy, "Twilight of the Supercarriers," Proceedings, July 1993, p. 43.

135. Charles T. Allan, p. 203.

136. Paul H. Nitze, "Is it Time to Junk the Nukes?," The Washington Post, January 16, 1994, pp. C1-C2.

137. From an interview with Edward Foster, Royal United Services Institute, London U.K., September 21, 1994, in which he expressed misgivings about the U.S. preference for a "stand-off solution" to Bosnia. His perception is that U.S. allies absorb a disproportionate share of the burden of peacekeeping in Bosnia, particularly when lives of ground forces are factored as a cost. He expressed the opinion that effective deterrence commitments incur cost.

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U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies

Kenneth Watman, Dean Wilkening
with John Arquilla, Brian Michiporuk

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PREFACE

With the Cold War over, U.S. national security strategy has shifted away from its focus on the former Soviet Union and toward possible U.S. regional involvements. As a consequence, the applicability to regional adversaries of virtually all the fundamental elements of U.S. strategy—which were developed during the Cold War with the Soviet Union—must be reevaluated. Among these fundamentals is the role of deterrence. Deterrence was the heart of U.S. strategy for countering the Soviets, both because the United States believed the Soviets were deterrable and because war with the Soviets was unacceptably dangerous. Much of what is called “deterrence theory” was developed specifically for this function. Therefore, regional strategy requires revisiting basic questions about deterrence. Should the United States base its regional strategy on deterrence? Can regional adversaries be deterred and, if so, by what? What resources can and should the United States devote to that objective?

This report represents an attempt to come to grips with these fundamental questions. As such, it should be of interest to policymakers, strategists, and military planners interested in the conceptual requirements for effective deterrence, as well as the operational and force structure implications that emerge should the United States make regional deterrence one of the pillars of its national military strategy. As an application of these concepts, a companion report¹ addresses the specific question of strategies for deterring nuclear

¹Dean Wilkening and Kenneth Watman, *Nuclear Deterrence in a Regional Context*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MR-500-A/AF, 1994.

attacks against the United States or U.S. allies by regional nuclear powers. This second report should be of interest to policymakers interested in U.S. counterproliferation policy.

This research was conducted jointly under the Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Structure program of Project AIR FORCE and under the Strategy and Doctrine program of the Army Research Division's Arroyo Center. Project AIR FORCE and the Arroyo Center are two of RAND's federally funded research and development centers.

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SUMMARY

This report assesses the requirements of a deterrence strategy for application to potential regional adversaries. In particular, this report elucidates the character and motivations of potential regional adversaries that may make them more difficult to deter than the former Soviet Union, the circumstances under which U.S. deterrent threats will appear credible, and finally the general military requirements that, historically, have correlated with deterrence success.

CHARACTER AND MOTIVATIONS OF REGIONAL ADVERSARIES

Few states or leaders appear to be truly "crazy" or undeterrable. A more useful characterization of the motivations of potential adversaries is based not on "craziness" but rather on the critical distinction between adversaries motivated to gain and adversaries motivated to avert loss (where loss or gain is determined from the adversary's perspective). This distinction is crucial. States (as well as individuals) motivated to avert a loss in their status quo tend to take higher risks, particularly if that status quo is already marginal. States seeking gain, especially if they enjoy an already acceptable status quo, appear to be much less willing to take risks. It follows that leaders who are willing to take greater risks will be more difficult to deter, all else being equal. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is a classic example of the risks leaders are willing to take to avert a deteriorating status quo, in this case hastened by the U.S. embargo on strategic materials.

What losses motivate leaders to take risks? An external threat to a state's survival is an obvious loss leaders seek to avert. However, for many regional states, another threat frequently arises—one that Western political analysts often overlook—namely, domestic political threats to the regime's survival. Many regional states live with chronic internal political instability arising out of the fragile character of their political systems. The leaderships of such states often enter into international crises in an effort to ameliorate their domestic problems. Put another way, the threatened loss these regimes are trying to avert is loss of their hold on power. As a result, their stakes are very high, and their risk-taking propensities are frequently much greater than others appreciate.

This dichotomy between states motivated by gain as opposed to averting loss has important implications for regional deterrence. States that are satisfied with their status quo, e.g., the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, should be relatively easy to deter, because they will likely be risk-averse decisionmakers. Moderately credible U.S. deterrent threats to deny the adversary a cheap victory should be sufficient. On the other hand, regional adversaries motivated to avert domestic political losses are usually willing to take high risks. For these cases, deterrence will require credible (from the adversary's perspective) U.S. threats to deny the adversary's objectives, perhaps with additional threats to punish the regime. Thus, the military problem of regional deterrence in this instance boils down to two factors: (1) ways in which the United States can make its deterrent threats credible and (2) military capabilities required for credible denial and punishment threats.

MAKING DETERRENCE CREDIBLE

Credibility has two dimensions: the adversary's belief about whether or not the United States *intends* to implement its deterrence threat and the adversary's belief about whether or not the United States *can* implement that threat effectively. If either the intent or the capability is lacking, adversaries will discount U.S. deterrent threats. If both are present to a sufficient degree, U.S. deterrent threats should be highly credible. For intermediate cases in which one of these dimensions is somewhat weak, the other must (and often can) compensate.

U.S. intent has two principal facets: interests and reputation. In general, U.S. interests in a region are evidenced by political, economic, and military ties between the United States and a regional ally or friend. Efforts to convince regional opponents that the United States does, in fact, have important interests at stake in a particular region should have substantial deterrence benefits. However, for an adversary to believe that the United States is committed to the defense of a particular interest, this commitment must be exceptional, selective, and established over time—often at considerable expense (both financially and politically). Therefore, in many regional crises, the United States may not have an existing commitment to rely on for credibility.

For those many cases in which a strong commitment is lacking (at least, from the adversary's perspective) a U.S. reputation for doing what it says it will do can buttress the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats. However, reputation quickly decays and appears to be specific to a given leader (e.g., a given U.S. administration), a particular type of interest (e.g., oil), and a particular type of warfare (e.g., armored desert warfare). Thus, after Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. reputation for defending oil interests in the Middle East from conventional attack was very high. However, this reputation probably does not extend to Bosnia or Somalia, situations in which the interests and the type of military conflict are very different.

Besides interests and reputation, two lesser factors—bargaining tactics and perceptions of legitimacy—also influence the perception of a state's resolve to act in defense of some interest. To some extent, these factors simply amplify the perception of interests and reputation. However, they also can be quite distinct. For example, bargaining tactics might involve shaping events so the opponent believes only he has the "last clear chance" to avoid a confrontation. This increases the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats, because they begin to appear automatic.

The perceived legitimacy of the defender's interests, or of his methods of defense, may also affect perceptions of resolve. If the challenger believes the defender's claim to some interest is legitimate, or that his own claim is less legitimate, the challenger is likely to believe the defender has greater resolve in defending that claim. The notion of legitimacy can also be applied to the methods used to defend in-

terests. Certain types of weapons (e.g., chemical and biological weapons) or certain types of warfare (e.g., terrorism) may be perceived by the international community to be illegitimate for advancing a state's interests. To the extent this is true, the challenger will believe the defender has greater resolve to deter such threats. Note that the challenger does not have to agree with the defender's perspective that certain claims or means are illegitimate. All that is required is that the challenger believe the defender holds these beliefs. However, since many potential Third World adversaries hold views on legitimacy different from those of the United States, it may be difficult for such adversaries to perceive accurately the strength of U.S. views.

For these reasons, the United States cannot count on the adversary being sufficiently convinced by U.S. commitment, reputation, or claims of legitimacy. To strengthen deterrence, the United States must depend upon a robust set of effective military capabilities to offset these deficiencies.

MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE

When they resort to force, regional adversaries typically seek short, cheap wars. Therefore, those U.S. military forces that can credibly deny a quick, decisive victory will be most impressive to the opponent. In other words, *it is those forces that are in the region, or that can deploy to the region on short notice, that will have the greatest deterrent effect.* In addition, for conventional threats, U.S. conventional forces are more relevant for regional deterrence than U.S. nuclear forces, because nuclear threats are likely to be less credible to regional adversaries—at least, so long as the adversary threatens to employ only conventional forces. While slower-arriving U.S. conventional forces can provide very effective warfighting capabilities for rolling back the adversary at a later time, they are less relevant for deterrence. Regional adversaries often do not believe such forces will arrive—although, if the adversary is threatening a target to which the United States has a credible commitment, the strength of this commitment may overcome the lower credibility of later-arriving forces.

The fact that the United States probably is limited largely to conventional forces creates problems, because, all else being equal, conven-

tional weapons are inherently less deterring than nuclear weapons. In large part, this is due to the greater unpredictability in the performance of conventional forces. No one can be certain what will happen when conventional forces fight. This uncertainty permits adversaries to misestimate the strength of their positions. Nuclear forces are more transparent. To enhance the effectiveness of conventional forces for deterrence, the United States could improve the transparency of its prompt-denial capabilities through frequent demonstrations aimed at specific adversaries. In addition, the United States may wish to retain a nuclear element in its regional deterrence strategy, particularly—although not exclusively—to deter attacks from weapons of mass destruction.

Beyond prompt denial, the United States should incorporate punishment into its regional deterrence strategy to convince regional opponents that they will be substantially worse off if they threaten U.S. regional interests. Punishment strategies aim to threaten that which the adversary values most. For many regional adversaries, this is the leader's life or the regime's hold on power. But threatening to kill a state's leadership poses operational, moral, legal, and political problems for the United States. Therefore, the preferred strategy would be to threaten the regime's hold on power by exacerbating internal threats or increasing the opponent's vulnerability to external threats. To implement this threat, U.S. targeting could focus on selected elements of the opponent's military and internal security forces, as well as on key regime supporters (e.g., prominent industrialists, wealthy oligarchs, etc.) who help keep the regime in power.

U.S. DETERRENCE STRATEGY

For the more highly motivated regional adversaries, deterrence is likely to succeed if the United States adopts a national military strategy based on the ability to deny promptly the opponent's political and military objectives, either by basing U.S. forces within the region in times of crisis or by convincing the adversary that those forces can be forward deployed rapidly if the need arises. In addition, the United States should consider options to punish the regime by threatening to cripple its hold on power. Both punishment and denial threats must be credible—a requirement that depends on visible U.S. commitments, the U.S. reputation with respect to the particular

interests at stake, and the perceived legitimacy of U.S. ends and means, as well as on the opponent's understanding of the U.S. military capabilities that can be brought to bear if U.S. leaders decide to act.

However, this begs the larger question of whether or not the United States can or should attempt to implement regional deterrence strategies. Political constraints may limit the U.S. ability and desire to implement regional deterrence successfully. Military constraints may also limit the U.S. ability to implement a robust regional deterrence strategy. In particular,

- The importance of prompt denial for deterrence runs counter to the current trend toward withdrawing U.S. forces to the continental United States and decreased readiness rates.
- The emphasis on frequent demonstrations and exercises of U.S. conventional military capabilities runs counter to the reduced operational tempo resulting from budget cutbacks.
- The emphasis on conventional forces is counter to the attractive features of U.S. nuclear escalation options, particularly for deterring nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks.

There are good reasons why these current military trends are occurring. The point to note is that, in many respects, they run counter to the requirements for an effective U.S. regional deterrence strategy.

Thus, in the post-Cold War world, can or should the United States base its regional military strategy on deterrence? During the Cold War, the United States had little choice but to accept deterrence as the only viable strategy for dealing with the Soviet nuclear threat. Now the United States has a choice. Considering the effort required to deter the hard-to-deter adversaries, the United States needs to be very selective as to where it devotes its military resources for deterrence. Therefore, at any given moment, the United States can reliably deter only a few of these adversaries, although there likely will be many more to be deterred.

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Deterrence may well become the centerpiece of U.S. regional defense strategy. But this is by no means certain. Much is different now that the Soviet Union has faded as the primary U.S. adversary. Some of these differences may affect considerably the priority given to deterrence as an instrument of policy. For example, most potential regional adversaries of the United States will not possess nuclear weapons, at least not for awhile. Of those that do possess nuclear weapons, virtually all of them would have trouble delivering them to the United States.¹ Regional targets are more likely. Since the United States has pledged not to threaten nonnuclear states with nuclear attack, U.S. regional deterrence will take on largely a conventional character. The relative invulnerability of the United States means that warfighting is less perilous now for the United States than it was during the Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, potential U.S. adversaries will no longer be backed by a state (i.e., the former Soviet Union) posing a strategic threat to the U.S. homeland. Therefore, although conflict may be as distasteful as ever, it is not as dangerous to the United States overall. It follows that deterrence of regional adversaries is less critical to U.S. security than was deterrence of the former Soviet Union. In other words, deterrence is no longer a necessity; it is an *option* to be evaluated just like any other policy option. At the very least, the costs of mounting a credible deterrent

¹"Bombs on freighters," etc., are always possible. However, we believe (and discuss below) that the operational problems posed by these modes of delivery are quite significant.

threat have to be compared to the costs of fighting a regional adversary.

This report does not contain a reformulation of deterrence theory *per se*. Deterrence theory is too generic to require reformulation. However, the way deterrence theory is *applied* to strategic policy may need reformulation to reflect the many differences between the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Using historical case studies as a guide, and logic where systematic case studies are few, this research sought accurate generalizations about the conditions that appear to correlate with successful extended deterrence. The document is organized as follows:

- Chapter Two introduces the definition and conceptual framework we found useful for discussing regional deterrence.
- Chapter Three discusses the character and motivations of many Third World states, leading to an understanding of the circumstances under which regional deterrence may be difficult.
- Chapter Four discusses the ways in which U.S. deterrent threats can be made credible.
- Chapter Five examines the military dimensions of deterrence, with an eye toward identifying those capabilities that have the greatest impact on deterrence success.
- Chapter Six provides general observations regarding the feasibility of a U.S. regional deterrence strategy in light of the political and military constraints the United States will likely face in the coming years.

A companion document applies the reformulation of deterrence discussed here to the specific question of how the United States might deter the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S. homeland, U.S. forces overseas, or U.S. allies and friends (see Wilkening and Watman, 1994). This issue is central to the ongoing "counter-proliferation" debate. This companion document specifically develops a framework for thinking about regional nuclear deterrence based on an understanding of the opponent's motivations for making nuclear threats, then discusses the basic elements of a coherent U.S. strategy for coping with the threat, including the role played by different generic classes of military capability (i.e., con-

ventional retaliatory options, nuclear retaliatory options, active and passive defenses, and counterforce capabilities).

CONTRASTING REGIONAL DETERRENCE WITH COLD WAR DETERRENCE

There are substantial reasons to suspect, *a priori*, that the most effective strategies for deterring regional adversaries from threatening U.S. interests may be different from the U.S. deterrence strategy directed at the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This is because many fundamental assumptions about conflict with the Soviet Union, which underpinned U.S. deterrence, may not hold when deterrence is applied for very different purposes against very different types of states or regimes.

The assumptions behind deterrence of the Soviet Union can be sorted into three categories: those arising from the character and motivations of the Soviet regime, those arising from the magnitude of U.S. interests at stake in the Cold War, and those arising from the military capabilities deemed important for deterrence of the Soviet Union. In each of these areas, regional adversaries may prove to be quite different from the former Soviet Union.

The Character and Motivations of U.S. Adversaries

First, the United States assumed the Soviet leadership understood the dangers and capabilities of modern war and weapons, especially nuclear weapons (see Freedman, 1983, pp. 257-272). This assumption was based on the experience of the Soviet Union in World War II and the fact that they possessed modern weapons. The Soviets had tested nuclear weapons, were familiar with their power, and wrote extensively about their properties. Therefore, the United States had little concern that a deterrent strategy based on nuclear weapons would be minimized by the Soviet leadership. Indeed, on those occasions when the United States encountered opponents who did minimize the power of nuclear weapons, both the United States and the Soviets were alarmed, as with Mainland China in the 1950s and Cuba during the 1962 Missile Crisis.

By contrast, the leaders of many Third World states may not have a good understanding of modern military capabilities, especially the advanced conventional weapons fielded in the last decade or so.² These leaders do not possess such capabilities, and they have had relatively little exposure to them. Indeed, the ultimate capabilities of conventional weapons are not clear to many advanced militaries as well. We are at the opening stages of the so-called "Military-Technical Revolution," and it is well to remember that U.S. estimates of casualties for the war with Iraq numbered in the many thousands. In other words, in some ways, the U.S. performance in that campaign proved a surprise to U.S. strategists, as well as to Saddam Hussein. With the introduction of many new types of systems, a prolonged period of learning may be necessary before the full capabilities of modern forces can be absorbed.

Second, the United States assumed that the Soviet leadership valued the Soviet population and economy.³ One component of this value was military and instrumental. It required a labor force and industrial base to produce and sustain national power. But the United States also assumed that the Soviet leadership felt some responsibility for the welfare of the Soviet people and that the future of the Soviet Union as a model to be emulated mattered. In a word, the United States assumed that the Soviet leadership was in some sense "patriotic." Therefore, the United States felt it would be effective to base its deterrent strategy, in part, on a threat to destroy large portions of the Soviet population and economy. Precisely because this threat was assumed to be catastrophic to the Soviet leadership, it was seen as the last resort of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy.

²This is not to say that *all* Third World leaders are ignorant of the capabilities of *all* modern military forces *all* the time. It is to say that less-advanced military states are less likely to comprehend fully the capabilities of the most modern forces than the states that possess those forces. Certainly, Assad of Syria is likely to know a good deal, but his military lacks many of the capabilities that make U.S. forces so potent: advanced C³I, effective air-to-ground weapons, stealth, and the like. Similarly, Mao knew a great deal about the powers of certain operational concepts, such as "People's War." But he grossly underestimated the capabilities of modern firepower to offset quantitative and morale factors and tactical adroitness in the Korean War. Similarly, he was markedly ignorant of nuclear weapons. On this latter point, see Freedman (1983), pp. 273-282.

³For discussion of this point, see Mandelbaum (1979) and Kaplan (1981), pp. 667-677.

For many Third World regimes, there may be little analogous sense of responsibility or duty toward the population and its welfare. At best, the population and civilian economy are instrumental goods for such regimes. They are valued and protected only insofar as they are important to accomplishing the goals of the regime or individual leaders. More often, the population and civilian economy are viewed with suspicion, a necessary evil unavoidable in the process of holding national power. Such leaders regard their states more as a private preserve than a personal trust. As a result, deterrence based on threats to these populations and economies may be without much coercive power. One must be skeptical that threats to destroy the civilian electric power grid would have been very effective against Papa Doc Duvalier or Idi Amin.⁴ Similarly, the economic measures imposed on Haiti and Serbia have been slow to take effect, because they create pain for a group toward which the leadership is largely indifferent. This would be different if such pain created political instability that seriously threatened the leadership. While the popular welfare *per se* may not be a high priority to these leaders, retention of political power is. However, these regimes are very skilled in repressing domestic threats to themselves. This point is explored in depth in Chapter Three.

Third, throughout most of the Cold War, U.S. strategy was based on the assumption that the Soviet Union was satisfied enough with its status quo and its future prospects that it would not run great risks that might jeopardize them. This notion is captured in the description of the Soviets as "opportunistic," "conservative," or "risk averse."⁵ It meant that the Soviets would exploit opportunities, but would be much less likely to embark deliberately on a course of action carrying a high risk of substantial loss.

⁴This is not to say that punishment as a tool of deterrence is without merit, only that traditional countervalue approaches are likely to be less effective. Attacks on targets of special interest to national leaders may have merit, as discussed in Chapter Five.

⁵The deterrence literature on communication, generally, and signaling, in particular, is quite large. Much of it is controversial, since, for many, it has become synonymous with "gradualism" or using military force indecisively. As is so often the case, the original ideas are much richer and more nuanced than are the later recollections of them. We will cite only a few of the contributions that deserve mention. See Schelling (1963); Kahn (1965); Halperin (1963), pp. 95–112; Freedman (1983), pp. 173–219.

Another indication of this view was the U.S. focus on inadvertent war, arising out of crises, as the most likely source of war rather than deliberate, premeditated aggression *à la* Nazi Germany. This meant that deterrence had to address crisis interactions, an emphasis that led to concerns about crisis stability and crisis communication. The focus on crisis decisionmaking, as opposed to premeditated plans to attack, also led to the use of so-called "signals" as a means of communication (see Halperin, 1963, pp. 95–112, and Freedman, 1983, pp. 173–219). Signals connoted military actions that themselves had little military effect on the adversary but were meant to communicate an intention and/or demonstrate a capability. Against an adversary following a deliberate plan, which presumably would take intentions and capabilities into account, signals could be expected to have little effect, except to make clear that surprise had been lost. However, in a crisis in which adversaries are attempting to communicate commitments to protect their interests, signals could convey useful information, especially nuclear signals.

Unlike the Soviet Union, many Third World states may be chronically dissatisfied with their status quo and its future prospects. That dissatisfaction may arise from many sources, but primarily it is related directly or indirectly to the unequal distribution of power, status, and resources in the international system. Such dissatisfaction may be of particular relevance to deterrence because, as is discussed in Chapters Two and Three, a belief that one's status quo and prospects are marginal can be associated with a propensity for risk-taking. By definition, states willing to accept risks are more difficult to deter, other things being equal.

The U.S. Interests at Stake

Classical deterrence theory has long stressed the importance of strength of interests as a means of making deterrence threats credible to an adversary. During the Cold War, U.S. retaliatory threats to deter Soviet nuclear attack against the United States were deemed to be highly credible because the interests at stake could not have been greater for the United States. Even when extending deterrence to protect Western Europe from a Soviet conventional attack, the U.S. interests at stake made what to many appeared to be an irrational threat (the willingness to risk the loss of New York to save Paris) ap-

pear not incredible. NATO grappled with this so-called "coupling" problem from the beginning of the alliance with much anxiety during those periods of apparent loosening between the United States and Western Europe. However, while there was disagreement over questions of degree, most analysts felt that NATO's "threat [U.S. nuclear first use] that left something to chance" could be less than completely credible and still be successful, because the Soviet leaders could never be convinced that the United States would not escalate to nuclear first use given the stakes involved—despite the vulnerability of the U.S. homeland to Soviet retaliatory strikes.⁶ This point dovetails with the Soviet Union's relative satisfaction with the *status quo* throughout most of the Cold War. U.S. credibility could be less than perfect, because Soviet risk-taking propensities were relatively low, and because nuclear employment was possible, if not likely.

By contrast, in almost all regional crises, threats to U.S. national interests will not be of similar magnitude. This suggests that the United States may find it more difficult to use strength of interests to bolster the credibility of deterrence in the eyes of an adversary. If so, deterrence threats from which the United States might suffer more than a trivial cost should be especially affected. Cost is meant here in all its senses: time, resources, casualties, political support, and the like. The problem may be exacerbated by the fact that nuclear weapons frequently will not be the weapon of choice for U.S. deterrent threats. Conventional forces, though more credible, may not appear sufficiently threatening to deter regional adversaries. This takes the discussion to the military requirements for effective regional deterrence.

U.S. Military Forces for Deterrence

The military balance vis à vis the former Soviet Union focused largely on nuclear weapons. Although the basis of military stability with the former Soviet Union was not exclusively nuclear, the nuclear com-

⁶Though it is impossible to know what the Soviets believed, many U.S. and European analysts commented on the credibility problems inherent in NATO's strategy of flexible response. The existence of independent French and British nuclear deterrent forces eased the U.S. extended deterrence credibility problem, because Soviet leaders then had to contend with two additional paths by which nuclear war could arise out of conventional conflict in Europe. See, for example, Schwartz (1983).

ponent of any military crisis between the two superpowers made the Soviets conservative and cautious to a degree that would not likely have been achieved had the balance been entirely conventional. Several consequences for deterrence flowed from this state of affairs.

First, nuclear weapons existed in such numbers and were so overwhelming in their effect that neither side had to be terribly concerned about being able to destroy only the correct targets or, indeed, knowing with much certainty what the correct targets were. Since the early 1970s, each side could attack virtually all important target sets, though not necessarily as effectively as each would have liked (e.g., ICBM silos). The point is that the enormous destructiveness of nuclear weapons compensated for uncertainty about what the exact requirements of deterrence were.⁷

Second, nuclear weapons required no special competence to use effectively. A successful attack was almost entirely a matter of technology functioning properly. Therefore, each adversary could pin little hope on the prospect of avoiding destruction because of the incompetence of the other side, inferior generalship, lack of unit cohesion, and all of the other myriad ways in which the employment of conventional forces can be unpredictable. Therefore, military balances based on nuclear weapons are reasonably calculable, and adversaries can realistically contemplate the consequences of their use.

For deterrence of regional adversaries, the United States will have to rely largely on conventional weapons, at least in response to conventional threats. Conventional forces lack some of the fearsomeness and certainty of nuclear weapons. They may require considerable skill and resources to deploy. They may not function as hoped; unit cohesion may be low; generalship may be poor; and so on. In sum, the outcome of using conventional forces is much less predictable than the outcome of using nuclear weapons. Therefore, the magnitude of a U.S. deterrence threat based on conventional weapons may be difficult for an adversary to determine. This, in

⁷Of course, many arguments occurred throughout the 1970s and early 1980s about the requirements for nuclear deterrence. However, we regard these as arguments "on the margin," with national leaders on both sides essentially believing that mutual deterrence was overwhelming.

turn, suggests that conventional deterrence is likely to be less reliable than nuclear deterrence.

METHODOLOGY

These differences between deterring the former Soviet Union and deterring regional adversaries provide a basis for the questions explored in this study:

- What is the relationship between the character and motivations of the political regimes of regional adversaries, and how difficult or easy is it to deter them?
- How can deterrent threats be made credible to such adversaries when the U.S. interests at stake are likely to be less than vital?
- What military capabilities are most important for deterring regional adversaries?

To answer these questions, we relied on historical investigations of about 30 military crises between states in the 20th century. Thus, the conclusions reached are most pertinent to the problem of deterring regional states in crises that involve primarily military threats. By "regional states," we mean the political regimes governing potential Third World adversaries. We have not studied cases that focused on deterrence of nonstate actors (e.g., terrorist groups). States control territory and population. States are more-or-less fixed, organized entities with resources and values that can be threatened. Nonstate actors have a much less tangible existence. No doubt they have resources and values that they would resist losing, but these resources and values are likely to be different from those of states.

By "crises" we mean sharp, sudden increases in threat to an important U.S. national interest. Crises are often characterized by some degree of surprise and time pressure on U.S. leaders to act. The national interests endangered need not always be "vital," but they must be important enough that military responses are contemplated. Crises should be distinguished from chronic, slower-arising problems that also may involve deterrence issues.

By "military threats," we mean that, in the cases we examined, military capabilities were the primary method for threatening and deter-

ring. Obviously, many nonmilitary instruments, such as economic sanctions, can also be used for deterrence, but this study did not examine cases in which they were major elements.

As a result of these limits on the data we used, our findings do not directly address the problem of deterring nonstate adversaries, deterrence in noncrisis circumstances, or deterrence situations emphasizing nonmilitary threats and responses. For example, we have not examined directly the requirements for deterring a state from embarking on a long-term program to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This is a chronic rather than an acute problem. Similarly, we have not dealt with deterrence of terrorists or drug cartels. Finally, we have not included evaluations of the deterrence effectiveness of nonmilitary capabilities. We understand fully the importance of these unexamined varieties of deterrence. However, for the purposes of this study, we wished to stay as close as possible to the historical data on deterrence.

A large case study-based academic literature on deterrence exists, and we have made considerable use of it.⁸ In addition, we evaluated in particular detail the cases listed in Table 1. Where case studies already existed with the necessary detail and proper focus, we did not do additional historical research. We chose these 32 cases because they involved a large variety of regime types, objectives, and circumstances. Individual case studies of the crises marked with asterisks are included in this document to support particular points.

Necessarily, the process of using historical evidence is interpretive and is focused on the central tendencies that emerged from a large number of historical cases. This means that, for every broad conclusion we reach, there will be exceptions, perhaps important ones. These should be regarded as deviations around the mean—a part of any work that attempts to generalize from disparate behavior to arrive at usable findings. Readers undoubtedly will disagree with

⁸George (1991); Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1985); Lebow (1981); Jervis (1976); George and Smoke (1974); Huth and Russett (1984), pp. 496, 526; Huth (1988); Huth and Russett (1988); Shimshoni (1988); Huth and Russett (1988), pp. 29–45; Huth and Russett (1990), pp. 466–501; Huth and Russett (1993); Stein (1987), 326–352; Maoz (1983), 195–230; Levy (1988).

Table 1
Historical Cases Used in This Study

1	Fashoda crisis between Britain and France (1898)
2	Morocco crisis between France and Germany (1905–1906)
3	Bosnian crisis between Austria, Britain, Russia, Serbia, and Turkey (1908–1909)
4	Agadir crisis between France and Germany (1911)
5	Austro-Serbian crisis (1914)
6	Japan's attack on the United States (1941)*
7	Iran crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union (1945–1946)
8	Berlin blockade crisis (1948)
9	Chinese invasion of Taiwan (1950)
10	North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950)
11	Chinese intervention into North Korea (1950)*
12	Chinese seizure of Quemoy-Matsu (1954, 1958)
13	The Suez crisis (1956)
14	Eisenhower Doctrine crisis in Syria (1957–1958)*
15	North Vietnamese threatened invasion of Laos (1961)
16	Iraqi-threatened invasion of Kuwait (1961)
17	The Sino-Indian war (1962)*
18	Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)
19	North Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam (1965)
20	The Six-Day War (1967)*
21	Sino-Soviet crisis (1969)
22	Arab-Israeli War of Attrition (1969–1970)
23	The Jordanian crisis (1970)*
24	India's war with Pakistan (1971)
25	Yom Kippur War (1973)
26	Turkish invasion of Cyprus (1974)
27	Moroccan invasion of the Spanish Sahara (1975)
28	The Chinese attack on Vietnam (1979)
29	The Iran-Iraq war (1980–1988)
30	The Libyan intervention in Chad (1980, 1983)*
31	The Falklands War (1982)*
32	Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War (1990–1991)*

*Individual case studies included in this report.

some of our interpretations of particular cases. Such disagreements are an unavoidable consequence of the measurement problems posed in any study using historical cases. To the extent possible, we have tried to minimize the impact of differing opinions by adopting what we take to be the consensus, or majority, view of each case.⁹

As mentioned, the next two chapters discuss deterrence generally and its relationship to the characters of many Third World regimes. The logic of the argument made in these chapters is as follows:

1. Deterrence is a threat intended to inhibit a decisionmaker (in this case, an adversary's leadership) from taking a particular action.
2. Deterrence is successful when the utility of not taking that action can be made greater than the utility of taking it in the eyes of the adversary.
3. However, an area of decision theory known as "prospect theory" suggests that it is especially hard to deter a decisionmaker when inaction carries the high risk of serious loss, even when acting in the face of a deterrence threat that also carries serious risks.
4. Regional adversaries, more than the Soviet Union and the United States, are likely to find themselves confronted by situations in which the costs of inaction are deemed to exceed the costs of defying deterrence.
5. This is because, for these regimes, not to act in an international crisis often endangers the political survival of the leadership.
6. For this reason, many regional adversaries are likely to be hard to deter.
7. However, there is no evidence that many are literally "non-deterrable" or "crazy," although they may take risks that U.S. leaders would view as irrational from the U.S. perspective.

⁹For more information about the place of historical data in this research, see Appendix A.

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR DETERRENCE

Although deterrence is a familiar concept, it is worthwhile making clear precisely what we mean. Broadly defined, deterrence involves dissuading a leader, group, or state from acting against another's interests by threatening to impose some sanction or cost. At this level, deterrence applies equally well to individual behavior and to the behavior between states. Deterrence, thus defined, is part of a larger set of strategies for influencing a country's behavior. In general, one can dissuade an opponent from acting against one's interests by offering rewards or inducements if the opponent acts according to one's wishes, or by threatening sanctions or retaliation if the opponent does not. The latter is the domain of deterrence. The actions one wants to discourage can range from the acquisition of particular weapons to overt military attacks. This report focuses on the restricted set of proscribed actions in which a hostile regional power threatens to use military force against a U.S. ally or regional interest.

DEFINITIONS

Before we introduce the conceptual framework we used for deterrence, several distinctions should be made. The first is between "general" and "immediate" deterrence (see Morgan, 1983, Ch. 2). General deterrence refers to an interaction between rival states in which one state deters aggressive moves by another simply by maintaining the capability to retaliate, even though overt retaliatory threats are not made. One can say that a state of "general deterrence" exists between these two rivals, because, if not for the costs, crises involving overt threats might occur. These rivals may experi-

ence an intense arms competition, or a cold war, but overt military threats are presumably deterred. On the other hand, crises or wars might occur between two rival countries if the military balance favors one of the contestants. The appearance of crises between rival states involving overt military threats signals a breakdown of general deterrence.

Immediate deterrence, on the other hand, refers to situations in which the threat to use military force has been made explicitly, usually accompanied by visible military preparations, and the defender actively and visibly engages in attempts to dissuade the opponent from carrying out the attack by threatening some form of reprisal. In fact, a continuum of deterrence situations actually exists between general and immediate deterrence, depending on the degree of hostile intent on the part of the putative attacker and the level of visible military activity associated with the attacker's and defender's threats. With the focus on crises, this research obviously addresses immediate and not general deterrence.

The distinction between general and immediate deterrence is important for historical case studies, because accurate data are much harder to collect on the former than on the latter. Historical cases in which war did not occur are not examples of general deterrence successes if the "attacker" never intended to attack in the first place. Similarly, conflicts may not be examples of general deterrence failure if the defender never attempts to deter the attacker. Unless one can make these distinctions accurately, historical studies of general deterrence will be contaminated with false positives and false negatives, i.e., cases in which general deterrence supposedly worked or failed, when in fact deterrence either was not required or was never attempted. For this reason, most historical investigations focus on the smaller set of deterrence interactions involving immediate deterrence. By definition, immediate deterrence is easier to identify, because overt threats as well as overt military actions are taken by the putative attacker. Similarly, the defender has made overt and clear attempts to deter the attack by threatening some form of retaliation (otherwise we, again, would have a failure to attempt deterrence as opposed to a failure of deterrence). Thus, for example, it is difficult to tell whether general deterrence was successful between the United States and the former Soviet Union from 1970 to 1990. However, it is easier to tell whether immediate deterrence was successful in dis-

suading the Soviets from attacking Berlin in 1961. (Even here, there is disagreement about whether the Soviets actually intended to attack Berlin in 1961 or whether it was a bluff designed to extract concessions from the West short of war.)

The second distinction is between central and extended deterrence. Central deterrence refers to attempts to discourage attacks upon the deterrer's homeland, e.g., dissuading Soviet nuclear attacks against the United States during the Cold War. Similarly, Israeli attempts to dissuade Egypt or Syria from attacking Israel involve central deterrence. Extended deterrence, on the other hand, involves an interaction between three countries, labeled here as the *attacker*, the *defender*, and the *ally*. By *ally*, we mean any state the defender attempts to protect, even if there is no formal alliance between them. In fact, the defender and ally may not even be friends, as in the "Black September" incident, when Israel extended deterrence to protect Jordan from a Syrian attack in 1970.¹ The classic example of extended deterrence during the Cold War was the U.S. commitment to protect Western Europe from a conventional invasion by the Warsaw Pact. Similarly, the United States provided extended deterrence to Japan, as well as to allies in the Middle East, from possible Soviet threats.

Having made this distinction, one should note that future U.S. strategies to deter regional adversaries will principally involve extended deterrence. Military threats to the U.S. homeland will usually be absent, because regional powers lack the capability to reach the United States, with the exception of state-sponsored terrorism and perhaps the unconventional delivery of weapons of mass destruction (though this may be less likely than is often assumed).

¹The Syrians invaded northern Jordan to pressure King Hussein to allow greater freedom of action for the Fedayeen (a radical Palestinian guerrilla movement) then operating out of Jordan. Since Jordan was in the midst of a civil war, King Hussein clamped down on operations of the Fedayeen. Israel supported Jordan's efforts to limit Fedayeen activities and, hence, wanted to deter further Syrian pressure. Israel's retaliatory threat consisted of verbal warnings accompanied by the forward deployment of armored forces along the Israel-Jordan border. Under the threat of Israeli intervention, Syria ultimately withdrew from northern Jordan, allowing King Hussein to prevail. This is also a clear case of immediate, as opposed to general, deterrence. For more detail, see the discussion of the Jordanian historical case (1970) in Chapter Five.

Finally, it is important to distinguish between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.² Deterrence by denial attempts to dissuade an adversary from attacking by convincing him that he cannot accomplish his political and military objectives with the use of force or that the probability of accomplishing his political and military objectives at an acceptable cost is very low. In general, deterrence by denial threatens the opponent's military forces, especially those capable of projecting power beyond the opponent's borders. Thus, it is frequently referred to as a "countermilitary" deterrent strategy. In many respects, deterrence by denial is similar to the concept of "direct defense," i.e., physically blocking an attack, with the emphasis on dissuading an opponent as opposed to using brute force to block the attack.

Deterrence by punishment attempts to dissuade an opponent from attacking by threatening to destroy or otherwise take away that which the opponent values. For this reason, it is frequently called a "countervalue" deterrent strategy. One way to do this is to threaten civilian economic targets. But punishment can involve a much broader range of targets, including such values as an adversary's foreign presence or economic interests and its political structure. These value targets may or may not include the opponent's military forces. The emphasis here is not on denying the opponent's military objectives, but rather on inflicting sufficient pain to outweigh any benefits the adversary hopes to gain by attacking.³

Deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment are, of course, pure types. Actual strategies incorporate elements of both to varying degrees, depending on which type of threat is believed to be most credible and most effective for a given adversary. Nevertheless, it is useful to talk about them separately, because they have quite different targeting implications.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Our approach to deterrence rests on rational choice theory, although the language of expected utility models (one variant of a rational

²For a discussion of this point see Snyder (1961).

³See Davis (1994).

choice approach) is useful for discussing the mechanics of deterrence. Expected utility theory makes several assumptions about the decisionmaker's ability to collect and weigh information, develop alternatives, assign utilities to them, and assess probabilities so a decision can ultimately be made by choosing the option from among the alternatives that maximizes the expected utility.⁴ Expected utility theory requires all of these assumptions to be true and is invalidated when they are not.⁵

Rational choice, on the other hand, might be called an "approach," a "framework," or a way of thinking about decisionmaking (see Elster, 1986). It is essentially descriptive of a decisionmaking *process* that

⁴Numerous publications explain the fundamental assumptions behind expected utility theory. A classic introduction can be found in Kreps (1990, Ch. 3). Other essays on the topic can be found in Eatwell, Milgate, and Newman (1990), including "Economic Theory and the Hypothesis of Rationality" by Kenneth Arrow, "Expected Utility and Mathematical Expectation" by David Schmeidler and Peter Wakker, "Expected Utility Hypothesis" by Mark Machina, "Rational Behavior" by Amartya Sen, "Subjective Probability" by I. J. Good, and "Utility Theory and Decision Theory" by Peter C. Fishburn, to name a few. For a good discussion of recent developments in expected utility theory, see Machina (1987).

⁵The purpose and adequacy of rational choice theory are much debated. Construed as equating with expected utility theory, rational choice has been strongly criticized as misrepresenting the way individuals actually make decisions. Experience and experimental evidence demonstrate that human beings do not and cannot develop and weigh probabilities and utilities with the rigor implied by expected utility theory. This line of argument has been elaborated in many instances. See, for example, Davis and Arquilla (1991a,b).

These objections to expected utility theory are legitimate. Humans bring many issues to decisionmaking that may not be represented in the theory, which is, after all, intended to be prescriptive. For this reason, we speak here of rational choice theory, not expected utility theory. Rational choice theory provides a general, qualitative description of human decisionmaking. No doubt it is incomplete, as all theories are. The question is whether rational choice theory is so distortive of human decisionmaking as to be useless as an organizing framework for our discussion. We think it is *not*. Simon (1958) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), pp. 263-291, make their criticisms of the shortcomings of rational choice theory by modifying it, not eliminating it.

This is precisely the sense in which we use it. We accept fully that human rationality is bounded, as Simon argues, and that the assessment of utility and risk is filled with psychological shortcuts and distortions, as Kahneman and Tversky show so well. But these and other researchers take as their starting place that rational choice theory is an indispensable paradigm of decisionmaking, at least so far. This is because human beings do seem to think in terms of alternatives, utilities, and probabilities, even if imperfectly. And these researchers have not found those imperfections to be so great as to require abandonment of the theory as a very robust foundation on which many valuable additions can be built.

observation and experiment suggest qualitatively corresponds to the way humans actually make decisions. This process consists of building a mental model of the future by construing decisions in terms of alternatives, predicting the expected consequences of each, and selecting the one that promises a result sufficiently close to the one desired. The way decisionmakers actually conduct this process may depart considerably from the quantitative formalism of expected utility theory. But the qualitative content of the rational choice approach generally provides the basis for virtually all modern research in this area. For our purposes, it provides a clear way of understanding the workings of deterrence and the reasons why it succeeds or fails.

With these distinctions in mind, we now develop the conceptual framework we found useful for thinking about regional deterrence. The framework used here draws on rational choice theory. Rational choice theory can be applied to the decisionmaking of individuals, organizations, or states, provided the actor behaves in an instrumentally rational manner, i.e., chooses the option that maximizes the actor's expected utility.

Figure 1 shows a simplified decision tree for a leader contemplating an attack. This, of course, is a highly stylized representation of the choices facing leaders. More realistic decision trees would include different types of "attack" (e.g., limited probes, pressures of various sorts short of war, along with large military attacks), and multiple branches representing different responses on the part of the defender, with different probabilities associated with each response. Despite this more general formulation, the simple binary decision tree in Figure 1 is sufficient to illustrate the important elements of deterrence. We use it here to organize our thinking about regional deterrence.

Referring to Figure 1, if a leader decides to attack, there are two possible outcomes, U_1 and U_2 , depending on whether or not the defender retaliates after the attack has occurred. U_1 represents the utility from the attacker's point of view of launching an attack and receiving some specified retaliation. The probability that the defender will actually retaliate is given by p . The attacker's belief that the deterrent threat is a bluff is given by $1 - p$. Finally, the value, from the attacker's perspective, of carrying out an attack without




Figure 1—Attacker's Decision Tree

drawing a response from the defender is represented by U_2 . Therefore, from the attacker's point of view, the utility of attacking is given by comparing these two possible outcomes weighted by the likelihood that each will occur.

In deciding whether or not to attack, the leadership compares the expected outcome of attacking to the expected outcome of not attacking, i.e., of accepting the status quo. The utility associated with the status quo is represented by U_3 in Figure 1. The status quo includes not only the attacker's contentment with his current situation but also his evaluation of his future prospects. If the leadership believes that conditions in its country are deteriorating rapidly and that waiting will almost certainly bring about a substantial loss relative to the current situation, then U_3 is negative (even if the current status quo is acceptable). Deterrence succeeds if the expected utility of attacking is less than the expected utility of not attacking.

Using this formulation, one can readily see that deterrence does not simply involve a comparison of the costs (i.e., U_1) relative to the benefits (i.e., U_2) of attacking, as is so often stated in discussions about deterrence, but rather it involves a comparison of these costs

and benefits relative to the attacker's perception of the status quo and its future prospects. When a country is facing a deteriorating status quo (i.e., the value of U_3 is negative), the expected costs have to be more negative to outweigh the expected benefits for deterrence to be effective.

If the defender's threat to retaliate is credible, the value of p is high and the attacker's decision is essentially based on a comparison of U_1 and U_3 . On the other hand, if the credibility of the defender's threat is low, it is easy to see why deterrence fails, because the attacker compares U_2 (a positive outcome) to U_3 (which can be positive or negative).

At this point, one can see how the three factors examined in this study affect deterrence. The character and motivations of regional adversaries are represented by the magnitudes of U_1 , U_2 , and U_3 .⁶ The credibility of the deterrer is represented by the value of p . Finally, the military balance affects not only the credibility that the deterrer will actually carry out his threats, but also the magnitude of U_1 .⁷

Including the status quo in discussions of deterrence seems like an obvious point except that it is honored more often in the breach.⁸ In

⁶In principle, these utilities incorporate political (international and domestic), economic, and military factors. In fact, as Chapter Three discusses, domestic political considerations may be among the most important factors that affect many Third World leaders' subjective evaluations of utility. For example, leaders concerned with maintaining personal power may be sensitive to threats to target the instruments by which they maintain control of their regime (e.g., the secret police, select elements of the military). This is incorporated into U_1 . Likewise, the utility associated with a successful foreign venture (i.e., U_2) may be measured largely in terms of its impact on domestic political stability. Finally, U_3 reflects the leadership's perception of the status quo and its future prospects, e.g., the regime's ability to stay in power if no action is taken.

⁷The attacker may also discount certain military capabilities. For example, if an attacker (who does not possess nuclear weapons) does not believe the defender will use nuclear weapons first because of political, strategic, or moral constraints, the credibility attached to nuclear threats is essentially zero, even though the magnitude of U_1 would be quite negative if nuclear weapons were used.

⁸See, for example, a classic formulation of deterrence by George and Smoke (1974), pp. 59-60. Although these authors leave out the status quo in discussing the basic propositions of deterrence, one suspects they are aware of its importance, because they include values for the status quo in their discussion of game theory on page 68.

fact, the opponent's view of his future prospects may be the most important factor motivating regional leaders to act. This has important implications for how hard it might be to deter certain states. If an opponent believes his current situation and the prospects for the future are so bleak that "he has nothing to lose" by acting, then the value of U_3 is negative in the extreme. If so, it will be virtually impossible to make the expected utility of attacking more negative than the value of U_3 . A slight chance that the defender is bluffing will suffice to make attacking appear more attractive than not attacking.

Many people have commented on the fact that deterrence requires rational decisionmaking on the part of leaders.⁹ Critics of deterrence often point to decision trees like that shown in Figure 1 to argue that decisionmakers do not possess perfect information, much less the cognitive ability to process this information in the midst of a crisis, to carry out the calculations required by expected utility theory to act in a rational manner. However, the only assumptions required by rational choice theory are that leaders develop preferences among their alternatives; that they rank their preferences ordinally, even if imperfectly; and that they choose the alternative best suited to accomplishing their objective, again even if imperfectly.¹⁰ Even if information is sparse and cognitive limitations prevent complete digestion of the available information, this does not imply that leaders will act irrationally, i.e., choose an alternative that they believe does *not* best correspond to their objective. The subjective utilities U_1 , U_2 , and U_3 , as well as the credibility p , may be subject to biases and distortions; however, within these bounds, leaders will still act so as to maximize the utility associated with the options they see before them. In short, most of the psychological critiques of deterrence do not invalidate the "rational actor" assumption upon which deterrence theory rests. However, they do suggest that deterrence is difficult to implement as a strategy, because the defender, in constructing his deterrent threats, must be aware of the multifaceted nature of the opponent's decision tree, as well as the psychological biases and

⁹For a defense of rational deterrence theory, see Achen and Snidal (1989). A series of critiques of Achen and Snidal's position is found in the same issue, namely, George and Smoke (1989), Jervis (1989), Lebow and Stein (1989), and Downs (1989).

¹⁰See Zagare (1990), pp. 238-260.

limitations that affect the attacker's perception of the risks associated with alternative courses of action.

PROSPECT THEORY AND DETERRENCE

Thus far, the workings of deterrence have been represented according to simple rational choice theory. Over the past several decades, researchers have observed that decisionmakers consistently treat the prospect of losses differently from the prospect for gains, though rational choice theory predicts no such distinction. Such findings have been obtained from several different disciplines: psychology, economics, and political science. An elaboration of rational choice theory known as "prospect theory" was developed to account for these observed anomalies.¹¹ In our judgment, the introduction of prospect theory, or more precisely the empirical observations that led to the formulation of prospect theory, enriches considerably the classical formulation of deterrence.¹² (We do not actually make use of the mathematical formalism developed by Kahneman and Tversky for prospect theory.)

Prospect theory explicitly accounts for the fact that decisionmakers appear to weigh losses more heavily than gains in ways not accounted for by comparing the apparent utilities of alternatives.¹³ It is as though the concept of "loss" has a different psychological connotation than the concept of "gain," independent of the utilities involved. The result is that, all else being equal, decisionmakers usually accept greater risks to avert a loss than to achieve a gain, even when the expected utilities of the choices would predict the oppo-

¹¹See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), pp. 263-291; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982); and Quattrone and Tversky (1988).

¹²The application of prospect theory to conventional deterrence has also been discussed in Davis and Arquilla (1991b).

¹³Risk aversion in expected utility theory is represented by a concave utility function (i.e., one exhibiting diminishing utility with higher gains). Risk-seeking behavior, on the other hand, is represented in prospect theory by a convex utility function (i.e., one exhibiting diminishing utility for larger losses, where the utility domain has now been divided into gains and losses). When facing a choice between a certain loss and a gamble on a larger loss (where the expected loss is equal in both cases), utility is maximized by taking the gamble.

site.¹⁴ Indeed, decisionmakers will accept particularly high risks to avert a serious or irremediable loss. This idea is captured by the phrase "the strategic costs of inaction," i.e., the costs of accepting prospective losses may be too high for leaders not to act. The distinction between these two occasions for risky decisions—opportunity to gain versus aversion of loss—helps one understand why deterrence can be difficult.

Thus, leaders facing losses can be expected to choose a course of action that runs the risk of greater losses so long as this choice contains the possibility of averting the loss. How much of a gamble depends on the risk-taking propensities of individual leaders. This risk-taking propensity is particularly acute if U_3 represents a certain loss and if the decisionmaker seeking to avert the loss already has a marginally acceptable status quo and anticipates that the impending loss will make the status quo unacceptable. Indeed, at the limit, such decisionmakers become literally nondeterrable if they believe they have nothing to lose by acting.¹⁵ By the same token, decisionmakers seeking to improve on a status quo that is already satisfactory are easiest to deter, because they are least inclined to take risks that might jeopardize their agreeable situation.

Although this discussion is based on the crucial distinction between two seemingly dichotomous types of risk-taking situations—averting loss and seeking gain—we do not mean to imply that any decision is entirely one or the other. Rather, all decisions involve mixes of the two. The more the desire to avert loss dominates the mix, the greater the propensity for risk-taking and the harder that leader or state is to deter, other things being equal. The more the desire for gain domi-

¹⁴A risk-averse decisionmaker is one who prefers a gain with certainty to a gamble of achieving the same expected gain or perhaps even a slightly higher expected gain. A risk-prone decisionmaker is just the opposite: He prefers a gamble to a certain outcome. The reader can easily demonstrate risk aversion for gains by asking whether one would rather receive \$100 for certain or gamble on a 50-50 chance of receiving \$210 or nothing. Most people prefer the certain outcome of \$100 over the bet, even though the bet has a slightly higher expected return, i.e., \$105. On the other hand, when facing losses, most people prefer a 50-50 gamble on losing \$210 to the certain loss of \$100.

¹⁵The condemned convict awaiting execution is an appropriate example. If he is convinced that no pardon will save him, there is no sanction that will deter him from taking any risk. What threat is more fearsome and certain than the one that awaits him?

nates, the greater the propensity for risk avoidance and the easier it is to deter that type of leader.

This is represented graphically by Figure 2, which portrays the deterrence continuum. Hardest-to-deter is at the left; easiest-to-deter is at the right. Among the easiest-to-deter states are the United States and the countries of Western Europe. These are societies with relatively ample status quo's and good prospects for the future. The stakes must be very high indeed to motivate these states to undertake risky behavior. Also on the easier-to-deter side was the former Soviet Union, although it was probably further to the left than the United States. This impression was reflected in the scholarly discussions of Soviet conservatism with respect to risk-taking throughout the Cold War (see for example, Adomeit, 1986).

As we seek to show in the forthcoming discussion, many regional adversaries are likely to fall on the left or harder-to-deter side of the continuum. This is because these types of states are more likely than the United States or the Soviet Union to find themselves threatened by the risk of serious or unacceptable losses unless they act.

Note that at the leftmost end of the continuum is the point at which the cost of inaction becomes so large as to warrant accepting any risk. Such a point is reached when the magnitude and likelihood of loss are very large unless some ameliorative action is taken. In principle, this should be the realm of the "nondeterrables," states that




Figure 2—The Spectrum of Risk-Taking Behavior

cannot be inhibited by a threat because no threat is as costly as doing nothing.

Fortunately, we have found no evidence to suggest such states actually exist. This does not mean they have not or could not, only that we found no evidence that the theoretical possibility has been realized in the post-World War II period. It is probably safe to say that true nondeterrability is likely to be quite rare at any time, although it must be granted that North Korea and Cuba may become the latest candidates for nondeterrability status. Thus far, both have behaved as though each has something left to lose. For example, North Korea has not yet decided that its future is so grim that "rolling the dice" on a military option is preferable. Again, the next few months are likely to show whether this is because the North truly does have something left to lose or merely because its preparations are not complete.

The related notion of so-called crazy states should be mentioned here in connection with nondeterrability (see Dror, 1980). In principle, a state may be nondeterrable because it is too irrational to be sensitive to a deterrent threat. Since deterrent threats often are rather crude, this degree of irrationality has to be pronounced. Based on the cases we examined, we found very few, if any, clear examples of leaderships irrational to this degree. Many leaderships of regional states can be characterized as paranoid or perhaps sociopathic, but very few can be characterized as disabled by psychopathology. The process of competing for and holding power has much in common with rivalry between states, so the domestic political process may weed out individuals who are highly incompetent in domestic and international politics. Idi Amin of Uganda and Emperor Bokassa of the Central African Republic may be exceptions, although even their respective disabilities became pronounced only after they had held power for a time. Certainly, many highly unpleasant individuals have held power in Third World states, but few could be called crazy in the sense of being so irrational as to be nondeterrable.

Instead, we have found that regional adversaries may be hard to deter, if not nondeterrable. This leads them to accept high risks, risks that might be deemed "crazy" if the United States accepted them. But, confronted with the prospect of serious losses, seemingly crazy risk-taking can be entirely rational. The question is: Why do many

regional adversaries find themselves in crises carrying the risk of serious losses, and what is the character of those losses? We believe part of the answer to this question is the way many of these states are governed, the subject of the next chapter.

**THE CHARACTER AND MOTIVATIONS
OF REGIONAL ADVERSARIES**

REGIME TYPES

Our research on regional deterrence led us to explore the extent to which a relationship exists between the basic types of regional regimes the United States may encounter and the requirements for deterring them. To begin, we start with a taxonomy of regime types. There are many ways to construct such a taxonomy.¹ We have used a simple model that distinguishes between the three basic regime types described in the literature:

- (a) Democratic regimes
- (b) Authoritarian regimes
- (c) Totalitarian regimes.

While we have included democratic regimes for completeness, the characteristics and motivations of nondemocratic regimes are far more relevant. This is because the great majority of Third World regimes remain nondemocratic. Of those that are democratic, it is unlikely that the United States will find itself in a crisis with one in

¹The following discussion draws from the large academic literature on regime types and the characteristics associated with them. We found the following work particularly helpful: Linz (1975). Those interested in surveying this field more widely should see Wiseman (1966), Almond and Coleman (1960), Almond and Powell (1966), Finer (1971), Blondel (1972), Rustow (1967), Organski (1965), Apter (1965).

which military deterrence is an issue.² Therefore, authoritarian, totalitarian, and personal dictatorship regimes are emphasized in this analysis.

These regime types differ across three criteria: the amount of compulsory public participation in regime activities, the amount of pluralism or alternative sources of political power, and the extent to which formal ideology plays a role in regime legitimacy and behavior. Compulsory public participation refers to an obligation imposed under penalty by the state on each citizen to take an active part in certain political activities. These might involve membership in a political organization at the workplace or home, acting as an informant to the secret police, public demonstrations on state occasions, participation in youth activities, etc. Degree of pluralism refers to the extent that centers of political, economic, and social power exist other than the central government. For example, in some regimes the church, industrialists, union leaders, or other social institutions may possess power independent from the state leadership. Formal ideology refers to an elaborate code for interpreting the past and the present and providing guidance for the future. It rationalizes the existence of the regime and enumerates the characteristics of the leadership that entitle it to rule. In the Soviet case, Marxism-Leninism provided the intellectual underpinnings for empowering the Party and its elite as the vanguard of the revolution, based on their supposedly superior understanding of the workings of societies.

Although often seen as interchangeable, authoritarian and totalitarian regimes differ considerably according to the three criteria listed above, and this distinction is important for the study of deterrence. Figure 3 illustrates these differences by locating each regime type along the dimensions of compulsory participation, pluralism, and ideology.

In a purely authoritarian regime, citizens are not required to participate in any regular political activities. Passive compliance with the regime's dictates is all that is necessary. Authoritarian regimes are

²There has been a lot of scholarly discussion of the proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other, although they show no reluctance to fight nondemocracies. For a recent discussion of this argument, see Doyle (1986). For an opposing point of view, see Layne (1993), pp. 5-51.




Figure 3—Regime Types

more like democracies in this way. Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, and Greece under the junta are good examples. By contrast, totalitarian regimes are characterized by very strong coercive pressures on the general public to become politically involved in some way. It may be through "block committees" or "self-criticism" as in Cuba and the People's Republic of China. The various forms of public political activity may be quite minor, but, in the aggregate, the degree of social mobilization in totalitarian regimes is high compared to that in authoritarian regimes.

Authoritarian regimes are more pluralistic than totalitarian, though certainly not as pluralistic as democracies. The alternative power centers in an authoritarian society are not based on popular sovereignty. Rather, they are important elite institutions, such as the military, the religious hierarchy, the wealthy, a traditional aristocracy, and the like. These multiple power centers have a degree of independence unknown in totalitarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes do not have true monopolies of power. Rather, they must maintain themselves by political activity: accommodation, bribery, *quid pro*

quo, playing rivals off against one another, and the like. Hence, authoritarian regimes are involved in constant "juggling acts" that frequently make them quite unstable. That instability is exacerbated by the permanent difficulties these regimes encounter in establishing legitimacy—in making clear why they should hold power and others should not. Ultimately, most authoritarian leaders are compelled to substitute claims of special effectiveness for legitimacy, which can be strengthened by simple longevity.³ This point about the dynamic aspects of authoritarian regime politics is particularly important for deterrence, for it provides an explanation for the crisis behavior of these regimes and the location of targets of considerable vulnerability and sensitivity.

Totalitarian regimes have little pluralism, or there are no sources of power in such societies other than the state. Organizations may exist that have the appearance of independence, such as religious groups, labor unions, physicians, and the like. But the power they possess is entirely derivative and revocable at will by the central authority. Such regimes are usually more stable than authoritarian regimes. They are not engaged in an internal "juggling" act, because no other institutions require juggling. However, this monopoly of power is purchased by a very heavy investment in the apparatus of state coercion: secret police, domestic intelligence, the militarization of domestic life, and the like. Indeed, both totalitarian and authoritarian regimes have this emphasis on domestic security in common. In both cases, the obsession with internal security is a manifestation of the chronic problem these regimes must overcome: the precariousness of the domestic political order.

Finally, authoritarian regimes have few if any formal ideological underpinnings. They frequently exploit nationalism and xenophobia for the purposes of generating political energy. However, such regimes seldom have complex institutional structures for elaborating, communicating, and codifying these themes. References to a great national "Golden Age" may appear in speeches and pronouncements. Persecution of various stigmatized groups may be

³Presumably, any group or individual capable of holding power for a long time in such circumstances must be presumed to possess some special skills.

encouraged. But these activities have little resemblance to the systematic approach taken to ideology in totalitarian regimes.

In contrast, totalitarian regimes usually depend heavily on ideology as a source of legitimacy. Ideology refers here to a formal and elaborate set of institutions for the promulgation of political thought supportive of the regime and the education of the public in it. These institutions are often represented at the highest political levels. Individuals can pursue careers in ideological activity; academic degrees are awarded in it; and ideological institutions compete favorably for resources with the other state priorities.

In either an authoritarian or totalitarian regime, central power usually resides mainly in an individual, although that need not be so. Power could reside in a junta, such as in Greece or Argentina. Power can reside partly in an individual and partly in a council, such as in the Soviet Union after Stalin. It can reside entirely in an individual surrounded by institutions with only derivative power, such as in Stalin's Soviet Union or, perhaps, Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Power can be distributed among a strong individual and strong semiautonomous institutions, such as in Franco's Spain or Salazar's Portugal. Finally, power can reside entirely in an individual surrounded by virtually no enduring institutions, such as in Idi Amin's Uganda or Papa Doc Duvalier's Haiti.

Obviously, as with any taxonomy, so-called pure cases are rare. Indeed, they may be nonexistent. The most extreme form of totalitarian regime would be a single person who holds and wields all power. While some regimes have approached this point, we can find none that has reached it. This is because the task of governance almost always requires delegation and institution building, a process that automatically creates the possibility of alternative power centers, even weak ones. The greater the extent of this power sharing, the more the regime can be characterized as authoritarian. The majority of regimes the United States will encounter will have substantial authoritarian elements.

Stalin's Soviet Union or Kim Il Sung's North Korea may come closest to a pure totalitarian regime. What power was delegated to other institutions seems to have been entirely derivative and revocable with little cost. Compare this to Hitler's Germany, in which power

was derived, but, once delegated, led to the creation of semiautonomous institutions: the SS, the war industries, the armed forces, and so on. It is not clear whether Hitler could have stripped Himmler and the SS of their power. Similarly, the costs of stripping Speer of his were deemed too high, which afforded him considerable safety and autonomy. Further toward the authoritarian pole might be Assad's Syria. This is a regime with strong totalitarian strains, yet power is shared with other individuals and institutions. Or, at least, Assad has to be concerned to maintain the support of those individuals and institutions while preventing them from growing too powerful. Less totalitarian was Nasser's Egypt. King Hussein's Jordan, prior to the constitution, was even less so. Opinions are mixed over where to place Saddam Hussein's Iraq along this continuum. Some would place that regime at about the same place as Stalin's. Others would place it close to that of Assad. Few would rate it as any less totalitarian than that.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL INSTABILITY

These distinctions between regime characteristics are important for deterrence. The central problem of both regime types is chronic domestic instability—at least in the view of their leaderships.⁴ Instability refers here to the extent to which the regime's hold on political power is precarious or fragile. One indicator of this instability is the frequency of regime changes in the developing world. But this statistic may not be most revealing, because several regional regimes have great longevity, for example, those in Syria, Iraq, and North Korea. More revealing of instability are the levels of resources and effort devoted to suppressing internal dissent. The great size of internal security establishments is a characteristic that many otherwise dissimilar regimes share in common. Thus, the fact that some

⁴For an extensive discussion of the internal weaknesses of Third World states, see Buzan (1988), pp. 14–43. Buzan proposes a regime taxonomy in which he categorizes states as unified, fragmented, and anarchic. There is a strong correlation between totalitarian and authoritarian Third World states, on the one hand, and fragmented states, on the other. For recent books on national security in the Third World, see David (1991), Jackson (1993), and Job (1992).

regimes have endured is more a reflection of the leadership's skills in rooting out domestic opponents than it is the absence of opponents.⁵

What explains this chronic instability? These regimes lack the legitimacy needed to justify why (besides simple possession of power) they should rule. Many more totalitarian regimes seek to ameliorate this problem by stressing their ideological basis. But few, if any, have been able to rely on ideology alone as a durable source of legitimacy for more than a decade or two. Soviet Marxism became increasingly cynical in its dependence on naked coercion. Nazism was defeated in war less than 20 years after its accession to power. Authoritarian leaders have an even more difficult legitimacy problem, since ideology usually plays only a minor role in such regimes. Perhaps some religiously based regimes, such as Iran's, may be successful at sustaining a claim of legitimacy, although it is too early to tell. Perhaps, Nasser's regime could be said to have been based on a principle, the leadership of the Arab nationalist movement. A few authoritarian leaders may derive some legitimacy from the risks they took in earlier revolutionary activity or in their descent from important personages. But, for the most part, it is difficult to discover a single example of a Third World nondemocratic regime that succeeds in deriving legitimacy sufficient to permit doing without an extensive apparatus for sheer repression.

Greatly exacerbating this problem is the fact that most Third World states are only partially formed. They are still involved in the problems of state building that were settled in Europe and the United States by the end of the 19th century. Governance in these states is often highly personal and poorly institutionalized. Political forms, values, and systems may not survive the leadership of particular individuals. Rational bureaucracies often do not exist or exist precariously. In particular, publicly recognized and reliable arrangements for succession do not exist in many of these states.

⁵The F-16 fighter provides an interesting analogy to the instability of these states. The F-16 is aerodynamically unstable. Yet it does not fall out of the air, because computers make the myriad slight control adjustments necessary to keep the plane aloft. If those computers were to fail, a human pilot would quickly lose control. The fact that few F-16s crash is not an indication of their stability; it is an indication of how well their inherent instability is managed. Precisely the same is true of most Third World regimes.

These problems of illegitimacy and weak institutions tend to create more problems for authoritarian regimes. This is because authoritarian regimes are more pluralistic than totalitarian ones. Plurality can be a source of great strength in the context of a regime with widely recognized and accepted legitimacy, an established process for governance and succession, and institutions not dependent for survival on particular individuals. In the absence of these sources of stability, political plurality can be highly destabilizing, especially when the competing power centers are closely balanced. Without a respected theory of legitimacy, any individual or institution with power can seriously entertain attempting to seize control. Without strong processes controlling political competition and succession, power is accumulated through *ad hoc* arrangements of rewards and penalties. These arrangements seldom have the durability of institutions, so they rise and fall for purely tactical reasons. Such impermanence makes domestic politics fragile, especially before a regime can accumulate longevity, a proxy for legitimacy.

This fragility can be termed a chronic internal crisis. Indeed, all the security organizations of the state have as their primary mission the control of this crisis. For this reason, it is often said that the most serious threats to the national security of many Third World regimes are domestic. This should be contrasted with the Western model of national security, in which external threats are the focus of interest.

Several authors have made this observation. For example Mohammed Ayoob (1991, pp. 257-283) states that

Security as a concept is fundamentally different for Third World States than for First World States. . . . Security for Third World States emanates from within. . . . Most leaderships are preoccupied primarily with internal threats to the security of their state structures and to the regimes themselves.

In the same vein Jusuf Wanandi (1981) writes that

Conflicts in the Third World are basically reflections of internal weaknesses. . . . Internal weaknesses may be the result of . . . decolonization; . . . political struggles; . . . social revolution.

The emphasis on domestic threats to national security is crucial to understanding the crisis behavior of Third World states, for, in many cases, a regime's responses to those threats help propel them into international crises. This can happen in several ways, as is illustrated below in some of the case studies. For example, a regime may find an international event unacceptable, because it improves the situation of domestic enemies. This was the problem Mao tried to address when he ordered the intervention in the Korean War in 1950. A weak regime may create a crisis or seize on an international situation as an opportunity to prove its effectiveness. Argentina's junta took this course in the Falklands in 1982. A regime may enter into an international crisis unwillingly as the only way to protect itself from domestic criticism. Such was the case of Nasser in 1967 and Nehru in his conflict with China in 1962.

These threats to domestic stability can take several forms. Most frequently, the threat is to the political power or survival of the existing leadership. However, threats to the existing system of governance, to relations between important social groups, and even to the survival of the state are not uncommon either. The point is that, although the proximate cause of an international crisis involving a Third World state may be an external event, its deeper causes are often more a function of domestic threats to the weightiest interests of the leadership. The stakes could not be higher for these regimes, and they behave accordingly.

Most often, authoritarian regimes are more vulnerable to domestic crisis than totalitarian ones, because authoritarian regimes can depend less on purely repressive means to ensure control. Institutions and powerful individuals have to be co-opted on a continuing basis, and their displeasure cannot be ignored. This equilibrium of forces that permit authoritarian regimes to rule is often exquisitely sensitive. Therefore, such regimes have little internal capacity to absorb shocks to that equilibrium. Those may arise from inside or outside the state, and the leaders of such regimes have to react emphatically to them, or believe that they do. Because more totalitarian regimes do not depend so much on maintaining an equilibrium, because the power of these regimes is more unitary and centralized, they are less sensitive to internal pressures. Presumably, Stalin was less con-

cerned about the reaction of the Soviet industrialists to his decisionmaking than Franco was about the Spanish industrialists.⁶

What follows are five of the many cases that illustrate the powerful ways in which concerns for domestic stability lead already fragile states to aggressive international risk-taking. One concerns a powerful, totalitarian regime; another a weak, partially formed totalitarian regime; two involve authoritarian regimes; and one a democratic regime. These cases are as follows:

- The Chinese decision to intervene in Korea in 1950
- Argentina's invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982
- Egypt's decision to remilitarize the Sinai in 1967
- India's attempt to coerce the Chinese over a disputed border area in 1962
- Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.⁷

HISTORICAL CASES ILLUSTRATING THE INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS

China, 1950

The Chinese decision to enter the Korean War in the winter of 1950 is an excellent example of the ways in which domestic fragility can drive a state's international behavior. In addition, this decision also demonstrates the strength of motivation that results when domestic

⁶Clearly, democratic regimes also feel pressures to act internationally to maintain domestic strength. However, these regimes are not so sensitive to such pressures as are many nondemocratic Third World regimes. This is because a democratically elected head of state or government does not have the freedom of action of nondemocratic leaders. He or she is hemmed in by a plethora of competing institutions, as well as by the public. Therefore, while a president or prime minister may want desperately to serve his or her own political interests in a particular international situation, the extent that he or she can is usually limited.

⁷Considerable historical evidence supports the argument that domestic political concerns were critical for China, Argentina, Egypt, and India. The case is less clear for Iraq, if only because less information is available. We feel we know enough at this point to support the view that Iraqi domestic considerations influenced Saddam Hussein's decisionmaking powerfully. Whether they were determinative is not answerable yet.

stability is deemed to be at stake. This case is informed by a number of classic works on this subject and by recently obtained Chinese documents: Mao's Korean War telegrams to Stalin, Chou en Lai, and Chinese military commanders in the field.⁸ These data provide a clear picture of Mao's sense of Chinese domestic weakness in the fall of 1950. The Chinese revolution was only two years old at this point; Taiwan was in Nationalist hands; and China was isolated in the world. Her economic situation was dire, and Mao was very concerned that the counterrevolutionary potential in China was dangerously high.

Mao's fears were twofold. First, he was concerned that U.S. and Republic of Korea forces would push into Manchuria and seize China's industrial heartland. However, he was relatively sanguine about this prospect compared to his greater fears that a liberated Korea and a U.S. presence on the Chinese border would imperil the internal order. Such a scenario would have this effect, because it would tie down troops that were needed to menace Taiwan and maintain internal security, be very expensive at a time when China had little cash, and embolden counterrevolutionaries.

Specifically, as Whiting and others have noted, the position of the new Chinese revolutionary regime was quite precarious in 1950. Internal armed resistance had not been entirely suppressed. Large areas in western and southern China remained potentially hostile because of their continued connections to the anticommunist opposition—Kuomintang forces, traditional sources of feudal authority, and non-Chinese ethnic groups. Mao's decision to enter the war was not taken as a crude diversion to the troubled population, although the "diversion" theory may be applicable at times. Rather, he sought to remove an external influence that, if left unrestrained, threatened to amplify critically indigenous sources of instability.

⁸See Whiting (1960); Lebow (1981); George and Smoke (1974). In particular, see Christensen (1992), pp. 122–154. This article discusses Chinese decisionmaking in light of recently released Chinese archival materials, including some of Mao's Korean War cables.

Argentina, 1982

Argentina's calculations that led to its attack on the Falklands (Malvinas) illustrate the way war and peace decisions can be crucial to a regime's struggle to retain legitimacy. In this case, Argentina's leaders attempted to buttress their hold on political power through a demonstration of military competence. The reasons they felt compelled to take certain steps illustrate the relationship between internal regime weaknesses and aggressive external behavior.⁹

The military junta in Argentina seized power in March 1976 in response to the incompetence of the Peronistas in managing internal security and the economy. The bloodless coup received widespread popular approval because of the expectation of the military's effectiveness in both of these areas. By early 1982, the junta's incompetence had proved to equal that of the previous regime, and Argentina's middle and upper classes, the military's main supporters, had become disaffected.

During World War II, Argentina had been the most prosperous and advanced state in South America. By 1976, when the junta took power, the Argentine economy had reverted to Third World status because of extensive corruption, national subsidies for various industries and groups, massive public-sector unemployment, and inflation. The junta attempted to rectify this situation through anticorruption and anti-inflation measures and free-market restructuring. Initially, the regime was able to obtain good results, as inflation dropped below 100 percent per year and national growth reached 7 percent in 1979. However, the widespread corruption and other weaknesses of the nation's financial institutions led to the collapse of its leading banks, which produced cascading business failures. By 1981, growth had dropped to less than 1 percent; inflation had reached an annual rate of 150 percent; real wages declined by 18 percent; and unemployment exceeded 15 percent.¹⁰ The junta reacted in the traditional way of authoritarian regimes in this situation: It relaxed the austerity measures, used the public

⁹For general information on the Falklands War, see Lebow (1985), pp. 89-124; Hastings and Jenkins (1983); "Falkland Islands—The Origins of a War" (1982), p. 43.

¹⁰As cited in Lebow (1981), pp. 97-98.

sector to absorb unemployment, and reinstituted government subsidies to prevent the loss of more jobs. Unfortunately, accelerating inflation was the result of the increased money supply needed to maintain these large-scale social programs.

The junta was no more successful in matters of internal security, an area of supposed expertise. In 1976, several left-wing insurgencies were active in Argentina, of which the Montoneros were the best known. The military encouraged the expectation that these groups would be overcome quickly and easily. Instead, what became known as the "Dirty War" ensued, which involved widespread repression, torture, and murder. As many as 20,000 may have been murdered, and many more were arrested or tortured. This "Dirty War" ultimately reached into many of the segments of Argentine society that had supported the 1976 coup.

As a result of its demonstrated incompetence, the junta became increasingly unpopular, especially between 1980 and 1982. Organized labor, which had been badly hurt by the junta's economic policies, staged large protests in major cities in 1982. Farmers and small-business people were openly critical, as well, although they were not well organized. Consistent with the "juggling act" characteristic of authoritarian regimes, the junta mixed repression with a certain measure of increased freedom. As a result, by June 1981, Argentina's five largest political parties joined together in a "common front" to demand open party activity and elections. The junta could not afford simply to deny these demands, and in November 1981 it issued new, freer guidelines for political activity.

Similarly, newspapers became bolder in 1980 and 1981 in their criticisms of the junta. Indeed, *La Prensa* and the *Buenos Aires Herald* openly advocated the reinstitution of civilian national leadership.¹¹ These and other newspapers also used continuing British sovereignty over the Falklands as illustrative of the junta's shortcomings. When the labor demonstrations reached their peak in March 1982, the junta felt compelled to use the Falklands as a means of reasserting its legitimacy through a demonstration of military competence.

¹¹As quoted in Lebow (1981), p. 98.

The growing domestic crisis in Argentina dovetailed perfectly with the Conservative electoral victory in Great Britain in 1979. The prior Labor governments of Wilson and Heath had conducted continuous negotiations with Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falklands. Although very slow, these talks had produced movement toward the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. However, the Thatcher government was much less friendly to this outcome. Negotiations stalled in 1981 and were broken off by the Argentines in early 1982.

Directly after the repudiation of the negotiations on March 3, 1982, the Falklands crisis began when a group of Argentine workmen raised the Argentine flag over South Georgia. They had been landed on the island as part of a long-term contract to remove British scrap metal. It is not clear whether or not the junta knew what the group intended; however, it is clear that Argentine public opinion had been fully aroused over the Falklands by this time. As a result, the junta seized on public approval of the workmen's actions and announced that the Argentine navy would give them "full protection." On March 26, 1982, over 100 Argentine troops landed on South Georgia; on April 2, Argentina invaded the Falklands.

Egypt, 1967

The Arab-Israeli War of 1967 provides another excellent example of the prominent role of regime weakness in the international behavior of Third World states. Specifically, the weakness was a lack of regime legitimacy, leading the Egyptian and Syrian leaderships to undertake risky behavior. In this case, both regimes miscalculated the risks, and war was the result.

A faction of the Ba'thist party seized power from another Ba'thist faction in Syria in February 1966. However, the new regime's stability was quickly threatened by serious factionalism within the governing party, the military, and the larger society. The governing faction attempted to ameliorate these cleavages by reasserting a policy of the forcible elimination of Israel. To this end, the new regime gave active support to Palestinian guerrilla organizations based in Syria and to their cross-border raids into Israel from Syria and Jordan. Tension with Israel grew throughout the summer and fall of 1966. In response, Syria signed a defense pact with Egypt in November 1966. Nasser's claim of Egyptian and personal leadership of the Arab world

arose from his vigor in pursuing Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause. Therefore, to a great extent, he could not separate himself and Egypt from the Israeli-Syrian confrontation without risking dangerous domestic and external criticism.

In the face of increasing casualties inflicted by the *fedayeen* raids, Israel launched a major attack on a Jordanian town, Es Samu, which was a major staging base for Palestinian guerrillas trained in Syria. Egypt did nothing to support Syria and Jordan during the Es Samu operation, in spite of pressure to threaten Israel in the Sinai or to provide Egyptian aircraft to the Jordanians. Nasser justified his inaction by pointing out that the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) formed a buffer in the Sinai between Egyptian and Israeli forces. Syria and Jordan loudly accused Egypt and Nasser of using the UNEF to cover cowardice. In taking this line, Syria and Jordan directly threatened the source of Nasser's legitimacy and, hence, the stability of the Egyptian regime. As a result, Nasser came under strong pressure from his high military commanders to request the withdrawal of the UNEF in December 1966. Nasser resisted this move, believing that the Arabs were unprepared for war.

This uneasy equilibrium of raid and counterraid continued until April 1967, when Syria began shelling Israeli border settlements over disputed claims to the demilitarized zone separating the two states. The artillery exchanges escalated, culminating in a highly public and visible air battle that extended to the outskirts of Damascus. Six Syrian aircraft were destroyed, compared to zero Israeli losses. Again, Egypt took no action, and criticism of Nasser increased. This time, the Egyptians attempted to justify their inaction by asserting that their treaty obligations did not extend to assistance against localized raids. Not surprisingly, Syria and Nasser's domestic opponents dismissed these arguments as evasions. The Soviet Union, concerned about its own interests in Syria, added its weight to the pressures on Nasser to act in some way against Israel.

Matters reached a head in May 1967 when the Soviets notified Egypt that Israel was concentrating forces in preparation for an imminent attack on Syria. The Soviets urged Egypt to deter Israel by deploying large forces into the Sinai. The intention was to signal Israel that a

one-front war with Syria was not possible. Such an action had been successful in 1960.¹² As it happened, the Israelis were not concentrating forces against Syria. This reality was reported by the Jordanian and Egyptian intelligence services to their respective governments. However, by this time the Egyptian leadership felt compelled to act or accept possibly fatal damage to its claims to political legitimacy.

On May 14, 1967, the Egyptian army was placed on full alert; some reserves were mobilized; and units on the Suez Canal were ordered to cross into the Sinai. These steps were given great publicity to buttress Nasser's domestic situation and to ensure that the Israelis would receive the signal.¹³ On May 16, the Egyptians sent a letter to the commander of the UNEF requesting only its partial withdrawal. Even at this point, Nasser was trying to avoid war with Israel by limiting the provocation he posed. At the same time, he had a competing interest in brinkmanship, to strengthen his political position. He attempted to strike a balance between them. *But, when compelled by events to favor one interest over the other, Nasser saw the risk of war with Israel as preferable to the risks of domestic instability.*

This preference is revealed by what transpired upon receipt of Egypt's May 16 message to the UNEF commander. The request was referred to U Thant, the UN Secretary-General, who informed Egypt that he would consider a request for partial withdrawal equivalent to a demand for complete withdrawal. At this point, Nasser might have been able to use the UN's response for political cover. However, he elected not to take that course. On May 18, Egypt decided "to terminate the presence of UNEF from the territory of the UAR and the Gaza Strip" (Riad, 1981, p. 18). By this action, the greatest obstacle to war had been removed. Israel ordered full-scale mobilization on May 19. Israeli operations against Egypt began on June 5 with well-known results.

¹²See Stein (1991), pp. 126-159; Riad (1981); Sadat (1977); Safran (1978). For a somewhat contrary view that recognizes the domestic political pressure on leaders to act, but concludes that deterrence fails only when opportunities to attack arise owing to the lack of credible deterrent threats, see Lieberman (1994).

¹³Ironically, in 1960, the Israelis did not detect the Egyptian advance into the Sinai for almost two days.

In sum, Syria, Jordan, and especially Egypt were captives of domestic fragility. This was a consequence mainly of the discontent of the elite in these countries, although public opinion played a significant role in Egypt and Jordan. Even by May 22, when war with Israel appeared highly likely to the Egyptian leadership, Nasser was described by Sadat as "eager to close the Straits [of Tiran] to maintain his great prestige within the Arab world" (Sadat, 1977, p. 172). Nasser's need to make Egyptian actions public also greatly decreased any flexibility he might have had. Jordan's taunts of Egyptian passivity in 1966 and early 1967 were the result of King Hussein's domestic vulnerability to his Palestinian majority. Indeed, his advisor and cousin, Sharif Zaid Ben Shaker, stated at the end of May 1967 that "If Jordan does not join the war, a civil war will erupt in Jordan."¹⁴ For Syria, public opinion was much less of an issue. The Ba'thists' claim to legitimacy was based on their party's role as a vanguard of secular Arab nationalism. The existence of Israel was always deemed to be inconsistent with that vision, so *any* Ba'thist regime was bound to pursue a policy of eventual confrontation with Israel. However, such a policy did not necessitate a war with Israel in 1967. The reason Israel-Syrian tensions reached the heights they did are directly related to the new Syrian regime's immediate need to play the "Israeli card" as assertively as it could.

India, 1962

The Sino-Indian war in October 1962 provides our last example of the intermingling of domestic stability and international behavior and of how the desire to avert loss (usually loss of political control) leads to increased risk-taking. It also illustrates, as do most of the cases we examine, that a propensity to take high risks is not synonymous with being undeterrable. The Indian leadership was concerned with the military balance with China, and a particular assessment of that balance was crucial in Indian decisionmaking.¹⁵ It follows that, had China been able to alter that particular assessment,

¹⁴Quoted in Stein (1991), p. 142.

¹⁵See Lebow (1981), pp. 164-169, 184-192; Maxwell (1972); L. Kavic (1967), (1975); Moraes (1956); and Edwardes (1972).

the chances of deterrence success would have been substantially increased.

This war was the result of India's decision to contest Chinese occupation of a disputed border area, the Aksai Chin. The relative equities of the Chinese and Indian claims to the Aksai Chin are irrelevant to this discussion. Interested readers are directed to an extensive literature on the long and rich history of the question (see, for example, Fisher, Rose, and Huttenback, 1963, and Lamb, 1964). Suffice it to say that the dispute had its origins in British colonial decisions over where the Indian border should be drawn. As such, the contest for sovereignty over the Aksai Chin was an outgrowth of one of the many colonial-era negotiations that resulted in troublesome administrative lines drawn on a map.

Following independence in 1947, India asserted its claims to the Aksai Chin. However, a confrontation with China did not occur until the mid-1950s, when India began introducing reconnaissance patrols into the area. These patrols discovered a strategic road that the Chinese had built in the early 1950s to link Sinkiang with Tibet. The discovery became a domestic crisis for Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister and founder of the Congress Party.

Nehru had pursued a consistently friendly policy toward China, even to the point of acquiescence to Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950. But large and politically weighty elements of the Indian military, the Congress Party, and the foreign policy establishment were quite hostile to China, suspecting it of hegemonic ambitions. Nehru's domination of the Congress Party, indeed of his own cabinet, was partial at best. Many of those who opposed Nehru over his China policy also opposed his broad social and economic reforms. So the border dispute was used to jeopardize Nehru's national domestic objectives; it was used as a proxy for those who had built up a "dislike of Nehru and his charisma, his claim of superiority, his indispensability, his concept of social and economic revolution . . ." (Edwardes, 1972, p. 287). As a result, Nehru had very little room to negotiate a compromise with the Chinese. This became especially true as the Indian population became mobilized over the border dispute in the wake of a sharp firefight between Indian and Chinese troops in August 1959. Nehru is quoted as having told a colleague, "If

I give them that (a negotiated settlement), I shall no longer be Prime Minister of India."¹⁶

His position was further constrained by a 1960 decision of the Indian Supreme Court, which ruled that any cession of Indian territory required a constitutional amendment. Thus to cede part or all of the Aksai Chin to the Chinese would have required a two-thirds vote in the Parliament plus simple majorities in eight of India's fourteen legislatures, a very difficult process to say the least (Lebow, 1981, p. 188).

In spite of these constraints and pressures, Nehru attempted (as did Nasser in 1966–1967) to walk a balanced course between China and his domestic enemies. To this end, he felt compelled to continue the Indian patrols in the Aksai Chin, although he did not increase them. A second exchange of fire occurred in October 1960. Public opinion reacted with bellicosity toward China. In a speech to the nation, Nehru attempted to rein-in the inflamed Indian sensibilities by taking a moderate line on the shooting. For his pains, he was accused in newspaper editorials of appeasement, weakness, and an "over-scrupulous regard for Chinese susceptibilities and comparative indifference toward the anger and dismay with which the Indian people have reacted."¹⁷

Nehru never took a conciliatory line again in this matter and responded to this criticism by increasing the Indian presence in the disputed area. A program was begun to construct a network of Indian forward outposts, and deployed Indian forces were ordered to fire on Chinese forces threatening them. A series of clashes ensued, increasing in intensity and cost throughout the remainder of 1961 and 1962. They culminated in a successful Chinese offensive in October 1962, in which China seized the Aksai Chin.

Iraq, 1990

The motivations for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait have been widely debated, primarily over what dominated Saddam Hussein's motiva-

¹⁶Quoted in Lebow (1981), p. 187.

¹⁷Quoted in Lebow (1981), p. 188.

tions: desire for gain or desire to avert loss (see Stein, 1992, pp. 147–179). While probably not in the desperate domestic straits of Japan in 1941 and North Korea in 1950, many analysts argue that Iraq's situation contained important parallels. This may explain some of Iraq's willingness to accept risks that surprised Western observers during the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991.

From 1980 through 1989, Iraq incurred \$80 billion in foreign debt, mostly to sustain its war with Iran. About 50 percent was owed to Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).¹⁸ By 1990, Iraq's creditors had become extremely concerned over Iraq's ability to meet its debt-servicing schedules. As a result, additional credit became difficult for Saddam to obtain.

The nub of his problem was financing national reconstruction after the ruinous war with Iran. Estimates of the cost of reconstruction were in excess of \$230 billion. Yet the national budget of Iraq was already running a deficit of about \$10 billion per year just to maintain the status quo. Obviously, the additional burden of reconstruction was unaffordable without new sources of capital. In principle, this could be obtained from three sources. First, the existing debt could be forgiven or rescheduled. Forgiveness was rejected by the creditors, and rescheduling could provide only small relief. Second, new credit could be extended, but that too was rejected by the creditors. Finally, Iraq could obtain hard currency from increased revenues from oil sales. Unfortunately, a higher oil price was needed. In the late 1980s, the price of oil had begun to fall, a trend that was still under way in early 1990. Iraq's attempt to arrest this slide by lowering production quotas was rejected by Kuwait and the UAE, the two biggest violators of the existing Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quota. By the beginning of 1990, OPEC was exceeding its production quota by 2 million barrels per day, with Kuwait and the UAE accounting for 75 percent of the surplus.¹⁹

Beginning at the Arab Cooperation Council summit in February 1990, the Iraqis began an intense diplomatic effort to induce or co-

¹⁸See, for example, Davis and Arquilla (1991b); Freedman and Karsh (1993), pp. 37–38; Karsh and Rautsi (1991), pp. 18–30; Gross (1992), pp. 147–179.

¹⁹At that time, OPEC's production quota was 22 million barrels per day. Actual production was 24 million barrels per day.

erce Kuwait and the UAE to agree to lower quotas, reduce their own production, and forgive Iraq's wartime debts. Kuwait and the UAE remained indifferent to Iraq's pleas and threats. By mid-July 1990, Iraq had begun its military buildup opposite Kuwait.

The important deterrence question is to what extent Iraq's debt situation and lack of additional credit imperiled Saddam Hussein's regime—or, at least, that this was believed by the Iraqi leadership. To the extent the regime was endangered, Saddam's decisionmaking could be said to be motivated by a desire to avert loss, i.e., his hold on power. Decisionmakers in this predicament have a propensity to accept high risks and so are hard to deter. To the extent the regime was not imperiled, Saddam's decisionmaking could be said to be motivated by desire for gain, i.e., Kuwait's vulnerable oil riches. Such decisionmakers most often are chary of risk and easier to deter. Certainly at the time of the crisis, the prevailing view in the United States was that Saddam was motivated primarily by the latter rather than the former. This presumption may explain some of the continuing surprise at Saddam's stubbornness in trying to hold Kuwait in the face of such overwhelming force. Many observers felt that the Iraqis would surely retreat from Kuwait at the last moment under the cover of Russian or French mediation. Of course, this did not happen, a pattern of behavior more consistent with a desire to avert loss than purely a matter of gain. For this reason, a number of analysts of the Gulf War take the view that Saddam's "political survival and his long-term ambitions" hinged on the national reconstruction that could not be undertaken without some debt relief.²⁰ If so, Iraq would have been difficult to deter from invading Kuwait (though probably not impossible) and even more difficult to compel to leave. So it proved. Beyond this, we cannot go without better information.

DETERRABILITY OF REGIONAL ADVERSARIES

Thus far, the discussion has illustrated the vulnerability of some regional adversaries to domestic pressures to act internationally and the ways those pressures can result in acceptance of high risks. By

²⁰See Stein (1992); Freedman and Karsh (1993); and Karsh and Rautsi (1991). For an opposing view, see Mylroie (1993).

definition, a willingness to accept risks suggests that deterrence of such regimes is difficult. Indeed, it proved so in the cases cited here.

However, these and other cases also suggest strongly that deterrence is not *impossible* in these situations, although it may be difficult and effortful. Specifically, virtually every case we studied in detail suggested (sometimes explicitly, sometimes indirectly) that Third World regimes are deterrable in such crises. The evidence for this is contained in the memoirs of the participants, primary source materials arising from meetings, and strategic instructions formulated to provide guidance for commanders and civilian decisionmakers. We again turn to the cases of China in 1950, Argentina in 1982, Egypt in 1967, India in 1962, and Iraq in 1990 to illustrate these points.²¹

HISTORICAL EVIDENCE THAT DETERRENCE WAS POSSIBLE

China, 1950

With stakes as high as regime preservation, one would predict that China would have been very difficult to deter. In fact, that seems to have been true. Mao recognized clearly the risk the United States could pose of striking urban-industrial targets from the air with conventional and *nuclear* weapons. China, after all, had no means to respond directly to this threat. Ironically, this threat led Mao to take the most aggressive course he could. He reasoned that the presence of U.S. forces anywhere in Korea posed an unacceptable risk to Chinese domestic arrangements. A Chinese offensive to drive the United States merely below the 38th parallel would be unsatisfactory. The United States still would be left in possession of Korean bases from which it could wage a strategic air war against China. Indeed, Mao's worst-case scenario was a stalemate on the Korean peninsula leaving the U.S. free and motivated to undertake strategic bombardment of China from within easy range. Therefore, Mao elected to commit forces sufficient to drive the United States entirely off the peninsula in one blow as quickly as possible. In that way, the U.S.

²¹One of the classic examples of a very risk-acceptant regime that was still deterrable is Japan's in its deliberations about war in the summer of 1941. Japan was not a Third World adversary, so that case has not been included in the body of the text. However, since it is still interesting and instructive, it has been included in Appendix B.

capability to strike Chinese targets could be reduced to a "more tolerable scope and duration."

This case is a good example of the domination of the costs of inaction over the risks of all other courses, at least in the eyes of the Chinese leadership. The presence of U.S. forces north of the 38th parallel was deemed a mortal threat, so to do nothing was unacceptable as soon as the U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel. Mao stated this explicitly in his wires to Marshall Peng Duhai and Stalin. Apparently, no buffer arrangement with the United States along the Yalu would have ameliorated his fears. Therefore, Chinese strategic decisionmaking shifted to evaluating ways in which the benefits of an inevitable and risky war could be maximized. In that process, Mao accepted the possibility that China could be struck severe blows. There is no evidence in his telegrams of confidence that the Soviets would or could deter the United States from attacking China. Thus, Mao deemed nuclear bombardment of Chinese cities less risky than tolerating U.S. forces on China's border.

Seen in this light, the prospects for deterring the Chinese were substantially reduced after the 38th parallel was crossed. This resolves the question posed by Thomas Schelling as to why the Chinese prepared their attack in secret, and launched it by surprise, if their objective was to deter the United States from crossing the Yalu (Christensen, 1992, p. 141). In Mao's view, deterrence of the United States had failed much earlier and, accordingly, deterrence of Chinese intervention became extremely difficult—but, perhaps, not impossible.

Mao's Korean War telegrams provide evidence that, as motivated as the Chinese were, they were not nondeterrable (Christensen, 1992, pp. 137–140). In the telegrams, Mao discusses his worst-case scenario: a failure to eject the U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula, followed by prolonged stalemate and U.S. bombardment of the mainland. It follows logically that Mao's strategic calculations might well have been affected *if the United States had been able to pose a credible threat that a Chinese attack would have resulted in Mao's worst case*. Presumably, this would have required the United States to establish a declaratory policy of this intention, and to reinforce and configure its advancing forces in Korea to make them clearly capable of resisting a Chinese attack. Ground forces would have been

necessary for this task, since the Chinese had assessed correctly that the air forces of that period could not halt a Chinese offensive with the coalition's ground forces deployed as they were.

Argentina, 1982

Could Argentina have been deterred by the British? Approximately one month passed between Argentina's first hostile action (support for the workers on South Georgia) and the full-blown invasion of the Falklands. During that period, the British were cautious to the point of passivity. As is so often the case, the problem the British government faced was ambiguous intelligence, a strong predisposition to believe that the Argentines would not act "irrationally," and a classic concern that aggressive British action would provoke rather than deter.²² This is not the place to assess British policy. Rather, the question is whether Argentina could have been deterred from invading the Falklands after the South Georgia event. Obviously, this question is impossible to answer, but several general points can be made.

The junta did not believe itself to be in control of events. This sense of compulsion is typical of a regime that deems its stability to be at stake. Endangered regimes usually believe they have no other choice but to take a desperate course of action. However, they seldom choose a course of action that they understand at the time to be virtually certain to fail.²³ Therefore, could the British have presented the Argentines with that prospect?

The British chose the most difficult option, which was to execute an amphibious landing and a subsequent ground campaign. There is good evidence that Argentina's planners thought that the British prospects of success in this endeavor were small and that the British themselves shared that assessment. In Argentina's view, once Argentine troops (regardless of their poor preparation) reached the

²²See Jervis (1976) for a discussion of the "spiral" model. The spiral model describes the conditions in which threats intended to be inhibiting are actually stimulating to an adversary.

²³As we said, the exceptions to this generalization are states in such dire straits that literally any alternative is preferred to doing nothing. But such states are rare.

Falklands, the British would be compelled to negotiate. Thus, as long as the Argentines felt certain that they could deploy a force into the Falklands, they could not be deterred by the British threat to expel them.

However, the British had the naval capability to have greatly increased the risks to Argentina's troop deployments, the bulk of which were moved by ships. The British could have used attack submarines to isolate the Falklands from the mainland. Indeed, David Owen made exactly this point (Stein, 1992, p. 109). It would have been possible to implement this policy if one or two submarines had been dispatched to the South Atlantic at the time of the South Georgia incident. Also, tactical aircraft or surface-to-air missiles could have been deployed to the Falklands airstrip to prevent Argentina from airlifting troops instead of sealifting them. Though Argentina might have contemplated contesting air superiority over the Falklands, it would have been helpless to contest control of the sea—a reality its leaders understood fully. Therefore, there are good reasons to suppose that the announcement that British submarines would prevent reinforcement of the Falklands would have been an effective deterrent, especially if coupled with an offer to renew negotiations over sovereignty. No doubt, the Argentines might have tested the British to ensure against a bluff. The British submarines could have given a graphic demonstration of their capabilities, and Argentina would have been entirely helpless to rectify their situation. Indeed, when H.M.S. *Conqueror* sank the *General Belgrano* on May 3, Argentina's surface navy never ventured again into the theater of operations.

One can debate whether the threat should have been made publicly or privately. Certainly, one characteristic of submarines is that they can be covertly deployed, thus making it possible to keep threats private. This threat, public or private, would have confronted the junta with a virtually assured risk of failure. Unless the junta believed its chances of political survival to be even less likely, or it simply disbelieved the British threat, it likely would have been deterred by such a British move.

Egypt, 1967

Could the Egyptians have been deterred from pursuing confrontation, especially in May 1967? As with the cases of China and

Argentina, there is evidence that Nasser could have been deterred. Although highly motivated by political considerations, Nasser devoted considerable attention to the question of the military balance between the two sides. His closest associates suggest that he would not have continued to escalate had he not concluded that Israel was militarily inferior (see Safran, 1978, pp. 397-398).

One reason for his misimpression was the Egyptian-Syrian defense agreement, which placed Syrian forces under Egyptian command. In May 1967, Jordan agreed to do the same, and arrangements were made to bring Egyptian and Iraqi troops into Jordan. The result was to compel Israel to fight a three-front war, its worst case. Nasser was undeterred by Israel *not* because he doubted Israel's resolve, but because he doubted Israel's capability. He did assess military balances, even in the midst of intense crisis, and that assessment was instrumental in his decision to go forward. Therefore, the Israelis should have been able to affect that decision, if they could have altered Nasser's view of the military balance. Thus Nasser was deterrable. Indeed, as was true with the Chinese in 1950, despite great differences in culture, values, and political system, the Egyptians and Israelis spoke a common deterrence language, albeit unsuccessfully.

India, 1962

Why did the Chinese fail in their attempts to deter the Indians? As with the other cases, the Indian leadership believed that its domestic political position was weak and that demonstrations of external "strength" could ameliorate that condition. Such behavior can be imperfectly analogized to "overcompensation" in psychodynamic theory. An individual may respond to weakness in one area by hyperaggressiveness and rigidity in another. Such behavior is not the exclusive province of Third World leaders. But Third World regimes tend to be fragile, so events that might be difficult for any leader become "life threatening" for them. Therefore, Nehru and India plainly fall into the "hard-to-deter" category. But "hard to deter" does not mean "impossible to deter."

We make this point because of the strong evidence that Nehru was very interested in the Sino-Indian military balance. Specifically, he had quite an optimistic (although misguided) view of the capabilities of the Indian forces to defeat the Chinese (Maxwell, 1972, pp. 240-

242). The fact that such an assessment was unrealistic misses the point that consideration of the balance was central to Nehru's risk-taking behavior. Further, his view was widely shared, even among Indians alarmed by the aggressiveness of Nehru's actions. It follows that the Chinese might have deterred the Indians had they found a way to communicate effectively their actual capabilities. Chinese caution prior to their October attack reportedly was taken by the Indians as evidence of the correctness of the Indian assessment.²⁴

Iraq, 1990

The deterrability of Iraq in 1990 is the most difficult to discuss because of the dearth of direct information that has proven so valuable in the other cases. Instead, we need to rely primarily on two well-done analyses of this question (Davis and Arquilla, 1991b, and Stein, 1992, pp. 147-179).

Both studies interestingly focus on what we would agree is the central question: Saddam Hussein's motivations. Was he an "opportunity-driven aggressor or a vulnerable leader motivated by need" (Stein, 1992, p. 155)?

Davis and Arquilla describe this as Model One and Model Two. Model One corresponds roughly to the "vulnerable leader motivated by need" and Model Two to the "opportunity-driven aggressor" (Davis and Arquilla, 1991b, pp. 12-15).

Both studies conclude that Saddam Hussein probably could have been deterred from invading Kuwait, regardless of which motivation dominated his calculations. Stein notes particularly the usefulness of combining deterrence threats with promises of rewards for desirable behavior. In the case of Iraq, that reward would have taken the form of debt relief.

Davis and Arquilla are more specific in their conclusions. They argue that a U.S. preinvasion tripwire force in Kuwait "might well have de-

²⁴Note the parallel between the effects of caution in this case and those in the Falklands invasion. It suggests that the period following the first provocation by the aggressor is especially important for communicating credible deterrence. Passivity at this point can be very dangerous.

tered his (Hussein's) invasion" (Davis and Arquilla, 1991b, p. 69). They also emphasize the importance of early action before the adversary has committed himself and before the problem becomes one of compellence rather than deterrence.

CONCLUSIONS

In sum, these cases show how states that believe that very risky international action will avert a domestic crisis will be hard to deter from that action. Unfortunately, many regional adversaries fall into this category; however, such adversaries usually are not impossible to deter. But deterrence is likely to be difficult, expensive, effortful, and dependent on accurate information about how the adversary evaluates his situation.

The cases suggest that successful deterrence would have been possible if the adversary could have been persuaded to a high degree of certainty that he could not achieve his military objectives and that efforts to do so would leave him in a dangerously poorer status quo. The primary criteria that these regional regimes used in determining the likelihood of their success were *military*. Could the objectives be achieved against the military defenses likely to be encountered? If the answer was thought to be "no" to that question, the evidence supports the view that the attackers would not have initiated the conflicts. In spite of the strength of the domestic needs—the costs of inaction—none of the regimes we examined was prepared to commit national suicide. They all had a theory of victory by which their military forces would succeed, and in no case were those theories irrational or crazy—although they involved high risks.

The implication of this reasoning is that such adversaries are deterrable by military measures that convincingly invalidate the adversary's theory of victory. Obviously, deterrence in these instances is narrow and limited. The hostile intentions of the adversary are left unchanged. Only the specific military action has been deterred, leaving the situation unchanged and the adversary likely to try again tomorrow. However, this sort of deterrence success is no small thing and, in any case, is all that can be reasonably expected of deterrence. Deterrence, in a sense, is a superficial policy, for it cannot affect the roots of the problem; it can only stifle it. Nevertheless, in a world of flawed and crude instruments, that may be the best one can do.

Thus far, we have tried to build a case that many regional adversaries are hard but not impossible to deter. Further, even with highly motivated adversaries, military forces are an effective instrument for making a deterrent threat if they can be tailored to persuade the adversary that his theory of victory cannot succeed. The following questions now arise:

- How can such threats be made credibly to regional adversaries?
- What military forces are especially useful as deterrents?

Chapter Four addresses the first question, Chapter Five the second.

THE CREDIBILITY OF U.S. DETERRENT THREATS

Credibility has two facets. The first is whether the adversary believes the United States *intends* to do what it threatens to do. This usually is a function of the strength of the U.S. interests the adversary deems to be at stake. Note also that it is really *future* U.S. intention that is the issue here: Will the United States try to implement its threat at the time in the future when deterrence is tested? The second is whether the adversary believes the United States is *capable* of doing what it threatens. This is a function of the adversary's assessment of the military balance with the United States. Overall credibility is, in a sense, the product of these separate elements, intent and capability. If the future intention is gauged to be zero and if capability is immense, the overall credibility is zero. Similarly, all the intent in the world cannot make threats credible if there is no capability to carry them out. However, between these extremes, the communication of a strong will to act can compensate to some extent for a less certain military capability. Similarly, a fearsome military capability can compensate for some uncertainty the adversary may feel about the U.S. will to act. This, after all, was the foundation of nuclear deterrence, especially in the context of NATO.¹

This chapter is devoted to a discussion of the first of the two aspects of credibility: communicating intent. The following chapter on mili-

¹Empirical investigation of intent and capability confirms that both matter in decisionmaking and that an overabundance of one can compensate for too little of the other—within limits. This point is born out specifically in the deterrence literature. See, for example, Huth (1988).

tary capabilities touches on the problem of credibly communicating U.S. capabilities for doing what it threatens to do.

There are two principal facets of intent: interests and reputation. At least one, and preferably both, must be robust for the intention to carry out a threat to be credible. If a state has very substantial interests in another state, it is more likely to commit itself to the other's defense. Therefore, to make commitments believable, a state has to behave as though its interests are engaged. Generally, this means establishing various types of ties and arrangements with the state to be defended. These include such things as political and economic relationships, formal defense arrangements, and the deployment or frequent presence of forces overseas.

Collectively, these measures can be called indicators of a state's interests. By these measures, U.S. interests in Europe and South Korea are quite high, as reflected by the extensive political, economic, and military ties; the existence of formal alliances; and the fact that these ties have withstood the test of time. On the other hand, U.S. ties to Bosnia or Somalia are weak or nonexistent. This, combined with erratic statements by U.S. leaders, suggests that U.S. interests in these regions are low.

Considerable qualitative and quantitative evidence bears out the relationship between the existence of ties and deterrence success. Indeed, scrutiny of the aggregate data derived from a large number of historical cases suggests that perception of interests is at least as weighty a variable as comparative military capabilities in explaining when deterrence will succeed or fail.²

Reputation refers to a state's record of past behavior. To a certain extent, reputation can substitute for a clear perception of interests. Reputation is established by previous actions and may reflect a leader's propensity for doing what he says, a leader's predispositions (e.g., a preference for negotiated settlements), a state's past behavior with respect to certain interests, or the military's capability for conducting certain types of operations successfully or unsuccessfully.

²Jervis (1976); Jervis, Lebow, and Stein (1985); George and Smoke (1974); Huth and Russett (1984), pp. 496, 526.

Although concerns for reputation seem to exert great pressure on decisionmakers, it is a relatively uninvestigated area in both the academic and policy-analytic literature. The historical case studies we used were not particularly helpful in shedding light on the importance or fragility of reputation as a factor in explaining deterrence success or failure. The best work in this area has been done by Paul Huth, Bruce Russett, Jonathan Shimshoni, and Elli Lieberman.³ Their results suggest that reputation can be important, in addition to interests, in buttressing credibility. However, all four find that reputation can be quite limited in its effects. For example, a state's reputation for behavior seems to be specific to the events that created that reputation. This suggests that U.S. credibility in Europe probably was not damaged a great deal by difficulties in Vietnam. But, on the other hand, U.S. success in the recent Gulf War probably has little positive effect on U.S. credibility in Bosnia.

One of the more troubling reputations the United States has acquired is for heightened sensitivity to casualties. Many foreign, as well as American, leaders believe that U.S. public opinion will turn against any conflict or war as soon as U.S. casualties begin to mount, leading the public to demand withdrawal. This sensitivity implies that U.S. threats to intervene are less credible if the adversary believes he can inflict sufficient casualties on U.S. forces, where the word "sufficient" is intended to suggest some match between the level of casualties and American perceptions of the interest at stake.

Our research suggests that there is a fundamental flaw in this perception. While it is true that U.S. public approval for conflicts drops as casualties mount, this decreased public approval should not be equated with a public desire to withdraw. *Rather, polling evidence from Korea, Vietnam, and the war with Iraq suggests that public disapproval is almost always associated with a public desire to end the conflict more quickly and cheaply by escalation, if that would be effective.* Rather than cutting U.S. losses by withdrawing, the public reaction is as often to cut U.S. losses by "taking the gloves off." Eventually, if it becomes clear that the United States will not escalate, the U.S. public will increasingly press for withdrawal as the only way to end pointless casualties. Note this explanation of U.S. casualty

³See Huth (1988), Huth and Russett (1988), Shimshoni (1988), and Lieberman (1994).

sensitivity is very different from the cliché that the U.S. simply has no "stomach" for casualties. The implications for regional deterrence are important. Regional leaders might have a very different image of U.S. resolve if they understood the real content of U.S. public opinion.⁴

Besides interests and reputation, two lesser factors—bargaining tactics and perceptions of legitimacy—also influence the perception of a state's resolve to act in defense of some interest. To some extent, these factors simply amplify the perception of interests and reputation discussed above. However, they also can be quite distinct. Hence, they are mentioned separately.

Thomas Schelling was the first to articulate a long list of bargaining tactics important for deterrence (see Schelling, 1966, Ch 2). Among them are the "rationality of irrationality," i.e., convincing an opponent that a threat will be carried out even if it hurts the defender (this could be an aspect of the leadership's reputation); convincing an opponent that he has the "last clear chance" to avoid the confrontation (i.e., relinquishing control over events, for example, by making retaliation automatic if the proscribed action occurs); and clear public declarations of one's intent to defend an ally, which makes it hard to back down from the commitment without incurring some damage to one's reputation (i.e., tying one's hands to some extent). The extent to which some of these tactics can be effectively employed by the leaders of a state is debatable. Nevertheless, one should at least be aware that bargaining tactics can affect the perception of credibility.

The perceived legitimacy of the defender's interests, or of his methods of defense, is more difficult to determine.⁵ Nevertheless, if the challenger believes the defender's claim to some interest is legitimate, or that his own claim is less legitimate, then the challenger is likely to believe the defender has greater resolve in defending that

⁴Public opinion polls taken during the Korean and Vietnam Wars show that Americans do grow weary of protracted wars as casualties mount. However, these same polls show that Americans do not wish to withdraw from the conflict. Rather, casualties lead to a growing desire to escalate the conflict in an effort to resolve it more quickly. See Schwarz (1994).

⁵For a discussion of the concept of legitimacy and its influence on international behavior, see Bull (1977), although the use of the concept of legitimacy in this report is somewhat different from Bull's.

claim. For example, major powers frequently believe the existing international system is legitimate. The challenger may not share this belief. However, if the challenger understands that major powers believe this to be true, the challenger is likely to believe they will have greater resolve to uphold the status quo. Note that this does not require the challenger to agree with the legitimacy of the defender's claim, only that he believe the defender believes this. Frequently, crisis diplomacy is designed to increase international perceptions of the legitimacy of one side's cause in a conflict and to decrease the perception of the opponent's legitimacy. Attempts to label the opponent as the "aggressor" and oneself as the "defender" in a crisis are an obvious example, or attempts by leaders to seek justifications for their actions in internal law.

The notion of legitimacy can also be applied to the methods used to defend interests. Certain types of weapons (e.g., chemical and biological weapons), or certain types of warfare (e.g., terrorism) may be perceived by the international community to be illegitimate for advancing a state's interests. To the extent this is true, threats to use these weapons will not be perceived to be legitimate. For example, if the international community believes that terrorism is not a legitimate means for addressing grievances, a state that threatens terrorist acts will have more difficulty convincing the defender of its resolve, since the defender may dismiss such threats as illegitimate. Put another way, the challenger, knowing that the defender believes terrorism to be illegitimate, will likely believe the defender's resolve to deter such threats, if only because the defender will have greater international sympathy for making strong counterthreats. Again, note that the challenger does not have to agree with the defender's perspective that certain means are not legitimate. All that is required is that the challenger believe the defender holds this belief.

Thus, the utility of establishing international norms against the use of certain weapons or types of warfare is not to convince the world of the rectitude of one's moral stance, but rather the pragmatic utility of undermining the coercive power of such threats.

Focusing on U.S. interests and reputation, one can draw several implications for regional deterrence. First, committing oneself to defending a particular interest is an effective way to communicate the intent to act, and, as such, commitments are an important deter-

rence tool. But, by definition, U.S. commitments must be few and selective, because real commitments are costly. Rhetorical commitments given promiscuously are not only incredible but may diminish the credibility of more serious commitments. Moreover, commitments cannot be created at the *time of a crisis*. Time is needed to develop a network of political, economic, and military ties with an endangered state. This means that the most credible commitment is one established well before the crisis and continually reinforced by tangible actions. Signals of commitment at the time of crisis may be useful to *remind* an adversary of an existing commitment, but they cannot establish that commitment in the absence of a historical record. Unfortunately, commitment is often an unreliable source of credibility for the United States, because, as a global power, the United States often seeks to exercise deterrence in regions where it has few past commitments. Also, the United States often does not know what its interests are until they are endangered. The classic example is Korea in 1950. It took the actual experience of an invasion to make U.S. interests salient enough to spur action.

This problem of "revealed interests" makes it difficult for the United States to establish commitments of various kinds to all the states on whose behalf it might act. Therefore, the United States often finds itself trying to assert a commitment in the absence of a believable record of action.⁶ This also means that the Flexible Deterrence Options in the U.S. National Military Strategy are unlikely to be effective signals of intent in cases in which there has been no discernible record of a strong U.S. interest.⁷ They are much more likely to be effective in crises in which evidence of U.S. interest is apparent.

Second, reputation can compensate for some of these difficulties with commitment. But reputation, by definition, depends upon a

⁶Bosnia is a good example. The Balkans have not been an area to which the United States has committed itself in the past.

⁷Flexible Deterrence Options are military actions a theater commander can take in the early days of a crisis to signal a potential adversary that the United States is committed to the defense of its threatened interests. Such actions might be the movement of a carrier battle group to a position more conducive to air strikes. Usually, the forces immediately at hand to a commander-in-chief for Flexible Deterrence Options are not sufficient to deny the adversary his objectives. Rather, the hope is that the early, forcible expression of U.S. commitment will deter the adversary from taking further steps.

record of action and, hence, cannot be created at the time of a crisis. Moreover, evaluation of historical case studies suggests that the power of reputation to enhance credibility is limited (see Shimshoni, 1988, pp. 231-234). Reputation appears to be specific to a given adversary or region and is not readily generalized. In this sense, the United States has multiple reputations, each connected to different situations.

Reputation also probably has an unfortunately short half-life. Even for situations similar to the war with Iraq, the U.S. reputation is unlikely to last for a decade without "booster shots" from other successful military interventions. Thus, the euphoric expectation that Operation Desert Storm would be some sort of anodyne for U.S. credibility is based on an illusion about the durability of reputation.

There is little that can be done about these problems of commitment and reputation. The United States can make clear commitments only to a limited number of states or regions, for example, Western Europe, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, Japan, and Korea. The credibility of U.S. deterrent threats extended to these interests is likely to be high. Elsewhere in the world, U.S. credibility is less assured, and one must expect that deterrence there will be more difficult. As mentioned earlier, there frequently are good reasons for resisting commitments to many areas. Commitments bolster credibility by binding a state to courses of action it later may wish to avoid. Violating a commitment damages reputation; inaction in the absence of a commitment is probably less damaging.

Therefore, the United States simply will have to live with the tensions of having global interests, but only a limited number of vital ones that warrant a clear commitment. Nevertheless, the United States may want to deter threats to U.S. interests not covered by a prior commitment. Reputation may be a substitute but only in a limited way. Military capability may be able to make up for these deficiencies in commitment and reputation. That is, U.S. regional deterrence strategy should probably rely more on convincing potential adversaries that the United States can respond overwhelmingly if it so chooses, rather than on convincing them that U.S. willingness to intervene is high. The latter may simply be too difficult in cases in

which U.S. vital interests are not clearly engaged. The discussion of what military capabilities would be useful in this regard is taken up in the next chapter.

THE MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF DETERRENCE

It seems odd that small regional powers would ever challenge the United States, or any other great power for that matter. Yet, this occurs quite frequently. Argentina went to war with Great Britain over the Falkland Islands; Libya intervened in the Chadian civil war in the early 1980s despite threats from France; and Iraq attacked Kuwait despite warnings from the United States. One explanation, of course, is that regional powers do not believe the major power will respond. If so, the military balance is less relevant. However, even when credible deterrent threats appear to be made, many regional powers still choose war (see Wolf, 1991, and Arquilla, 1992).

Some commentators have suggested that regional powers ignore military factors in their decisions about whether or not to go to war. This explanation is not compelling, because it suggests highly irrational or impulsive behavior on the part of leaders in situations that could lead to the loss of their regime, if not their entire country. While such irrationality is not impossible, the historical evidence suggests that it is quite rare. The relative roles and weights of military and nonmilitary factors in explaining the success or failure of deterrence remain among the most unsettled issues in the deterrence literature. Those who argue against the importance of military factors do so on the basis of what might be called a "push" theory of deterrence. That is, they argue that states are impelled or pushed irresistibly into international crises for reasons of necessity. If "forced" by necessity to take risks, states must largely forgo the rational calculation of costs and benefits, which are so much a part of classical deterrence theory. As a consequence, military balance assessment ought to be of little import in crisis decisionmaking. Note that this

style of argument is quite similar to what we have described as the state that "has nothing to lose," discussed earlier. These states occupy the extreme left side of the deterrence continuum portrayed in Figure 2.

On the basis of the cases examined, we find that the proponents of this "push" theory of deterrence overstate the prevalence of states with so little to lose that they cease to be interested in the risks attendant to their actions. Certainly, as illustrated by the cases of Japan, North Korea, and Cuba, there are states with little or nothing to lose. For such states, the military balance probably is secondary in their calculations. Certainly, regional adversaries frequently feel powerfully the push of domestic exigencies to engage in international risk-taking, and this can make them hard to deter. But few regional adversaries feel the push so strongly as to render the relative military balance irrelevant. Indeed, we have found that the military balance powerfully shapes behavior in the great majority of deterrence situations, even when the adversaries are separated by great gulfs in values, objectives, history, and political systems. Recall the cases discussed in Chapter Three on the character and motivations of regional states. In each of these cases, we found specific evidence that decisionmakers paid close attention to the relevant military balance. It is true that their perceptions of the balances were often flawed, but that is hardly unusual and, in any case, is not the point. The point is that the military balance was a central feature in the calculations of decisionmakers. Indeed, as discussed in those cases, it is possible to deduce from the historical record what it likely would have taken to have deterred the attackers. Therefore, while we obviously believe the push model of international crises, as advanced by Lebow, Jervis, and Stein, has much merit, we find that they go much further than the data will bear, presumably in the interests of distinguishing themselves as much as possible from more traditional formulations of deterrence.

The perspective advanced here is that regional leaders do take the relative military balance into account when deciding whether or not to use military force to accomplish their objectives. However, not all dimensions of military power are equally important. Otherwise, regional states would never challenge great-power interests. The question is, which military factors are most salient?

THE LOCAL MILITARY BALANCE

Regional powers seek quick, decisive military results, not long wars of attrition.¹ While this is true for major powers as well, there are several factors that make it particularly true for Third World states. First, the financial and military costs of such wars are often ruinous for small states. Many of these states cannot maintain conflicts for extended periods without severely sapping their economic strength.² Second, long wars exacerbate domestic political instabilities and frequently unleash political forces that can topple the regime. In contrast, rapidly achieved victories may be quite popular. The difference with democratic states is that, although long wars may topple the current administration, the democratic political systems are not so vulnerable as to collapse.³ For many regional powers, the collapse of the current political regime brings with it the downfall of much of the bureaucratic structure. In short, long wars can be politically and economically disastrous for regional states.

If short wars are the basis for planning, it is logical that the military capabilities that can deny regional leaders a quick victory will likely have the greatest deterrent influence.⁴ With respect to extended deterrence, regional adversaries may decide to attack another state if they believe they can accomplish their objectives so quickly that they present the defender with a *fait accompli* before the defender can meaningfully come to the aid of its ally. The gamble is that the de-

¹Many analysts and scholars have noted this point. See, for example, Mearsheimer (1983) and Anderson and McKeown (1997), pp. 17-22. Notable exceptions to this might be revolutionary governments, such as North Vietnam's under Ho Chi Minh, who chose low-level guerrilla warfare tactics when facing a more advanced military opponent, because guerrilla warfare played to their strengths.

²For example, Saddam Hussein suffered serious economic problems in the wake of his 8-year war with Iran (1980-1988), as did Vietnam in its struggle to defeat the United States.

³Certainly, democratic political leaders can be and have been voted out of office, even in the midst of war. But these changes of leadership do not result in the end of the political system.

⁴This turns out to be a surprisingly contentious point. For arguments emphasizing the importance of military factors in deterrence failure or success, see Huth and Russett (1984); Huth (1988); Huth and Russett (1988), pp. 29-45; Huth and Russett (1990), pp. 466-501; Huth and Russett (1993); and George and Smoke (1974). For arguments that military factors are secondary, see Stein (1987), pp. 326-352; Maoz, (1983), pp. 195-230; Levy (1988).

fender will not attempt to roll back the attacker at some later time, because the effort involved and the potential costs will be too great.⁵

That said, what aspects of the military balance are most important for deterrence? If denying the adversary a quick, cheap victory is most important, the military capabilities that can perform that task are most relevant for deterrence. The allied and U.S. forces in theater, or the forces that can be deployed to the theater in a short period of time, should weigh most heavily on a regional leader's mind. Slower-deploying forces (e.g., most active and reserve forces in the continental United States) are less likely to deter the adversary, although such forces make an important contribution to U.S. warfighting capabilities.⁶

Local or early-arriving forces and later-arriving forces both may be highly effective warfighting tools. Each may be equally able to defeat an adversary. Indeed, since later-arriving ground forces often consist of heavy armored forces, they may be more effective from the warfighting point of view. The problem is that these two types of forces are not usually equal in their deterrence power. Adversaries are more likely to find it credible that they will actually have to contend with local or early-arriving forces if they challenge U.S. deterrence, because later-arriving forces require great effort, expense, and time to deploy. Moreover, they arrive after the opponent has consolidated his hold over his military objective, thus presenting the defender with a more difficult military obstacle. In short, they are easy to discount. Therefore, in the absence of especially strong reasons to believe the United States will actually deploy its later-arriving forces,

⁵For example, in 1950, the North Korean regime believed that if it could rapidly defeat South Korean forces and sweep the small U.S. contingent off the peninsula, the United States would not have the political will to reinvade the peninsula to roll back the North Koreans to the 38th Parallel. Similar thinking affected Japanese decisionmaking, leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Saddam Hussein may have believed that if he conquered Kuwait quickly, the United States would not expend the effort to roll back Iraq, especially if this military operation appeared costly in terms of casualties. Saddam Hussein certainly tried to convince the United States that uprooting Iraqi troops dug in along the Kuwait-Saudi border would inflict a large number of casualties. Even after the air war started, Saddam Hussein held to his view that the inevitable ground war would be costly and, hence, that the United States could not forcibly eject him from Kuwait.

⁶This observation has been made by many. The numerous studies cited earlier by Huth and Russett arrive at similar conclusions. So too does Arquilla (1991).

adversaries find local and early-arriving forces more credible and germane to their assessments of the military balance.

A further distinction can be made between local forces forward deployed and early-arriving forces, because early-arriving forces still require a political decision to deploy. If an adversary believes the political will to commit such forces is lacking, early-arriving forces would be less effective as a deterrent than local forces. Put another way, stationing troops on foreign soil demonstrates commitment in a way that rapid power projection capabilities cannot.

The relatively weak deterrent power associated with late-arriving forces is probably less true in regions where the United States is bound by strong defense commitments. It is more credible that the United States will deploy large forces over a period of months to Europe, Korea, and Southwest Asia than to any other part of the world. Therefore, in these cases, the eventual arrival of later-arriving forces probably plays an important deterrent role.

Two cases illustrate powerfully the deterring effects of the local military balance. The first is the conflict between Libya and France over Chad between the years 1980 and 1983; the second is the Jordanian crisis of 1970.

HISTORICAL CASES

Chad, 1980 and 1983

This example is about as close as one can get to a natural experiment on the impact of the local military balance, because the players and the stakes were the same in 1980 as they were in 1983; only the defender's (France's) contribution to the local military balance changed. In addition, French global military capability remained the same between 1980 and 1983. The particulars are as follows:⁷

France and Libya had been at odds over the fate of Chad since it gained independence from France in 1960. Since independence, internal political rivals backed by different external powers vied for

⁷See Lorell (1989); Lemarchand (1981), pp. 414-438; Haley (1984); Huth (1988), pp. 97-104.

power during a long civil war. Libya had long-standing interests in Chad because of its mineral resources in the north, as well as longer-term ambitions of annexation. Consequently, Libya supported a rebel faction led by Goukouni in Chad's civil war. France provided economic and military aid to try to stabilize the government after independence. In August 1979, France finally agreed to withdraw its troops from Chad on the condition that a peacekeeping force led by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) take its place. Shortly after the French withdrawal, Libyan-backed rebels attacked the capital. Despite repeated warnings from France, along with the alerting of French forces stationed in France, Libya supported a large-scale invasion of northern Chad using 4,000 to 5,000 Libyan troops to back Goukouni. By December 1980, the capital city, N'djamena, was overrun, and the French-backed leader, Habre, was deposed. Hence, the initial French attempt at extended deterrence failed.

In January 1981, Qaddafi announced plans to merge Libya and Chad. This merger was opposed by neighboring African states. Consistent pressure from these states eventually forced Libya to withdraw its forces from Chad in November 1981. Shortly thereafter, Goukouni's Transitional National Union Government fell into disarray, and civil war quickly resumed, despite the presence of OAU peacekeeping forces. In June 1992, Habre succeeded in toppling the Goukouni government, thereby reversing the defeat of December 1980.

In the spring of 1983, Goukouni's forces, resupplied by Libyan arms, confronted Habre in a series of battles lasting throughout the summer. By early August, Libya substantially increased its support for Goukouni in an attempt to achieve a decisive victory. In August 1993, Libya sent 2,000 to 3,000 troops south into Chad, including armored forces, airlift support, and tactical air support. By mid-August, it appeared that Goukouni's forces were gaining the upper hand and would soon be in a position to threaten the capital in a repeat of the events of December 1980.

However, this time the French government took prompt action to deter the advance on Chad's capital. Within two days, between August 10 and August 13, over 1,000 French troops were airlifted to the capital. Throughout August, further French reinforcements arrived and were deployed into forward positions along a defensive

line protecting the capital. Approximately 3,000 French troops, including ten advanced combat aircraft, were eventually deployed to Chad. To underscore these actions, French President Mitterand warned that, if French troops were engaged, they would not limit themselves to purely defensive retaliation. As a result, Libya halted further escalation of the conflict and did not confront French forces.

By August 1983, a military stalemate had been reached, resulting in diplomatic negotiations to end the long civil war. These negotiations dragged on for over three years without resolution. France initially withdrew its forces in 1984, only to reinsert them in 1986 when the negotiations threatened to break down. Early in 1987, the stalemate ended when Habre's forces decisively defeated Goukouni's forces, compelling Libya to withdraw from Chad altogether.

This confrontation illustrates many of the points concerning capability and deterrence discussed above. France's national military power was far greater than Libya's, but this did not dissuade Qaddafi from supporting rebel forces in their assault on Chad. The fact that France was a nuclear power also seemed to be of little significance. Moreover, in December 1980, rebel forces conquered the capital, despite repeated warnings from the French. The assault on the capital in August 1983 was a repeat of the events of December 1980; however, this time the French backed up their warnings with the rapid deployment of forces to Chad. The French deployment not only created a "tripwire," thus raising the possibility of more massive French involvement, it also materially shifted the local military balance against Goukouni's Libyan-backed forces, making a quick rebel assault on the capital difficult—unlike in December 1980.

Jordan, 1970

Another interesting example is Israel's successful attempt to deter significant Syrian intervention on behalf of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970 Jordanian civil war (see Blechman and Kaplan, 1978, pp. 257-288; Quandt, 1977; and Safron, 1991, pp. 450-456). In the wake of the June 1967 "Six-Day War," Palestinian guerrillas operating out of several neighboring Arab states, including Jordan, took up a popular armed struggle against Israeli control of the "occupied" territories. Tensions between the PLO and the Jordanian government reached a peak in September 1970 ("Black

September") when King Hussein established a provisional military government in Jordan to bring the PLO under tighter control. Although he opposed Israel's control of the occupied territories, King Hussein feared Israeli retaliation for PLO attacks against Israel emanating from Jordan. Intense fighting broke out between PLO and Jordanian forces in northern Jordan.

On September 20, Syrian President Atasi sent armored forces into Jordan to fight on behalf of the PLO over the objections of his Defense Minister, Hafiz al-Assad. In an effort to prevent the downfall of King Hussein, a moderate Arab from the Israeli perspective, Israel mobilized its forces in the Golan Heights and northern Israel and threatened to intervene if King Hussein's regime was threatened. Syrian forces withdrew several days later, most likely because of the mounting Israeli threat on their flank—although other factors played a part as well (e.g., the prospect of U.S. and Soviet intervention, the lack of Egyptian support for Syria, and the civil-military split within the ruling Ba'ath Party in Syria). With the Syrian withdrawal, PLO resistance quickly collapsed.

What makes this case particularly noteworthy is that the existence of superior Israeli military forces alone did not dissuade President Atasi from intervening prior to September 20. However, once Israeli forces moved into positions on the Syrian flank and were poised to attack, Defense Minister Assad ordered the withdrawal of Syrian forces (presumably overruling Atasi). Thus, Israel's latent military capability was discounted until its presence was felt by the mobilization and alerting of Israeli armored forces, giving Israel a credible capability to cut off rapidly Syrian forces operating in northern Jordan. This prompt denial capability apparently was decisive in Assad's decision to withdraw Syrian armored forces.

U.S. PUNISHMENT STRATEGY

Because even a prompt denial capability may not be sufficient to deter a highly motivated adversary, an additional threat to damage or punish him may be necessary. For punishment threats to be effective, the United States must threaten what the adversary values

most.⁸ This question has particular relevance now, because the United States will rely more on its conventional forces to deter regional adversaries. Therefore, fewer targets can be reliably and promptly destroyed, which means that care must be exercised to select them wisely.

The evidence of prior crises and the scholarly literature on regimes suggest strongly that most regional adversaries, especially non-democratic ones, value the preservation of their political power more highly than the welfare of their populations. This means that punishment threats aimed at the welfare of the population and the civilian economy are not likely to be very effective for deterrence. Threats aimed at the political stability of the adversary's regime are more likely to be effective.

Nondemocratic regimes depend for their preservation on the support of specific organizations and individuals. In totalitarian regimes, these tend to be the internal security forces and special units of the military. In authoritarian regimes, security forces are also important, but so are other organizations that have some degree of autonomous political power. Classically, these institutions include industrialists and other prominent individuals in the private economy, religious authorities, and the military leadership. Threatening to destroy these regime supporters should have a substantial effect on the behavior of nondemocratic regimes.

In a punishment strategy intended to threaten regime stability, the individual leaders and inner circle can be threatened directly. The United States has been building a record of proceeding against these so-called "leadership" targets with mixed results. Manuel Noriega was an explicit target of Operation Urgent Fury; Qaddafi was an implicit target of the air strike on Libya; and Saddam Hussein was probably an implicit target during Operation Desert Storm. In one case, the United States succeeded; in one it missed narrowly; and in one (seemingly) the effort failed entirely.

⁸By the late 1960s, nuclear deterrence strategy did not need to come firmly to grips with this question, because nuclear weapons existed in sufficient number to permit targeting virtually everything of conceivable value. Even so, at the heart of nuclear strategy was the punishment threat to annihilate the Soviet Union's population and economy. As discussed before, this countervalue core represented a set of assumptions about the character of the Soviet regime.

The effects of these attempts have been unclear. Obviously, the vulnerability of Noriega did not stimulate him to diminish the intensity of his confrontation with the United States—a striking reflection of the power of internal politics to shape the strategic actions of states. The near miss of Qaddafi may or may not have caused him to reduce his support of terrorism. Unquestionably, he became less public about it. The threats to Hussein are similarly unclear. They may have deterred him from using chemical weapons, although he seemed to be a U.S. target regardless of whether he used those weapons.

However, one must insert a strong cautionary note. Although there are logical reasons to expect that these threats to leaders are potent, there are serious problems with targeting the opponent's leadership. First are the substantial legal and moral compunctions.⁹ Second is the strategic consideration that U.S. Presidents may be more vulnerable than Third World leaders. If the United States makes a practice of leadership targeting, we must be prepared for it to be practiced on us.¹⁰ Few national interests may be large enough to warrant such an exchange. Third, in many cases, we may not wish to implement a threat to an adversary's leadership because of the "devil you know" phenomenon. The loss of a leader can produce consequences that may be even less desirable than the actions the United States seeks to deter. Finally, leadership targeting can be very difficult operationally, as the U.S. attempts have shown.

For these reasons, a related target set may be more attractive than leadership targets. We call them "regime-stability" targets. These are the organizations and individuals responsible for preserving the power of the regime, e.g., internal security forces, special military units, wealthy oligarchs, etc. Usually these have some sort of infrastructure that can be attacked, e.g., in the case of security forces,

⁹Assassination of foreign leaders is illegal in the United States. The limits of the definition of "assassination" are unclear. For example, does the law apply in the case of a declared war? What is its application in cases of undeclared wars? What constitutes a declared war in the post-Cold War period? Does "assassination" refer only to actions taken with certain weapons and tactics and not with others? For example, is it germane that in one case a sniper rifle be used and in another a tactical aircraft?

¹⁰The alleged Iraqi plot to kill former President Bush while on a trip to Kuwait may be an indication of this.

there may be barracks, vehicle parks, weapon and ammunition depots, etc. Also, these targets are usually disseminated widely, so they or the connections between them are difficult to protect.

The arguments we have mustered for punishment by regime targeting are based largely on logic. Nevertheless, there are historical cases that illustrate how sensitive states are to threats of this type. As the following discussion illustrates, threats to regimes can trigger frenzied activity in the adversary. That frenzy may be evidence of pain with deterrent value. However, that pain can also lead to desperate behavior that may be undesirable to the deterring state as the adversary reacts sharply to neutralize the threat. The reaction of the Syrian leadership to U.S. threats to topple its regime in 1957 provides an interesting historical example of the kinds of behavior one might elicit with the aforementioned punishment strategy.

In March of 1957, the United States entered into what was known as the Eisenhower doctrine. This policy provided for U.S. support of all kinds, including force, to friendly regimes in the Middle East endangered by the Soviets or their proxies. Though not explicitly identified as a particular target of the policy, Nasser's leadership and promotion of the Arab nationalist movement was the main stimulus for its promulgation. The U.S. hope was that the Eisenhower Doctrine would not only be a source of direct defense of allies but also a source of effective deterrence of Soviet and Arab nationalist activities in the region, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

Jordan had just survived a crisis in 1956 and early 1957 in which King Hussein had successfully suppressed what were deemed to be anti-Western, pro-Communist, Arab-nationalist elements in his population and in the inner circles of his regime. He was able to carry this off with the help of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, backed by the United States.

In the summer of 1957, the United States endeavored to achieve a similar success in Syria. Syria, under Kassem, had been strongly supportive of Nasser and, in 1956, had begun to develop defense ties with the Soviet Union. The Syrian government, an authoritarian regime, was composed of a number of different factions, some friendly to Nasser and the Soviets, some much less so. What alarmed

the United States was the prospect that the pro-Nasserite elements and Communists might seize complete control and carry Syria off to the Soviet camp.

To prevent that from happening, the United States issued a series of threats to the Syrian leadership warning of the consequences of increased ties to the Soviets and Egyptians. Indeed, the language of these threats explicitly stated that the United States would take action against the Syrian regime as punishment for the proscribed behavior. Apparently, more than mere threats were involved, because, in August 1957, the Syrians foiled a serious coup of opposition military officers who were supported by Turkey, Iraq, and Jordan, again likely backed by the United States.

The Syrians reacted to the conspiracy by declaring several members of the U.S. diplomatic community *persona non grata*. They also pressed the Soviets for increased shipments of weapons. The United States responded by arms deliveries of its own to Jordan and Lebanon and by a concentration of the Sixth Fleet off the Syrian coast. Most important, President Eisenhower called upon the Syrian people directly "to act to allay the anxiety caused by recent events"—in other words, to revolt and depose the Syrian regime.

The Syrian government reacted with frantic requests for help from Egypt and the Soviet Union, as well as other Arab states. Unfortunately, the character and explicitness of the threat to the Syrian regime were too blatant for Iraq and Saudi Arabia to ignore publicly, and these states (which had supported U.S. policy in Jordan) now sided with Syria. Seeing that the United States had miscalculated and was overextended, the Soviet Union took the opportunity to declare its readiness to defend the cause of Arab solidarity, thereby "proving" its willingness to balance U.S. power in the region. The Egyptians, similarly emboldened, sent two battalions to Syria, which became the nucleus for a combined Egyptian-Syrian armed force. Although the crisis subsided in November 1957, the Syrian "trauma" precipitated the rapid formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 a strengthening of ties between Egypt and Syria.

One might say with justification that the clumsy U.S. threats to the Syrian regime produced the worst possible results. But, for our purposes, the point to be noted is the potency of regime-stability threats.

Secure regimes are not so sensitive. Regimes like Syria's and most other regional adversaries are not secure and, hence, are highly sensitive to this form of pressure. The question is whether such threats can be used more constructively in the current era. Certainly, the absence of the Soviet Union removes one avenue of protection for threatened regional regimes. Nevertheless, regime-stability threats must almost always be kept private or implicit.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Conventional Forces

Even a favorable local or immediate military balance does not guarantee successful extended deterrence. Regional adversaries may not correctly perceive the balance (e.g., the effectiveness of modern air power in the recent Gulf War), or they may simply be overconfident about their ability to defeat local U.S. and allied forces. Such misperceptions may not be a product of ignorance (although this is always possible) but rather are inherent in the use of conventional military forces as instruments for deterrence. The deployment of conventional forces to a region is costly, ponderous, and complex, making it less likely that such actions will be taken. The outcomes of conventional wars, unlike those of nuclear wars, depend on numerous factors that are difficult to measure. These factors include military doctrine, tactics, accurate intelligence information, the skill and training of the troops, unit cohesion, generalship, terrain and weather, and technology. Luck often plays no small part in the success of conventional campaigns. Even when abundant information exists, as was the case between NATO and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War, assessing the conventional military balance has proven to be very difficult. Witness the debates within the United States over whether or not NATO could successfully defend against a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact.¹¹ Moreover, conventional military capabilities are constantly changing through advances in armor, avionics, sensors, munitions, etc.

¹¹For example, see the discussions in Mearsheimer (1983), pp. 165-188, and Mako (1983).

Under these circumstances, it is not hard to understand why senior political and military leaders have a difficult time accurately assessing the likely outcome of conventional military operations. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons is clear. The delivery of such weapons is more akin to an engineering problem than to the complex logistics and operational issues associated with conventional military operations. This suggests that, if the United States is constrained to use only conventional military forces to deter regional adversaries, deterrence will be less reliable than it would be if credible nuclear threats could be made. Unfortunately, nuclear threats are probably not credible except under the specific circumstances discussed below.

Can anything be done to ameliorate this problem of the effectiveness of conventional deterrence? Here we move beyond the data that case studies can supply to the realm of logic and plausibility. The United States would benefit from making conventional forces as "transparent" in their capabilities as possible. Of course, one way to do this would be to fight periodic wars.¹² However, it would be preferable by far for the United States to communicate its conventional military capabilities more clearly through an intense, continuous program of realistic exercises and demonstrations more potent than annual TEAM SPIRITS and BRIGHT STARS. This program would be especially effective if it could be tailored to counter what an adversary hopes is a U.S. vulnerability. For example, an adversary hoping to move more quickly than the United States might be impressed with a demonstration of U.S. prompt denial capability. Similarly, an adversary hoping to enmesh U.S. forces in prepared defenses might be discouraged by a realistic demonstration of U.S. capabilities to deal with prepared defenses quickly and cheaply.

In addition, the United States could advertise some weapon system operational test and evaluation results. The point is not to subvert these activities by turning them into public-relations campaigns, but simply to note that some of these tests should be constructed so as to influence potential future adversaries. Public demonstrations of precision-guided weapons landing within several feet of their aim-

¹²This is the conclusion reached by Lieberman (1994). According to Lieberman, short-term deterrence failures may be a necessary part of the learning process that leads to long-term deterrence stability.

point or of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System locating armored forces or convoys might send a strong message to regional adversaries that the United States can and will locate enemy forces and destroy them rapidly. The United States might also undertake joint exercises with regional allies and friends on a more frequent basis, especially if an adversary looms on the horizon.

There are difficulties with this approach. First, it may be difficult to design exercises so they do not appear provocative, hence setting off a spiral of regional tensions and/or arms buildups.¹³ Second, a high level of tests and training exercises would be expensive. Israel is a good example of a state that conducts frequent training exercises and maintains a very high operational readiness to enhance Israel's reputation for prompt military action. This boosts the credibility of Israel's conventional deterrent, but it costs them dearly in terms of government spending.¹⁴ Although the United States may not need to match the Israeli operational tempo, exercises and tests should be viewed as one way to convey a deterrent message apart from their objective of honing warfighting skills and evaluating the engineering performance of weapon systems.

Nuclear Weapons

Even with a demonstration program along the lines suggested above, conventional forces will probably never be as deterring as nuclear weapons. Nuclear forces simply are inherently more impressive and clear in their destructiveness. For this reason, we believe it is important for the United States not to permit an adversary to be absolutely sure the United States would *never* use nuclear weapons in a regional conflict under any circumstance.

The problem is to make this threat credible. Just as regional adversaries tend to discount the mobilization potential of a great power, they also tend to discount its nuclear capability if they suspect that

¹³Jervis (1976), pp. 58-113, discusses the provocation problem.

¹⁴The Israeli situation is slightly different, because it involves central deterrence. In addition, Israel relies to some extent on its undeclared nuclear capability to deter threats to Israel's homeland. For a discussion of Israeli conventional deterrence policy, see Shimshoni (1988).

political and moral constraints will preclude nuclear use.¹⁵ In the U.S. case, this belief is encouraged by a pledge under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty not to threaten nonnuclear states with nuclear attack, along with unilateral U.S. declarations buttressing this pledge in the United Nations.

There are three limited situations in which U.S. nuclear threats against regional adversaries may remain credible:

- In response to an adversary's first use of nuclear weapons
- In response to an adversary's use of chemical or biological weapons¹⁶
- In response to an adversary's threat to overwhelm a major U.S. ground unit, even if that threat is entirely conventional.

The first two situations, when an adversary threatens to employ nuclear weapons or some other weapon of mass destruction, are discussed in a companion document to this report and, hence, will not be discussed further here (see Wilkening and Watman, 1994). The third situation is when important U.S. interests are threatened by an adversary that may not be defeatable at an acceptable cost by purely conventional means. Historical examples in which implicit nuclear threats were made include the 1961 Berlin crisis and the 1954 Quemoy-Matsu crisis between the United States and China.¹⁷

¹⁵The essential irrelevance of nuclear weapons can be seen in the Falklands War and the conflict between France and Libya over Chad. In both cases, regional aggression occurred despite the fact that the defender was a nuclear power. When we recall these crises, it seems highly implausible to think that either Great Britain or France would have made nuclear threats in an attempt to compel Argentina or Libya to accept the status quo *ante*, much less actually carry out these threats if they refused.

¹⁶The gray area represented by chemical or biological weapons is particularly troublesome for U.S. strategy, because the United States will soon eliminate its chemical weapons. U.S. biological weapons were eliminated years ago. Hence, the United States cannot rely on tit-for-tat retaliatory threats to deter chemical or biological attacks. U.S. leaders could threaten conventional escalation, perhaps by expanding the war aims to include the capture and later trial of the leaders responsible for these attacks as war criminals. Threatening to use nuclear weapons is the other alternative. Obviously, the utility of U.S. nuclear threats in such circumstances is in tension with a "no first use" policy.

¹⁷In the Quemoy-Matsu crisis the United States had substantial naval forces deployed in the straits between Taiwan and the mainland, in addition to its nuclear capability. Hence, the local military balance may have favored the United States, thereby

Obviously, the last nuclear employment situation—forestalling the defeat of a major U.S. combat unit—is most open to skepticism. Would it be credible to threaten what would be nuclear first use against an adversary that had not used any weapon of mass destruction—and perhaps did not even possess any? There is no way of answering this question, but it seems plausible that, especially in the early period of an intervention, U.S. light ground units may find themselves in dire straits. If the United States has no other means to save them from being overrun and the tactical conditions are appropriate, a U.S. President might convincingly threaten to do “all that is necessary” to protect them, rather than passively accept the human and political costs of their destruction. This said, the central point is that, in the vast majority of purely conventional conflicts, the United States may not encounter the conditions needed to make U.S. nuclear threats credible against regional adversaries.

For political reasons, not the least of which is to avoid provoking other countries to acquire nuclear weapons to deter the United States, the United States should be exceedingly circumspect about mentioning the use of nuclear weapons against a nonnuclear adversary. U.S. declaratory policy should strongly emphasize the use of conventional military options (in addition to condemning the first use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons). The point here is simply that the United States should not create a situation in which an adversary believes, with a high degree of certainty, that the United States will *never* use nuclear weapons under any circumstance.

Implications for Regional Deterrence

Much has been covered in this chapter, and a short summary may be helpful. First, the most important military capability required for deterrence is to be able to deny the adversary his or her objective. Prompt denial, the capability to prevent the adversary from reaching an objective, is more deterring than a rollback capability to be employed after the adversary has captured his or her objective. The relevant military forces for a prompt denial capability are those sta-

contributing to successful deterrence. Another opinion holds that China never intended to attack and, hence, that this is not an example of extended deterrence success but rather a nondeterrence event.

tioned in the theater or those that can arrive in time to interpose themselves between the adversary and his objective. If U.S. national military strategy is designed with regional deterrence in mind, "forward presence" and/or rapid "crisis response" become key elements in this strategy.¹⁸

Second, the United States could profitably develop a program of exercises and demonstrations to make its conventional capabilities as transparent as possible.

Third, the United States should retain some thread of nuclear threat in its regional deterrence strategy to be used on those specific occasions when such a threat is likely to be credible.

¹⁸Again, "rapid" means that the United States must be able to credibly deny an opponent's war aims on a timetable set by the adversary. If an adversary believes he can conquer a neighboring state within a week, the time frame for a U.S. response is days. If it takes several days for an adversary to accomplish his military objectives, then 24 to 48 hours is the time frame for a rapid U.S. response.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING REGIONAL
DETERRENCE

The research findings discussed bear on the "requirements" for regional deterrence: If the United States wishes to deter a regional adversary with high confidence, what are the requirements to be met? However, this begs a critical question that arises with the end of the Cold War: To what extent *should* the United States rely on deterrence to protect its regional interests? This question could never have been asked during the Cold War. At that time, deterring the Soviet Union was the focus of U.S. national security strategy. Deterrence was not an option—it was a necessity, since nuclear war was inconceivable.

In the post-Cold War era, this may not be true with respect to deterring some types of regional adversaries. There are likely to be some regional adversaries against whom and some occasions when the United States may elect *not* to implement deterrence. The more costly and difficult deterrence is found to be, the more often the United States may choose not to use deterrence in its regional security strategies. Instead, alternative policies, such as appeasement or neglect, may be more desirable. Indeed, it may be more cost-effective for the United States to fight an occasional war with a particular regional adversary than to pursue a costly, concerted, and unremitting policy of deterrence. For, in the final analysis, deterrence is an *option* now, not a necessity. As such, it needs to be evaluated using the same metrics of cost and benefit that are applied to all other strategic options. Deterrence is no longer sacrosanct.

INTELLIGENCE

Our findings suggest that regional adversaries are more or less difficult to deter depending upon their motivations for entering into the crisis with the United States. If an adversary is motivated more by a desire for gain than to avert loss and if his status quo is more satisfactory than not, such an adversary will fall into the easier-to-deter category. If an adversary is motivated by a desire to avert loss and if his status quo and prospects are less satisfactory, such an adversary will fall into the harder-to-deter category. We use this categorization for convenience, since we understand that, in reality, regional adversaries are arrayed along a deterrence continuum.

One of the fundamental contributions of national intelligence is to help decisionmakers understand in which category (or place on the continuum) a particular regional adversary falls. Its particular location on that continuum will shape importantly the requirements the United States needs to meet to deter successfully. In particular, there is a critical need for accurate political intelligence regarding the stability of political regimes governing Third World states, since the desire to avert the loss of domestic political power frequently leads to risk-taking behavior. This, in turn, implies that these states may be hard to deter. For the most part, this type of intelligence is collected by signal and human intelligence sources and methods. Imagery is probably less important. It is unclear to us how well prepared the U.S. intelligence community is to acquire and analyze such data.

This point has particular salience at a time of defense reductions. The smaller U.S. military capability is, the more efficient must be the allocation of that capability to its tasks. Inefficiency threatens to increase dangerously the chances that some demands on U.S. forces will not be met. Among the efficiencies is what is called "economy of force": assigning to each task only as much force as needed and no more. In the context of deterrence, this means gauging correctly how difficult an adversary will be to deter. Failure to do so will mean underdetering the difficult and overdetering the easy.

STRATEGIES AND CAPABILITIES

For adversaries in the easier-to-deter category, the research suggests that deterrence requirements are often moderate. Such adversaries

can be deterred by posing a reasonably credible threat of U.S. involvement in the event of a crisis. Strategies that communicate or signal this threat are an appropriate choice in these cases. A "tripwire" strategy is a good example. The tripwire force cannot itself defend the U.S. interest threatened by the regional adversary. But a symbolic force is sufficient to deny the adversary a reasonable hope of a "free ride." Given the low risk-taking propensities of these adversaries, denial of a "free ride" can be a very effective deterrent. Indeed, such adversaries may be quite responsive to deterrence strategies that fall short even of a tripwire.

The capabilities needed for a symbolic deterrence strategy emphasize "presence" in some form. The symbol of U.S. intention to defend an interest is usually a military force insufficient to defend the interest. That force must be tied with the interest to be defended, either through basing in the area or through visits. The visits must be sufficiently frequent that the adversary cannot reliably hope to conclude his operation without a significant risk of encountering the U.S. symbolic force. An example of such a strategy is "presence," such as that provided by the U.S. Navy. An offshore presence cannot deny a motivated enemy its objective; however, the presence of naval forces does pose a threat of U.S. involvement, which may be sufficiently credible to make the threatened U.S. interest an unattractive target of opportunity for potential regional adversaries. The logic of this argument suggests that naval presence is likely to be less effective than a ground presence, because an adversary can better entertain the possibility that it will not have to engage the former. Air forces probably fall between these two, if they are introduced into the crisis area. That done, air forces would be less avoidable than naval forces, though still more "withdrawable" than ground forces.

In sum, the requirements for deterring these sorts of regional adversaries are moderate, even considering the resource constraints expected to shape U.S. military capabilities for the foreseeable future.

The same cannot be said for the harder-to-deter regional adversaries. Motivated often by major domestic concerns, these adversaries require more than a symbolic strategy for successful deterrence. Our research suggests that what is required is a highly credible capability to deny them their political and military objectives promptly and, in some cases, to punish them by threatening regime-stability targets.

The capabilities needed to implement a prompt denial strategy of deterrence, with or without an additional capability to punish, are likely to be large and expensive. Most stressing may be a requirement for forward forces sufficient to stop the adversary short of his objective, at least until additional forces can arrive. Optimally, this means stationing all the forces necessary between the adversary and his objective, but even the United States lacks the resources to meet such a requirement in more than a few cases simultaneously. Therefore, a strong incentive exists for the United States to explore capabilities that can provide prompt denial and that are so rapidly deployable into an area as to be "virtually" stationed there. Air forces are a natural choice for this sort of capability, at least against threats vulnerable to air attack.

The military capabilities needed to punish an adversary by endangering his regime stability are varied. Presumably, the capability to strike reliably with precision and surprise from long distances will be important. This is because attacking the regime-supporting organizations and installations likely will require low collateral damage, multiple attacks (since the targets may be widely disseminated), and low cost (to enhance the credibility of the threat).

Special operation forces may also be useful, for two reasons. First, they may be the only way to strike at targets that are commingled with civilian areas. Second, such forces (specifically, Army Special Forces) may be very useful for training internal insurgencies in the state we wish to deter. Regional adversaries frequently contain dissident populations. On some occasions, it may be very useful for purposes of deterrence to threaten to increase the power of those dissident populations.

POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

There are significant constraints in the way of satisfying these military requirements. Some of these constraints are political.

The U.S. government is not designed for swift action, even when the president can act unilaterally. Normally, presidential inhibitions on the commitments of the United States make it difficult to meet the

"promptness" requirement. This difficulty is exacerbated greatly by the internal and external coalitions that the United States often must form as a prerequisite to international military action. Internal coalitions refer to the congressional and popular support necessary to permit the deployment of U.S. troops (at least in large numbers). External coalitions refer to the increasingly multinational character of international military action. While, in principle, the United States can act unilaterally, it is likely to opt to do so less and less often.

Traditionally, the United States has coped with this sort of problem by using commitment and the activities easily identified as committing. For example, the United States does as much as possible to persuade the adversary that all the preparation and coalition-building needed for a prompt response have been accomplished prior to any crisis. Contingency plans have been created, forces earmarked, training adapted, exercises formulated, and "red lines" agreed to by all concerned. Therefore, when a crisis does arise, only presidential authorization is necessary to commit the forces. The adversary is given no reason to hope that much, if any, crisis coalition-building will slow the U.S. response. This is the logic of our commitment to South Korea, Europe, and, to some extent, the Persian Gulf. Unfortunately, this process of preparation is feasible in only a limited number of areas. Further, since commitment of this sort drastically reduces freedom of action, the United States likely will reserve it for only the most important interests. Therefore, for most places, most of the time, prompt action by the United States is unlikely.

A second type of political constraint is that imposed by fears of the public's reputed sensitivity to U.S. casualties. We say "reputed" because, as discussed earlier, other research carried out under this project suggests that the reality of U.S. sensitivity to casualties may be quite different from the prevailing wisdom.¹

These findings may not apply to public sensitivity to *anticipated* casualties as a crisis deepens, since the data used are almost entirely extracted from public opinion polling once fighting has begun and U.S. casualties have accrued. In this regard, one could argue reasonably that the public's precombat sensitivity to casualties may be dif-

¹See Schwarz (1994).

ferent from its sensitivity once combat has begun. To this we can only say, "possibly so." But it is clear that the issue of casualty sensitivity is much more complex than today's common wisdom that Americans simply will not tolerate casualties. Prior experience suggests otherwise and that casualty sensitivity may be related to the magnitude of the U.S. interest at stake.

It is important that the U.S. conversation with itself about this question be much clearer and more accurate. Saying unconditionally, as many do, that the U.S. public will not tolerate casualties is to provide potential adversaries with dangerously incorrect information. For example, this may have affected Saddam Hussein's risk calculations. Therefore, it behooves the defense community to treat this matter with greater care, if for no other reason than to avoid undermining our own deterrence efforts.

A last type of political constraint specifically affects the proposed punishment strategy. Threatening to attack the stability of regional regimes can produce substantial discomfort in coalition partners, as well as within the United States, regardless of how effective such threats may be for deterrence. This is especially true if the adversary's leadership itself is among the targets.

This problem may be of particular importance to the extent the United States seeks to rely on the threat of punishment to substitute for, rather than complement, the threat of prompt denial. This would be a very tempting way to circumvent the sizable and expensive requirements imposed by prompt denial. It would be much easier if the United States could deter reliably by threatening to strike important targets of the adversary, even though its military capabilities are left substantially intact.

As mentioned, experience is not encouraging to the hope that punishment alone can deter. However, that experience was gained at earlier times with much less effective weapons against very highly motivated adversaries. It may be that the threat of modern capabilities wielded for punishment against less-motivated adversaries may be more effective. At this point, there is no more that can be said on an empirical basis. We think this question of denial versus punishment is a promising and important one for additional research.

MILITARY CONSTRAINTS

At least as weighty are the military constraints impeding the U.S. ability and desire to meet the requirements for deterring the harder-to-deter cases. Under the pressure of resource reductions, many U.S. military trends are running counter to the policies recommended here for regional deterrence.

First, the United States is reducing its overseas deployments, particularly in Europe. Europe may no longer urgently require U.S. deterrence protection, although that is far from clear yet. The general trend toward continental U.S. basing undermines deterrence extended to other regions, because it undermines prompt denial.

Second, the United States does not now use exercises and demonstrations as a means of deterrence communication, at least to the extent we suggest. Indeed, the size and frequency of some U.S. exercises are in danger of reduction, for example, TEAM SPIRIT. In addition, operational tempo rates are declining for all three services when a higher level of activity focused on specific regions would be desirable for deterrence.

Third, the notion of punishment may be at odds with the trend toward increasingly precise and "bloodless" war. Operations intended to threaten regime stability may not imply great collateral damage, but they are not likely to be antiseptic.

Fourth, to support nonproliferation, the United States is moving in the direction of deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons. This may be a reasonable policy when all U.S. policy objectives are considered. However, with respect solely to regional deterrence, an entirely nonnuclear regional strategy is likely to be counterproductive.

These trends are driven by good reasons: the end of the Cold War and a declining defense budget. We are not proposing here that the trends be reversed. However, we are pointing out that a substantial deterrence price is likely paid.

DETERRENCE IN U.S. REGIONAL STRATEGY

Deterrence of the easier-to-deter adversaries is within U.S. capabilities for the foreseeable future. However, the harder-to-deter adver-

saries are a different matter. Given the difficulty of deterring these adversaries, the focused and long-term application of effort and resources necessary, and the limits on those resources, the United States will be able to devote its deterrence attention to only a small number of these adversaries. Presumably, this number will be smaller than the number the United States would prefer to deter. Unfortunately, some number of the harder-to-deter adversaries will have to be treated as though they were among the easier-to-deter adversaries, implying that the United States will use limited presence, perhaps tripwires, but not a credible prompt denial and punishment capability to deter hostile acts. So treated, some number of these adversaries will be deterred. Most, sooner or later, will not. Therefore, the United States has to focus its deterrence strategy very carefully so as to be able to concentrate its efforts on the most important interests and to make sure it can tolerate the consequences of the failure to deter other harder-to-deter adversaries.

THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

We have used historical data in several different ways to support this research.

First, we conducted an extensive review of the deterrence literature, which consists of two bodies of work, the classical, deductive development of deterrence theory and the later, empirical, inductive assessment of deterrence practice in international politics. The latter relies on history for data, and, as a result, most of the empirical research is accompanied by detailed case studies of crises in which deterrence was deemed to play a part. We studied these cases carefully and, in some instances, elaborated on them to develop our hypotheses about regional deterrence.

Second, one of our principal hypotheses concerns the links between the governing regimes of regional adversaries, their domestic political problems, and their propensity to accept risk. Few of the case studies we consulted contained detailed information addressing these factors. Therefore, we elaborated a number of those cases with additional information bearing on the specific areas of interest to us.

Third, the research literature on deterrence (academic and otherwise) provides a number of propositions about deterrence for which there is some support in evidence. However, these do not exist in the context of an overall model of deterrence; indeed, a number of the supported propositions are in conflict with one another. These include the following:

- Deterrence is an invalid concept, since adversaries often do not *choose* to enter a conflict. Others believe that deterrence is a

valid concept, since adversaries do have sufficient choice to enter or refrain from a conflict.

- Military capabilities are only weakly related to deterrence outcomes, as opposed to the view that military capabilities are strongly related to deterrence outcome.
- Demonstrating commitment is the primary determinant of deterrence success, as opposed to the view that commitment is important but does not determine deterrence success.

To resolve these contending views, we delved into the existing cases in considerable depth. By that process, we found strong support for the views developed in the study:

- Most adversaries do not enter conflict entirely out of a sense of compulsion. They retain sufficient choice over their behavior that deterrence is a valid concept in dealing with them.
- Local military capabilities are of great importance in deterrence success.
- Commitment or resolve is important but no more so than local military capabilities.

Fourth, we used historical examples throughout to illustrate and "flesh out" the conceptual issues raised in the research.

THE JAPANESE DECISION TO ATTACK PEARL HARBOR

The Japanese decision to enter into war with the United States and Great Britain represents a classic example of the sort of decisionmaking driven by assessments of the costs of inaction. It is a profitable case to study not only because it is a striking example of risk assessment under extreme conditions, but also because it illustrates well some of the factors at play (in a less extreme way) in the decision-making of more commonly encountered regional adversaries.¹

In the Japanese government of the time, decisions as to whether or not to go to war were the formal province of the cabinet. However, the bulk of the deliberations prior to cabinet considerations was conducted in the Liaison Conferences attended by a committee of high military and civilian government leaders. A somewhat expanded National Security Council is the best U.S. analogy to this Japanese organization. The Liaison Conference sessions were attended by the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Navy Minister, War Minister, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Navy, their Deputy Chiefs, and assorted high-level civilians representing economic ministries. This committee met several times during the latter half of 1941 and reached the decision to take Japan into war. The accounts of these meetings are available virtually in stenographic form, and they provide a remarkable look into the analytical processes employed by the participants (Ike, 1967). As always, these processes

¹This discussion of the Japanese decisionmaking relies generally on several sources. See Wohlster (1962); Betts (1982); Morton (1954), pp. 1325-1337; Sagan (1988); Toland (1970); Maxon (1957); Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (1946); and Ike (1967).

were a mixture of clarity and chaos, detachment and manic passion. But, in our view, what comes through clearly was the sentiment that the almost certain costs of inaction for Japan exceeded the uncertain, although potentially very high, costs of action. For the most part, the participants understood Japan's weaknesses and the implications of U.S. strengths. The overall level of self-delusion and impetuosity, while undoubtedly present, seems low. Rather, even the most pessimistic Japanese officials seem to have believed that the current and prospective status quo for Japan was inconsistent with her most vital objectives—membership among the Great Powers with an established sphere of interest—and that the only course of action open to Japan with any chance of success (even if low) was war.

On July 2, 1941, the Japanese cabinet endorsed the view developed in the Liaison Conferences that Japan had to develop the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to include all British, Dutch, French, and Portuguese possessions in the Far East, as well as the Philippines, India, and Australia. Although leaving open the prospect of achieving these objectives by negotiation, the minutes of the meeting are explicit that the Co-Prosperity Sphere was to be pursued "no matter what obstacles may be encountered" and "no matter what international developments take place."² Indeed, the decision memorandum refers explicitly to the necessity of an "advance into the Southern Regions." The Japanese decisionmakers hoped that the United States could be kept out of this war, but they accepted the necessity of planning for the disappointment of those hopes.

The Liaison Conference met again on October 23 to consider whether or not the United States could be kept out of a war while Japan pursued the Co-Prosperity Sphere. The conferees agreed that there was no chance that the United States would accept Japanese objectives in the Far East and drop its economic sanctions. They further agreed that compliance with U.S. terms to resolve the sanctions crisis would mean that "Japan would be compelled ultimately to withdraw entirely from the (Asian) continent." At the same time, the conference concluded that it was not possible for Japan to fight the United States separately, that U.S. war potential was seven or eight times that of Japan, and that "there were no means of directly van-

²Quoted in Wohlstetter (1962), p. 345.

quishing the United States in case of war against her."³ Yet, this conference reached a unanimous or, at least, majority decision to go to war with the United States if negotiations were unavailing—as all expected them to be. Why was this decision made?

The military members of the Liaison Conference were quite optimistic that Japan could achieve major successes in the Pacific against the United States and Britain in the first six to twelve months of war. However, they were equally pessimistic about Japanese chances if the war continued beyond that point. This assessment was entirely realistic. On the other hand, they believed that continuation of diplomatic activities was foolish, since they were unlikely to bear fruit and would erode even Japan's short-term advantages as U.S. war preparedness accelerated. Therefore, as Navy Minister Shimada concluded, "though there is a great risk in beginning the war now, we must realize that there is also great risk in depending on negotiations unless we can be certain of the final outcome."⁴

Ultimately, the Japanese chose war in the hopes that, in some way, it could be kept short. But, as they were aware, they had no plan to ensure that it would be short, other than to hope that the United States would elect to cut its losses in an area of the world of less interest than Europe. In other words, the Japanese could not deprive the United States of the freedom of action or the means to continue the conflict. The Japanese chose this course—which U.S. planners discounted as grossly irrational—because all other courses seemed worse.⁵

Indeed, as Roberta Wohlstetter has pointed out, the very notion of "choice" is slippery in such situations (Wohlstetter, 1962, p. 357). The Japanese felt compelled to go to war; they did not see themselves as free *not* to do so. This notion of compulsion occurs frequently in the assessments of states in similar circumstances and illustrates the difficulty of even less extreme, more common international situations. Inherent in the concept of deterrence is that the adversary has some freedom to refrain from the undesirable behavior. If he thinks

³Togo (1956), pp. 125–127.

⁴Quoted in Wohlstetter (1962) p. 351.

⁵Quoted in Sagan (1988), pp. 894, 904.

he has none, deterrence must fail. If he thinks he has at least some freedom to refrain (as most states do), deterrence is possible even if difficult.

A final point is in order about the problem these situations pose to U.S. intelligence analysts. The assessments of U.S. planners about the consequences of war with Japan were identical to those of the Japanese. The U.S. estimate found the disparities in national power to be so great that "national sanity would dictate against such an event" (referring to war).⁶ But this U.S. conclusion omitted an assessment of the status quo and its future prospects as viewed by the Japanese and provides a good illustration of how frequently such considerations are dropped from deterrence calculations. The United States never weighed seriously the Japanese view that the alternative to war was "gradual exhaustion" without ever having struck a single blow (Wohlstetter, 1962, p. 354).

Interestingly, as desperate as the Japanese believed their situation to be, they clearly were deterrable, at least in a limited military sense. Admiral Nagumo, the commander of the Japanese naval force sent to attack Pearl Harbor, was under orders to abort the operation if his approach was detected. The Japanese planners believed that surprise was essential if the attack was to have any prospect for success. Therefore, the United States could have deterred the Japanese by taking steps that suggested to them that surprise had been lost.

North Korea and Cuba are current candidates for nondeterrable status. Both are facing prospects that appear catastrophic for the survival of the existing political regimes. The forces pushing in this direction seem irresistible if left unremediated. Remediation, in these cases, would require some benign, external intervention to shore up these regimes in much the way the Soviets did. This seems unlikely, short of coercion by the failing regime. So far as we know, Cuba has no coercive means sufficient to this task. Humanitarian intervention can be expected in Cuba, but nowhere near the magnitude needed to preserve the Castro regime. North Korea, on the other hand, has managed to create better prospects by skillfully us-

⁶Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (1946), Part 14, p. 1056.

ing its putative nuclear capability to extort economic and diplomatic benefits from Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Whether it can extort enough to make a difference is an open question.

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
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to Global
Leadership?

*America & the World
After the Cold War*

Zalmay M. Khalilzad



Project AIR FORCE

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faces no global rival and no significant hostile alliances. Most of
the world's economically capable nations are U.S. allies. Three
years after the end of the Cold War, however, no new grand design
has yet jelled, and this failure carries large opportunity costs.
Now is the time for the United States to decide upon a new grand
strategy to guide the nation's direction for the future. The report
identifies options for a new U.S. architectural framework. During
the Cold War, U.S. foreign and security policies were guided by the
objective of "Soviet containment." Today, does the country need a
new vision and grand strategy? What options are there to choose
from, which is the best, and
520: why? And what are the preferred option's implications for America's
foreign and security policies and its military forces? The report
seeks to answer these questions and offers seven principles that
should guide U.S. policies.
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PREFACE

This report discusses the importance of grand strategy for the United States in the post-Cold War era. It aims to contribute to the debate on what that grand strategy should be. It should be of interest to policymakers and analysts in the realms of security and foreign policy, future military forces and their roles and missions, alliances, burden sharing, intelligence priorities, and international politics generally.

This report was produced in the Strategy, Doctrine, and Force Structure Program of RAND's Project AIR FORCE.

PROJECT AIR FORCE

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SUMMARY

This report argues that the United States needs a new "grand strategy" for pursuing national security, economic, and foreign policy interests. It identifies three potential grand strategies, makes the case for choosing one of them, and offers recommendations for how to pursue that strategy.

LACK OF VISION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

During the Cold War, the United States was relatively certain of its objectives. Now it is not. Despite efforts by Secretary Cheney's Defense Department during the Bush administration and pockets in the Clinton administration, no grand strategy has yet jelled. In fact, the United States has been operating without a grand strategy since the end of the Cold War. This failure carries large opportunity costs. The lack of a grand strategy makes it more difficult to decide what is important and what is not, to determine which threats are more serious than others, and to develop coherent approaches to respond to new challenges. It causes policy on many issues to be characterized by ambivalence, uncertainty, and a lack of staying power. Short-term and parochial interests may take priority over the longer-term national ones. And without a broadly agreed-upon architectural framework, it becomes harder to gain widespread bipartisan support for policy. Sustaining popular support and staying the course for particular policies are difficult as well, if the costs of implementation increase but the commitment cannot be explained in terms of a national interest and a strategy on which broad agreement has been achieved.

OPTIONS FOR A NEW U.S. GRAND STRATEGY

The report identifies three options for a new grand strategy and assesses each one.

Neoisolationism. This option would involve abandoning U.S. preeminence and turning inward to face domestic problems. Although this approach could produce significant defense savings and other benefits in the short run, it would most likely increase the danger of major conflicts, require much greater U.S. defense efforts over the long term, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity.

A return to pre-World War II multipolarity. This option would rely on the balance of power among several nations to preclude the emergence of a preeminent superpower. As in the 19th century, the United States and other global powers would compete and cooperate to avoid hegemony and global war. There could be advantages for the United States in a such a strategy, including a lower defense burden—but less than might be the case with a neoisolationist strategy. The risks, however, could be severe. They include the possibility that the other powers would not cooperate fully; that the United States is likely to face increased competition from other major powers; that a decline in U.S. influence might have negative economic consequences, including a weakening of GATT and the IMF; that the members of such a system would find it too difficult to behave according to its rules; and that such a world could lead to new arms races and even global wars.

Maintain U.S. global leadership and preclude the rise of another global rival and multipolarity. This goal is the most promising for a future U.S. grand strategy. A world in which the United States exercises leadership would be more peaceful and more open to values of liberal democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Such a world is likely to have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony and lower-level conflicts, and the long-run avoidance of new world wars with their enormous costs and consequences.

STEPS FOR MAINTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

For long-term success in realizing the objective this report recommends, the United States should adhere to seven principles, outlined below, as guidelines for its policies.

Maintain and Selectively Extend the Alliance Among the Economically Most Capable Democratic Nations

During the Cold War the United States was successful in integrating Western Europe and East Asia into U.S.-led coalitions and alliances. Given continued unity, this group will be strong enough to overpower any threat from outside its ranks. Thus, this community of nations may be called a "democratic zone of peace and prosperity." Maintaining this zone of peace should be the central feature of American post-Cold War grand strategy.

Prevent Hegemony over Critical Regions

The United States should be willing to use force if necessary for this purpose. There are currently two regions whose control by a hostile power could pose a global challenge: East Asia and Europe. The Persian Gulf is critically important for a different reason—its oil resources are vital for the world economy. In the long term, the relative importance of various regions can change. A region that is critical to American interests now might become less important, while some other region might gain in importance.

Hedge Against Russian Reimperialization and Chinese Expansionism While Promoting Cooperation with Both

Both the United States and the other members of the democratic zone of peace have a substantial interest in helping Russia shed remnants of its imperial leanings, communist-style command economy, and totalitarian politics. In the near term, Moscow is unlikely to pose a global challenge. However, over time it can pose a regional and ul-

timately a global threat if it gets its house in order and moves toward reimperialization. In the case of China, there is a strong tendency to reject U.S. preeminence, implying the need to balance it—but at the same time China wants economic and technological cooperation with the United States to improve its relative position. China is one or two decades away from becoming a serious global rival—either by itself or in coalition with others. The United States should continue to encourage Chinese political and economic integration in the global economy, in the expectation that it would lead to democratization and decentralization. At the same time, the United States should limit technological transfers with military implications and discourage Chinese aggression against ASEAN states and Taiwan by encouraging regional cooperation and helping ensure that these states have adequate defense capabilities.

Preserve U.S. Military Preeminence

For the foreseeable future, this means having the capability for fighting two major regional contingencies nearly simultaneously, e.g., Korea and the Gulf. The United States should also acquire increased capabilities for occasional intervention in lesser regional conflicts, such as humanitarian relief operations, and for countering weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles. For the longer term, it should consider moving toward sizing its forces to be able to defeat the plausible military challenges to critical American interests that might be posed by the two next most powerful military forces in the world—which are not allied with the United States. The United States also needs to remain in the forefront of developing and employing technological advances affecting military effectiveness. In addition to technological superiority, the United States must maintain the quality of its military personnel.

Maintain U.S. Economic Strength and an Open International Economic System, and Reduce the Nation's Social Crisis

U.S. economic strength is essential for U.S. global leadership. To remain the preeminent world power, the United States must enhance its economic strength by improving productivity, thus increasing real per-capita income; strengthening education and training; and generating and using superior science and technology. In the long run,

the nation's economic future will be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. Second, and even more important to long-term economic well-being, may be the overall rate of investment. Although government cannot imbue Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to invest, it can use tax policy to encourage such behavior. The nation's global standing will also be affected by its social conditions—which are currently unsatisfactory because of the high rate of violence in the cities, the poor state of race relations, and the breakdown in families. Though the United States faces no global ideological rival, and though movements such as Islamic fundamentalism and East-Asian traditionalism are limited in their appeal, the country's social problems are limiting its appeal as a model. If the social crisis worsens, it is likely that over the long term, a new organizing principle with greater universal appeal might emerge and be adopted by states with the power and the desire to challenge the United States.

Be Judicious in the Use of Force, Avoid Overextension, and Achieve Effective Burden Sharing Among Allies

Overextension is a mistake that some past great powers have made. Such a development can occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in various regions—sapping its energies, weakening its military capabilities, and undermining support for its global role. U.S. vital interests are engaged primarily in critical regions where it should be prepared to use force if other means fail. When it comes to lesser interests, the United States, in cooperation with like-minded nations, should rely on nonmilitary options: arming and training the victims of aggression; providing technical assistance and logistic support for peacekeeping by the UN, regional organizations, or other powers; economic instruments such as sanctions and positive incentives; and, of course, diplomacy.

The nation's European and Asian allies must do more to protect common interests in places such as the Persian Gulf, Korea, and East Central Europe. The United States does face a dilemma: as long as it is able and willing to protect common interests, others might be happy to have a free ride, thereby keeping political opposition under

control, accepting no risk for their youth, and continuing to focus on their economies. But the United States also should not want Germany and Japan to be able to conduct expeditionary wars on their own. Therefore, although the United States will probably be willing to bear a heavier military burden than its allies, fairness and long-term public support require that the disproportion not be excessive. A balance needs to be struck and a formula has to be found to balance each country's contribution of "blood and treasure." In the Gulf War, a substantial degree of burden sharing was realized. But the allies should do more in protecting Persian Gulf oil and deterring aggression in Korea, although they are likely to resist and argue that they, too, are cutting back their defense budgets. For the long term, one possible solution is to institutionalize burden sharing among the G-7 nations for the security of critical regions, including sharing the financial costs of military operations. Another is for NATO to enhance significantly its power projection capability for operations in East Central Europe and the Middle East.

Obtain and Maintain Domestic Support for a Global Leadership Vision and Necessary Strategy

Will the American people support such a strategy? They might well do so if (a) it was presented to them by the President and supported by the senior members of both the Democratic and Republican parties and (b) the costs and benefits of such a strategy and some alternatives were debated and understood. A global leadership strategy will entail costs—a greater defense effort than might well be the case under some other grand strategy—but those costs have to be compared with the potential risks of alternatives. The costs of the other choices of global role the United States might take can ultimately be higher. Besides, there are economic benefits for the United States from playing a global leadership role. Those benefits have not been illuminated, either analytically or in public debate. Global leadership and efforts to build a more democratic and peaceful world should also appeal to American idealism, a defining feature of the republic. To sustain domestic political support, this appeal might well be as important as the more selfish and material American interests. In fact, such a lofty goal could be a spur to the kinds of social and educational reforms that the country needs, rather than an alternative to them.

Of course, should the public reject such a strategy, the United States would not be able to pursue it. In the long run, American preeminence will not last if the nation turns inward or makes the wrong choices. And as a country it would fail to seize this historic moment. Over time the relative position of the United States would decline, and the world would most likely settle into a balance-of-power multipolar system—and become more dangerous for the United States. The development of a multipolar world is not inevitable. It depends to a significant degree on what this nation wants and does. Even if the development is inevitable, the later it happens, the better.

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INTRODUCTION

With its victory in the Cold War, the United States is now the world's preeminent military and political power. Despite a decline in its relative economic power and significant domestic problems, the United States remains the world's largest economy. It leads the world in many areas of technology. It faces no global rival and no significant hostile alliances. Most economically capable nations are U.S. allies. What about future direction? Where is the United States going?

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign and security policies were guided by the objective of "Soviet containment." Three years after the end of the Cold War, however, no new paradigm or grand design has emerged. Does the country need a new vision and grand strategy? What are the opportunity costs of not having a new grand strategy? What alternatives does the country face? What is the best option and why? And what are the implications of the preferred option for U.S. foreign and security policies and U.S. military forces? These are the questions that this report seeks to answer.

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE

With its victory in the Cold War, the United States has become the world's preeminent power. This is the second extraordinary change in the global balance of power in this century—a century that has seen many dramatic developments in the international security environment.

In the first 50 years of the 20th century, there were two world wars and two major revolutions, in Russia and in China. Five empires collapsed: the Ottoman, the Austro-Hungarian, the German, the Italian, and the Japanese. Two other global imperial systems—the British and the French—greatly declined. As a result, the character of the international system changed fundamentally. For several centuries, the international order had been characterized by multipolarity and a balance of power. No single nation was allowed to gain such preponderance that a coalition of other states could not confront it with greater might. The system succeeded in preventing the emergence of a single dominant power, but ultimately it failed and led to World War I, which was followed by a chaotic period, the rise of fascism, and World War II. This was followed by the emergence of a global bipolar system.

The transformation to bipolarity occurred for two reasons. The first was the reduction in the relative power of several key members of the old (pre-World War I) balance-of-power system. Germany was defeated in World War I. Britain and France experienced a significant decline. These developments coincided with the second important change: the concentration of relative power in the United States and the Soviet Union and their active engagement in global affairs. These

changes, which were the result of a complex set of factors, produced a new international system. A special feature of the new system was the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States represented two different value systems and ways of life—and such issues had not driven the conflicts in the multipolar balance-of-power era. Moscow was animated by a revolutionary ideology and a sense of historic mission. After a period of uncertainty, the United States decided to undertake a determined effort to contain the spread of Soviet power. This struggle, the Cold War, took place in the context of the development and refinement of weapons of mass destruction, with the ever-present danger of nuclear annihilation.

The Cold War dominated U.S. foreign policy, national security strategy, and major defense decisions—weapons system acquisition, force sizing, overseas presence, and alliances. Cold War bipolarity required the United States to be prepared to contain the spread of Soviet power on a global basis. This principle affected U.S. dealings with various regions. Developments even in remote areas were perceived to affect relative American power and position in the Cold War, and therefore received U.S. attention and response.

The Cold War ended with the sudden collapse of both the Soviet empire and the Soviet state. The disintegration of the USSR marked the end of the world's last great empire. Although Russia retains the strategic nuclear capability for a massive attack on the United States, at present there is no political motive for using it. Except for its strategic weapons, Russia is no longer a superpower. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian military power receded some 1,000 kilometers eastward from the heart of Europe—a process that had started with the stunning changes in Eastern Europe in 1989. The independence of Central Asia and the states of the Caucasus removed the “Russian” empire’s contiguity with the Persian Gulf states, reducing the worries of some nations about threats to the oil supply from that quarter. The Soviet Union had been the world’s second- or third-largest economy; Russia accounted for 60 percent of the total Soviet GNP. Now, Russian GNP has declined dramatically, currently ranking somewhere between fifth and ninth in the world, in a group of economic middle powers such as India, Brazil, France,

Britain, and Italy.¹ According to the World Bank, by the year 2020, the Russian economy might well rank even lower—behind Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.² The Russian military establishment continues to deteriorate, and it has lost much of its ability to project power beyond the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Although the reasons for the failure of the Soviet Union are varied and complex, the U.S.-led containment strategy certainly contributed to its demise. It frustrated the Soviets' global designs, forced them to confront their domestic contradictions, and perhaps most importantly, added to their economic difficulties. The Cold War was expensive for both sides, but especially so for the Soviet Union.³ Ultimately unable to continue to bear the costs, the Soviets began incrementally losing their hold—first on Afghanistan, then on Eastern Europe, and ultimately on the Soviet Union itself. The Cold War ended with triumph for one side and collapse for the other. This took place rapidly and peacefully—an unprecedented development in a bipolar rivalry.

Rhetoric about an American "decline" aside, the relative balance of political and military power has now shifted strongly in favor of the United States. Through the more than four decades of the Cold War, the United States accumulated enormous political status and vast military capabilities. Despite a decline in its relative economic power and significant domestic problems, the United States remains the world's largest economy. It is the world leader in many areas of technology in an age of unprecedented technological changes. In addition, the way the Soviet Union collapsed undermined communism as an economic system and as a global ideology capable of

¹ *The Economist*, December 25, 1993, p. 39; *Argumenti i Fakty* #4, 1994, p. 4; and *The Economist*, October 1, 1994, p. 4.

² *The Economist*, October 1, 1994, p. 4.

³ In 1985, U.S. defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP equaled 6.4 percent, higher than most of its NATO allies and Japan; by contrast, the Soviet figure for 1985 was 16.2 percent. Sources for these figures are U.S. Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993; and Christopher Mark Davis, "The Exceptional Soviet Case," *Daedalus*, Vol. 120, No. 4, 1991, p. 122.

challenging the popularity of the market economy and liberal democracy. The market economy—relying on free enterprise, market-based incentives, and private property—is now broadly accepted as the best path to prosperity and development. Although less widely accepted than market economy, most of the fundamentals of liberal democracy are being embraced by successful nations. At present, all liberal democracies are market economies, although not all market economies are liberal democracies.

At the moment, the United States faces no global rival and no significant hostile alliances. Most economically capable nations, including those with both high per-capita and high total gross national product, such as Germany and Japan, are U.S. allies. The U.S. success during the Cold War in helping Western Europe and East Asia become prosperous free-market democracies and integrating them into U.S.-led alliances and coalitions—through such generally successful institutions as NATO, GATT, Bretton Woods, and G-7—may in the long run be a greater achievement than the victory against the Soviet Union. The nations of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia (Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and South Korea) shared common values, most importantly democracy and a commitment to free markets. Economically these regions became prosperous and interdependent—doing most of their trade with each other. Under American leadership, war among these nations became “unthinkable,” and they pursued a policy of containing the Soviet Union until it collapsed. In the post-Cold War era, it is clear that given continued unity, they will be strong enough to overpower any threat from outside their ranks. Thus, this community of nations may be called a democratic zone of peace and prosperity.⁴

⁴The concept of a democratic zone of peace was first used in U.S. Defense Department documents in 1992. See Dick Cheney, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress*, Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, February 1992, pp. 1–19; and Dick Cheney, *The Regional Defense Strategy*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, January 1993. The concept was picked up by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky in their 1993 book, *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones of Turmoil*, Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993. On the proposition that democracies are less likely to make war on each other, see Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993; and Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs,” Part I, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, Summer 1983. Also see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, New York: Free Press, 1992.

In modern times, no single nation has held a position as preeminent as that of the United States today. Others sought to attain such a position but failed. The push for preponderance was one of the main causes of recurring wars, as others coalesced to block the effort. The fact that the United States achieved it without a war and without spawning a hostile alliance is itself an extraordinary development in history.

Besides America's sole superpowerdom and the existence of a democratic zone of peace and prosperity, there are seven other important features of the current international scene.

- First, there is dramatic economic growth under way in Asia, in places like China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand. The Asian growth rates are likely to slow down. Nevertheless, their continued growth, even at a slower rate, will produce important changes in relative economic power—with important potential geopolitical and military implications.
- Second, significant parts of the rest of the world, such as Latin America, East Central Europe, and the Middle East, are experimenting in market economies and democratic government. Some are likely to succeed and might become members of the democratic zone of peace.
- Third, much of the rest of the world is an undemocratic zone of conflict, harboring dangers of major regional conflicts, attempts at regional hegemony, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them over increasingly long distances.
- Fourth, there is an increasing risk of chaos and fragmentation within states due to political decay and to ethnic, sectarian, and ideological differences—which can produce man-made disasters such as mass starvation and attempts at genocide—with humanitarian and at times consequential geopolitical implications. This means that the United States and other members of the zone of peace and prosperity are likely to be confronted by a significant and perhaps growing number of small wars.
- Fifth, there are important and accelerating technological changes under way with potentially dramatic effects on the global economy and military power.

- Sixth, there is intensified international economic competition among the nations of the democratic zone of peace.
- Seventh, a number of states, such as Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, China, and Russia, are unhappy with the current global system. Over the longer term—the next twenty years—there is a real possibility of efforts by China or Russia or a coalition of states to balance the power of the United States and its allies.

The interaction of these factors is likely to determine the geopolitical shape of the world in the 21st century.

THE SEARCH FOR A NEW VISION

Surprisingly, although America's victory in the Cold War is its most important international accomplishment since the end of World War II, it has been largely a silent victory. The country did not celebrate it; there were more festivities for comparatively far smaller events, such as the victory in the Persian Gulf war. There have been no monuments or museums built, no special day designated to mark the country's victory and to honor the sacrifices made to achieve it. Part of the reason for the absence of euphoria and a new grand vision may have had to do with the timing of the victory. It came at a time when the U.S. economy was falling deeper into recession and the country and its political leaders were focused on domestic revival and revitalization. It was regarded as impolitic to worry about a new grand vision and a new global strategy when there was such an urgent agenda at home. If the Soviet Union had disintegrated in 1985—at the high point of the Reagan administration—the reaction might well have been very different. Another part of the reason was Washington's desire to welcome Russia as a potential friend and partner, and it was believed that celebrating victory in the Cold War might undermine that goal.¹

Despite efforts by both the Bush and Clinton administrations, three years after the end of the Soviet Union, no grand strategy has yet jelled and there is no consensus on overarching national security

¹Some might argue that we did not celebrate because "we did not win"—although the Soviet Union clearly lost. See Carnegie Endowment National Commission, *Changing Our Ways: America and the New World*, Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992, p. 2.

objectives. It appears that the country is still trying to get its strategic bearings.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Secretary Dick Cheney's Defense Department put forward a new defense strategy—the "Regional Defense Strategy"—which emphasized keeping any hostile power from dominating a region critical to U.S. interests, strengthening and extending the alliances among democratic and like-minded powers, and helping reduce the likelihood of conflict by reducing the sources of instability.² The Regional Defense Strategy did not jell as the nation's grand strategy. There was an intense but brief debate when the two versions of the document were leaked. Although in some of his statements President Bush appeared supportive of the concept, he did not try actively to build political support for it. Given the dangers involved in any systemic shift in power, President Bush managed the disintegration of the Soviet Union extremely well. But because of the deteriorating domestic economy during the last year of his presidency, he did not push for a broad political consensus on a new grand strategy. An election year, moreover, may not be the best time to seek such a consensus.

In July 1994, a year and a half after coming to power, the Clinton administration published its national security strategy document.³ Like the Regional Defense Strategy of the previous administration, President Clinton's document proposes strengthening and adapting the alliances among the market democracies. But unlike the Bush administration's position, the Clinton strategy favors the strengthening of a European security identity and European military force. Like the Bush strategy, it emphasizes regional threats. However, it goes further in its emphasis on peacekeeping operations, and it highlights the importance of economic issues and the global expansion of democracy and concern about environmental issues. It also emphasizes its readiness to "participate in multilateral efforts to broker settlements of internal conflicts." Similarly, it states that "our forces must prepare to participate in peacekeeping, peace enforcement and

²Dick Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy*, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1993.

³William J. Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 1994.

other operations in support of these objectives." Other than globalizing democracy, the document does not have a unifying concept. It does not deal with some of the tough issues, such as how to hedge against possible Russian reimperialization and Chinese expansionism. It also does not provide a clear sense of priorities.

Besides the problems with the content of what has been proposed by both administrations and the failure to build a consensus, two other, broader factors have played a role in the absence of a widely agreed-upon grand strategy. One is the fact that American culture is disinclined toward great strategic design. This is exacerbated by the second factor: an underlying and widely held belief that the world is more uncertain now, compared to the Cold War period.

But the assumption of greater uncertainty is only partially and only retrospectively correct. The Cold War world was not truly much more certain than the world of today—at least not to those who were players in the struggle. Even though the enemy was known, it was never easy to predict Soviet behavior or developments around the world. "Kremlinology" was an almost mystical science, and as developments showed, U.S. information about and understanding of what was really happening in the Soviet Union were often well off the mark. Nor was there always a consensus over policy; there were major disagreements about such issues as arms control and Vietnam. Even so, during the Cold War the United States was relatively certain of its overall objectives and the priorities among them. Now it is not. This is the critical difference between the Cold War and the current era.

The absence of a broadly agreed-upon new grand strategy creates several problems. Uncertainty tends to take away the initiative and place the United States in a reactive mode. However, improvisation and a reactive attitude can squander a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Given its power position in the world, the United States is in a position to shape the future to enhance the prospects for freedom, prosperity, and peace. But it cannot succeed in shaping the post-Cold War world unless it knows what shape it wants the world to take and has the strategy and the will to make it happen.

This lack of vision endangers the achievement of even modest tasks. Specific policy decisions cannot be evaluated adequately in the ab-

sence of a framework for guiding policy and setting priorities. Until such a framework is built it will be more difficult to decide what is important and what is not, to determine which threats are more serious than others, and to develop coherent approaches to respond to new challenges. Policy on many issues will continue to be characterized by ambivalence, uncertainty, and a lack of staying power. Short-term and parochial interests are likely to take priority over the longer-term national ones.

Without a broadly agreed-upon architectural framework, it is also difficult to win widespread bipartisan support for a policy. Sustaining popular support and staying the course for particular policies becomes harder if the costs of implementation increase but the commitment cannot be explained in terms of a national interest and a strategy on which broad agreement has been achieved.

Given the opportunity costs, the United States should no longer delay the development of a vision and a national grand strategy. The shift in the tectonics of power confronts Washington with several options. The choice is not only important for setting the country's global direction for this new era, it will also have a major impact on the calculations of others.

As the victor of the Cold War, the United States can choose among several strategic visions and grand strategies. It could abandon global leadership and turn inward. It could seek to give up leadership gradually by reducing its global role and encouraging the emergence of an old-fashioned balance-of-power structure with spheres of influence. Or the central strategic objective for the United States could be to consolidate its global leadership and preclude the rise of a global rival.¹

¹Several RAND analysts have debated and discussed alternative grand strategy for the United States. See Paul K. Davis, "Protecting the Great Transition," in Paul K. Davis (ed.), *New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much Is Enough*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994, pp. 135-164; and Norman D. Levin (ed.), *Prisms and Policy: U.S. Security Strategy After the Cold War*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994. Also see "Strategy and the Internationalists: Three Views," *RAND Research Review*, Vol. 18, No. 1, Summer 1994. The broader community's debate has included: Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Random House, 1993; Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, 1993; Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World*, Vol. 70, No. 1, 1990-1991; and the initial draft of the Defense Department's "Planning Guidance," as leaked in *The New York Times*, March 8, 1992, p. 1.

NEOISOLATIONISM

Abandoning predominance and turning inward could result in a significant reduction in defense expenses in the short run—although how much money such a strategy would really save in either the short run or the long run has not been seriously studied. To assess how much money might be saved, the following questions would have to be addressed: Will U.S. defense include the defense of North America or the Americas generally? How far will a defensive perimeter extend in the Pacific and Atlantic? Will the United States need a robust antiballistic missile system?

Abandoning global leadership would also decrease the likelihood of placing American soldiers in harm's way around the world in places like Iraq, Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. The reduction in defense spending could help deal with the budget deficit and improve U.S. economic competitiveness, especially since economic competitors would immediately be forced to increase their own defense spending. Ignoring foreign issues might enable the United States to pay more attention to domestic problems.

Furthermore, in some cases, allies whom the United States has been committed to defend either need that help less (e.g., the Soviet threat to Western Europe has disappeared and the threats to Europe are now comparatively much smaller) or should be able to manage on their own (e.g., South Korea has over twice the population and many times the GNP of North Korea). The U.S. defense commitment to its allies may enable them to spend less on defense and focus more on strengthening their economies.

Realistically and over the longer term, however, a neoisolationist approach might well *increase* the danger of major conflicts, require greater U.S. defense effort down the line, threaten world peace, and eventually undermine U.S. prosperity. By withdrawing from Europe and Asia, the United States would deliberately risk weakening the institutions and solidarity of the world's community of democratic powers, establishing a favorable climate for the spread of disorder—in other words, a return to conditions similar to those of the first half of the 20th century. In the 1920s and 1930s, American isolationism had disastrous consequences for world peace. Then, the United States was but one of several major powers; now that it is the pre-

ponderant power, the shock of a U.S. withdrawal from the world could be even greater.

What might happen in the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and NATO, the West European nations, rather than cooperating, might compete for domination of East Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany—especially after its unification—is the natural leading power. Germany might cooperate or compete with Russia for influence over territories between the borders of the two states. German efforts would likely be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy in the long run.

The same is true of Japan. With U.S. withdrawal from the world, both Japan and Germany would have to look after their own security and build up their military capabilities. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japanese military capability would be likely to grow dramatically, to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. Given Japan's technological prowess, to say nothing of its stockpile of plutonium acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear-armed state relatively quickly if it chose. Japan could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces.

With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as Indonesia, Korea, and India could come significant risks of preventive or preemptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional domination could also lead to major wars. If the United States stayed out of such a war—an unlikely prospect—Europe or Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten the United States, since the hostile power would be likely to exclude it from the area and threaten U.S. economic and political interests in the region. Be-

sides, with domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might well seek global hegemony, leaving the United States to face another global cold war and the risk of another world war—even more catastrophic than the last.

In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. Both Iran and Iraq have in the past sought regional hegemony. Without American protection, the weak oil-rich states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) probably would not retain their independence. To preclude this development, the Saudis might seek to acquire, perhaps by purchase, their own nuclear weapons. If either Iraq or Iran controlled the region that dominates the world oil supply, it could gain a significant capability to damage the U.S. and world economies. Whichever state gained hegemony would have vast economic resources at its disposal, which could be used to build military capability as well as gain leverage over the United States and other oil-importing nations. Hegemony over the Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would increase and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risks of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.

Already, rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. More states would acquire nuclear weapons if the United States became isolationist. Several states with potential nuclear capability, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have refrained from producing such weapons because of their security ties with the United States. Without such ties, these states and others might reconsider their nuclear posture. Similarly, nations now exercising restraint because they fear possible negative U.S. actions might be emboldened and shift to significant, perhaps overt, nuclear programs.

The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Gulf would impact the U.S. economy even in the unlikely event that the nation was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Turmoil in the Gulf would most likely reduce the flow of oil and increase its price, thus reducing the American standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, because it is likely to

reduce the trading opportunities that have been so important to recent global prosperity, including U.S. prosperity.

At present both mainstream Republicans and Democrats reject isolationism as a national strategy—even though both parties have elements favoring it.² It is possible, however, that without a vision and grand strategy the United States might follow policies that result in at least some of the consequences of a neoisolationist strategy.

RETURN TO MULTIPOLARITY AND BALANCE OF POWER

Another option would rely on a balance of power to preclude the emergence of another preponderant power. This approach has some positive features, but it is dangerous as well. Based on current realities, the other potential great powers, besides the United States, are Japan, China, Germany (or the European Union), and Russia. In the future this list could change. New great powers—such as India, Indonesia, or Brazil—could emerge, or one of the existing ones—such as Russia—could decline or disintegrate and cease to be a great power.

Some argue that the world is inevitably heading toward a multiplicity of roughly equal great powers and that the United States should facilitate such a development. This approach starts from the assumption, based on economic indices, that the world already consists of several great powers and that the diffusion of wealth and technology will continue. It is further assumed that over time, the current economic powers will become political and military powers commensurate with their economic strength; they will be obliged to do so because in the post-Cold War world others will not perceive threats in the same way and so would not be willing to run risks for them.³

In a balance-of-power regime, NATO would gradually decline in relative importance and ultimately be replaced (or in effect be taken over) by the Western European Union (the military arm of the European Union) or by the individual great powers in Europe. U.S. pres-

²See Clinton, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, op. cit., and Cheney, *Defense Strategy for the 1990s*, op. cit.

³Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 809.

ence in Western Europe would end as the West Europeans built up their capability and a balance of power emerged on the continent. The United States could affect the pace of such a development by, for example, announcing that it intended to withdraw from Europe by a specific period—thus creating the framework for a European military buildup to balance Russia.

For such a balance-of-power system to work, either Germany would have to substantially increase its military power or the European Union would have to deepen and become a kind of superstate. The United States would continue to have a vital interest in preventing the domination of Europe—including Russia—by a single power. So if the Germans decided to build up militarily, the United States would play its part by forming alliances with any European country or countries that sought to prevent hegemony and by maintaining adequate forces in the United States and possibly in England. However, problems other than an attempt to establish hegemony over Europe, such as instability in the Balkans, East Central Europe, or North Africa, would be the responsibility of the Europeans alone, and the United States would not get involved militarily in local conflicts in these regions.

Similarly, the United States would be unlikely to get involved militarily on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In general, it would accept those areas as a Russian sphere of influence. However, the other European great powers (and perhaps even the United States) would not want Russia to reincorporate Ukraine, since a combined Russia and Ukraine would have a military potential so much greater than any European power as to threaten to destroy the possibility of a balance of power on the continent. West European powers, especially Germany, and Russia would have interests in East Central Europe and would have to try to work out some rules for regulating their interactions.

In Asia, the United States would similarly become a balancer as Japan built up its capability. In the event of a serious imbalance between Japan and China, it could play a balancing role with forces based in the United States or possibly in some of the smaller states in the region. As in the case of Europe, the United States would seek to prevent the emergence of regional hegemony by shifting alliances; it would cooperate with other powers to protect common interests and

be prepared to protect specific interests in the region, such as the lives and property of American citizens.

In the Persian Gulf, in this framework, the United States and other major powers would oppose the domination of the region by any one power, since such a power would acquire enormous leverage over states that depend on the region's oil. At the regional level, the United States and other major powers could rely on a balance between Iran and Iraq to prevent regional hegemony. Assuming the great powers were willing to pursue a joint policy toward the Persian Gulf, the fact that the United States is relatively less dependent on the Gulf than either Western Europe or Japan would confer a strong bargaining position when it came to allocating the burdens required by such a policy among the great powers. On the other hand, one or more great powers might be tempted to abandon the great power coalition and to support a potential hegemon in the Gulf in return for favorable access to the Gulf's resources and markets. Finally, the United States would have to be the dominant power affecting important security issues in the Americas.

Aside from the question of inevitability, a balance-of-power system would have some advantages for the United States. First, the country could reduce its defense expenditures (though probably not by as much as with a neoisolationist strategy) and deploy its military forces less often to the world's "hot spots," since it would let other great powers take the lead in dealing with problems in their regions. Second, the United States would be freer to pursue its economic interests, even when they damaged political relations with countries that had been, but were no longer, allies—except when this might constrain an alliance with another great power necessary to ward off a bigger threat.

It is possible that in a balance-of-power system the United States would be in a relatively advantageous position compared to the other great powers. Given the relative distance of the United States from other power centers, it could try to mimic the former British role of an offshore "balancer." As in the 19th century, the United States and other great powers would compete and cooperate to avoid hegemony and global wars. Each great power would protect its own specific interests and protect common interests cooperatively. If

necessary, the United States would intervene militarily to prevent the emergence of a preponderant power.

But this approach also has several serious problems. First, there is a real question whether the major powers would behave as they should under the logic of a balance-of-power framework. For example, would the West European powers respond appropriately to a resurgent Russian threat, or would they behave as the European democracies did in the 1930s? The logic of a balance-of-power system might well require the United States to support a nondemocratic state against a democratic one, or to work with one undesirable state against another. For example, in the Gulf, to contain the power of an increasingly powerful Iran, the United States would have to strengthen Iraq. At times the United States has been unable to behave in this fashion. For example, after the Iraqi victory against Iran in 1988, the logic of balance of power would have demanded that the United States support strengthening Iran. But because of ongoing animosity in U.S.-Iranian relations, the nature of Iran's regime, and moral concerns in U.S. foreign policy, Washington could not implement such a strategy. There are many other examples. Therefore, a grand strategy that requires such action is probably unrealistic.

Second, this system implies that the major democracies will no longer see themselves as allies. Instead, political and military struggles among them would become legitimate. Each would pursue its own economic interests much more vigorously and might well weaken economic institutions such as GATT and the liberal world trade order. Such a development would increase the likelihood of major economic depressions and dislocations.

Third, the United States would be likely to face more competition from other major powers in areas of its interest. For example, other powers might not be willing to grant the United States a "sphere of influence" in the Americas, but might seek, as Germany did in World War I, to reach anti-U.S. alliances with Latin American nations. As noted earlier, another great power might support a potential hegemon in the Persian Gulf.

Finally, the system might not succeed on its own terms. The success of the balance-of-power system requires that the great powers maintain it without provoking war. Great powers must signal their depth

of commitment on a given issue without taking irrevocable steps toward war. This balancing act proved impossible to perform even for the culturally similar and aristocratically governed states of 19th-century Europe. It is likely to prove infinitely more difficult when the system is global, the participants differ culturally, and the governments, because of the increasing influence of public opinion, are unable to be as flexible (or cynical) as the rules of the game would require. Thus, there could be miscalculations on the state of the balance that could lead to wars the United States might be unable to stay out of. The balance-of-power system failed in the past, producing World War I and other major conflicts. It might not work any better in the future; and war among major powers in the nuclear age would surely be devastating.

U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

U.S. global leadership and deterring the rise of another hostile global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership is one that has the most preferable attributes. First, the global environment will be more open and more receptive to American values: democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world has a better chance of dealing cooperatively with its major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threat of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership will help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all its dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. It is therefore more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance-of-power system.

Precluding the rise of a hostile global rival is a good guide for defining what interests the United States should regard as vital. It is a good prism for identifying threats and setting priorities for U.S. policy toward various regions and states, for military capabilities and modernization, and for intelligence operations.

To succeed in realizing this grand vision, the United States would have to adhere to the following principles as guidelines for its policies:

- Maintain and strengthen the democratic “zone of peace” and incrementally extend it.
- Prevent hostile hegemony over critical regions.
- Hedge against Russian reimperialization and Chinese expansionism while promoting cooperation with both.
- Preserve U.S. military preeminence.
- Maintain U.S. economic strength and an open international economic system.
- Be judicious in the use of force, avoid overextension, and achieve effective burden sharing among allies.
- Obtain and maintain domestic support for U.S. global leadership and these principles.

Why are these principles important, and how can the United States pursue them effectively? The remainder of this report will focus on these issues.

Maintain, Strengthen, and Extend the Zone of Peace

Maintaining, strengthening, and extending the democratic zone of peace should be the central feature of American post-Cold War grand strategy.⁴ Maintaining the zone of peace requires, first and foremost, avoiding conditions that can lead to “renationalization” of security policies in key allied countries such as Japan and Germany. The members of the zone of peace are in basic agreement and prefer not to compete with each other in *realpolitik* terms. But this general agreement still requires U.S. leadership. At present there is greater nervousness in Japan than in Germany about future ties with Washington, but U.S. credibility remains strong in both countries. The credibility of U.S. alliances can be undermined if key allies such as Germany and Japan believe that the current arrangements do not deal adequately with threats to their security. It could also be undermined if, over an extended period, the United States is perceived

⁴The Clinton administration has adopted the selective spread of democracy—called *enlargement*—as a central feature of its national security policy. See Clinton, *op. cit.*, p. ii.

as lacking either the will or the capability to lead in protecting their interests.

In Europe, besides the need to balance Russian military might and hedge against a possible Russian reimperialization, the near-term security threat to Germany comes from instability in East Central Europe and to a lesser degree from the Balkans. For France and Italy, the threats come from conflicts in the Balkans and the danger of Islamic extremism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic and cruise missiles to North Africa and the Middle East. For example, at present the Germans fear that conflicts and instability in East Central Europe might "spill out" or "spill in."⁵ Such crises could set the stage for a bigger conflict and/or send millions of refugees to Germany. The Germans are divided on how to deal with the threat from the East. For now, however, they are focused on integrating the former East Germany and favor a U.S.-led alliance strategy—NATO expansion to East Central Europe—rather than filling the vacuum themselves, as indicated by their substantial defense cuts. This is in part because of the confidence they have in the United States and the perception of common values and interests among allies, and in part because an alliance-based policy is cheaper for Germany than a unilateral approach. But should the Germans come to believe that the alliance will not or cannot deal with threats to their interests, they might well consider other options.

In East Asia, too, Japan favors alliance with the United States to deal with uncertainty about Russia, future Chinese military capability, including power projection, and the threat of nuclear and missile proliferation on the Korean peninsula. For the same reasons as Germany, Japan currently prefers to work with the United States. But the loss of U.S. credibility could also change Japan's calculations. An issue that will test U.S. credibility in Japan is how it ultimately deals with North Korea's nuclear program.

⁵Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "Building a New NATO," *Foreign Affairs*, September–October 1993; Zalmay Khalilzad, *Extending the Western Alliance to East Central Europe: A New Strategy for NATO*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, IP-107-AF, May 1993; and John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones (ed.), *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991.

As long as U.S.-led allied actions protect their vital interests, these nations are less likely to look to unilateral means. This implies that the United States needs a military capability that is larger than might be required based on an isolationist or balance-of-power-based definition of U.S. interests.

U.S. power and a willingness to lead in protecting vital joint interests in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East are necessary to preserve the zone of peace. In Europe these interests can be best served if NATO remains the primary entity to deal with the security challenge coming from instability and conflict in the south and the east and possible revanchism in Russia. To perform this role NATO must adapt by maintaining a robust military capability as a hedge against Russia's going bad and taking over countries such as Ukraine and the Baltic states, by preparing for the eventual membership of East Central European nations in the alliance in coordination with EU expansion, and by developing the capability to deter and defeat threats from the south. To perform the security functions needed, NATO must increase significantly its power projection capabilities. The United States would need to maintain for an indefinite period a significant military force on the continent—both because of military needs and to demonstrate its commitment and resolve. At the same time, the allies need to do more to protect common interests in the Middle East and East Central Europe.

Asia has no NATO-like multilateral alliance. The core security relationships are the U.S.-Japanese and U.S.-South Korean ties. Maintaining security ties with Japan is important for both nations, even though trade relations between the two countries have a greater potential to create mutual antagonism than U.S.-German trade relations. As long as North Korea remains hostile and militarily powerful, and in order to hedge against uncertainties in Russia and China, the United States needs to maintain enough forces stationed in the region to deter and, with reinforcements, defend critical American interests with limited risks. At present the main military threat is a possible North Korean attack against South Korea. This could change quickly if North Korea collapses and the two countries become one.

Preclude Hostile Hegemony over Critical Regions

A global rival could emerge if a hostile power or coalition gained hegemony over a critical region. Therefore, it is a vital U.S. interest to preclude such a development—i.e., to be willing to use force if necessary for the purpose. A region can be defined as critical if it contains sufficient economic, technical, and human resources so that a hostile power that gained control over it could pose a global challenge. Although this could change in the future, two regions now meet this criterion: East Asia and Europe. The Persian Gulf is very important for a different reason—its oil resources are vital for the world economy. In the long term, the relative importance of various regions can change. A region that is critical to U.S. interests now might become less important, while some other region might gain in importance. For example, Southeast Asia appears to be a region whose relative importance is likely to increase if the regional economies continue to grow as impressively as they have done in the past several years. The Gulf might decline in importance if its resources became less of a factor in world prosperity because some new energy technologies come to provide cheaper alternatives.

At present, the risks of regional hegemony in Western Europe and East Asia are very small. This is due in large part to the alliance of the key states of these regions with the United States, endorsing the presence of U.S. forces and the credibility of U.S. commitments. It is vital that U.S. alliances in Europe and East Asia be maintained—but adapted to the needs of the new era. During the Cold War, the U.S. role in these two regions not only deterred threats from the Soviet Union but also contained rivalries. In Europe, it is not in U.S. interests for the EU either to become a superstate or to disintegrate. The former could ultimately pose a global challenge—Western Europe's economy becoming bigger than that of the United States; the latter could encourage mutual suspicion and contribute to renationalization—a possible repeat of the first half of the 20th century.

At present, the United States is the preponderant outside power in the Persian Gulf. Its position there can help discourage the rise of another rival and, should one arise, will be conducive to competition. U.S. preponderance serves the interests of the members of the zone

of peace, since because of it they do not face the threat of interruption of oil supplies from the region. But the threat of hostile regional hegemony remains. The United States, with support from allies, needs to maintain adequate military capability to deter and defeat the threat of regional hegemony from Iraq or Iran. The United States should seek greater contribution from NATO allies and Japan in meeting the security challenge in this region. Washington and its allies must also encourage regional cooperation among the GCC states and help them cope with the contradictory pressures—liberal and fundamentalist—for domestic change. Given the recent progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, Israel, the dominant regional military power and one that has strong security ties with the United States, should also help in meeting security challenges in the Gulf. Cooperation between the United States, Israel, the GCC states, Turkey, and NATO generally should be the cornerstone of the U.S. approach for the Gulf.

Hedge Against Reimperialization in Russia

Russia is still struggling to find a place for itself in the world. Although it is still weakening militarily and economically, Russia, the heir to the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal, is capable of conducting an all-out nuclear attack on the United States. Remaining a "nuclear superpower" is a key Russian objective. Compared to its economic capability, Russia's military might is very great. The country's size, its location, and its potential economic and military capability add to its importance. Consequently, it requires special attention under any circumstances. In the near term—10 years—Moscow is unlikely to pose a global challenge. But even in the near term, Russia can pose a major regional threat if it moves toward reimperialization. This scenario has been dubbed "Weimar Russia," i.e., the possibility that, embittered by its economic and political troubles and humiliations, Russia may attempt to recover its past glory by turning to ultranationalist policies, particularly the reincorporation of—or hegemony over—part or all of the old "internal" empire. In the aftermath of the last parliamentary elections and the show of support for Zhirinovskiy, Russian statements indicated a strong preference for the reincorporation of the so-called "near abroad"—the states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. But more recently, concerns about costs and negative international reaction have resulted in a

shift in favor of hegemony—Russian geopolitical and economic domination of weak but nominally independent states.

To avoid Russian hegemony over the "near abroad," to say nothing of creating the groundwork for future cooperation on a whole range of international matters, the United States and the other members of the democratic zone of peace have a substantial interest in helping Russia become a "normal" country, i.e., one that is not an empire and is unburdened by a communist-style command economy and totalitarian politics. Ideally, Russia would become a prosperous, free-market, Western-style democracy—cooperating with the United States in meeting current and future challenges. Whether Russia will succeed in becoming a normal state is difficult to predict, but the stakes justify a major Western effort. Nevertheless, the key determinant is Russian domestic politics, over which, under the circumstances, the West can have limited influence.

As Russia is encouraged to join the zone of peace and to cooperate on specific issues based on common concerns, it is in the U.S. interest that Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and the other independent states are able—with outside support—to make any attempts to recreate the empire very costly, and thereby deter them. And should deterrence fail, such an approach would also help sap Russian energies, undermining its prospects for becoming an effective global challenger. This should not mean that the United States wants hostile relations between these countries and Moscow. Good economic and political relations between Russia and its neighbors are not inconsistent with U.S. interests.⁶ But discouraging the emergence of a robust Commonwealth of Independent States, and consolidating Ukrainian, Kazakh, and Uzbek independence and reducing their dependence on Russia—and this goes for the other newly independent states as well—should be the primary U.S. objective in dealings with these countries. Helping consolidate the independence of the new states is only in part a military matter. The key for Ukraine and others is to carry out economic and political reforms to increase internal stability and reduce their vulnerability to Russian interference and domination. The United States, the EU countries, and Japan have a

⁶Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Premature Partnership," *Foreign Affairs*, March–April 1994, pp. 67–82.

stake in helping Ukraine and others adopt significant economic reforms. To encourage such a development, the G-7 states should be willing to meet some of the costs of transitioning to a market-oriented system. The United States and its allies have lost some opportunities here, as economic problems in Ukraine and some of the other newly independent states reduced support for their independence.

To discourage Russian military reincorporation of Ukraine and the Baltic states, NATO must make it clear to Russia and must convince its own publics and parliaments, including the U.S. Congress, that such an action would lead to a cutoff of economic assistance to Russia, to NATO membership for the nations of East Central Europe on a much faster track—perhaps immediate—than would be the case otherwise, to possible material support to Ukrainian and other resistance movements, and to Russian isolation from the West. Without such preparations now, there is danger that in the face of a possible Russian takeover of Ukraine, NATO expansion to East Central Europe would not have political support because it would appear to be too provocative. Unfortunately, at times in the past we have understood our stakes too late to express them clearly enough to deter an aggressor.⁷ A clear and strong Western posture now should also strengthen those Russians who do not consider reimperialization to be in their country's interests.

Discourage Chinese Expansionism

The People's Republic of China is another major power that might, over the long term and perhaps sooner than Russia, emerge as a global rival. China's economic dynamism, now also being reflected in its military development, ensures that—if domestic turmoil can be avoided—China will become an increasingly important player on the global scene in coming decades. The country has had dramatic economic growth. Between 1978 and 1992, its GNP increased by 9 percent annually. In 1992, that rate increased to 12 percent. Its foreign trade increased from \$21 billion in 1978 to \$170 billion in 1992. Ac-

⁷Paul K. Davis, "Improving Deterrence in the Post-Cold War Era: Some Theory and Implications for Defense Planning," in *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, op. cit., p. 197.

cording to the International Monetary Fund, Chinese output may have exceeded \$1.6 trillion dollars in 1992. The World Bank gives even a higher estimate: \$2.3 trillion.⁸ If China continues to grow at a higher rate than the United States, at some point it could become the world's largest economy. Such a development might well have important implications for the global balance of power. Militarily, China has been increasing its power projection capability—both naval and air—in part by purchasing advanced equipment from Russia. It has also been importing Russian military scientists to help with increasing domestic production of sophisticated equipment.

However, China faces many uncertainties in its domestic politics, including a possible succession crisis on the death of Deng Xiaoping and the centrifugal tensions unleashed by differential economic growth among the provinces. Indeed, Chinese weakness, not excluding a possible civil war that could disrupt economic prosperity and create refugee flows, may cause significant problems for its neighbors and the world community.

But China is an ambitious power. Among the major powers, China appears more dissatisfied than the others with the status quo. Beyond Hong Kong and Macau, which will be ceded to China by the end of the century, it claims sovereignty over substantial territories that it does not now control—such as Taiwan, the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea generally, and the Senkaku Islands between China and Japan. Although China has abandoned communism as a global ideology and seems to have accepted the economic imperative of the global economy, it is still seeking geopolitically its “rightful” place in the world. How will China define its role as its power grows beyond its territorial interests? China appears to be seeking eventual regional predominance, a prospect opposed by Japan, Russia, India, Indonesia, and other regional powers. Even without regional domination, it might become interested in becoming the leader of an anti-U.S. coalition—based on a rejection of U.S. leadership generally or as that leadership is expressed in such policies as nonproliferation and human rights. This is evident in China's assistance to the Pakistani and Iranian nuclear programs. It is also clear that China is not as opposed to the North Korean nuclear program as the United States is.

⁸ *The Economist*, November 28, 1992.

Chinese writings on strategy and international security express hostility to U.S. preponderance and imply the need to balance it. But China recognizes the importance of the United States, as a market for Chinese goods and a source for technical training and technology. Without U.S. help, China is less likely to achieve its economic and military objectives.

Given China's economic potential and its strategic ambition, it is the most likely candidate for global rival. China, however, is decades away from becoming a serious global rival either by itself or in coalition with others. This provides the United States with ample strategic warning. For the near term, economic considerations are likely to be dominant in Chinese calculations. Chinese economic success could go two ways: it could increase the Chinese potential for becoming a global rival, or it might produce democratization and decentralization and a cooperative China.

Even in its current state, China (by itself or as the leader of a coalition of renegade states) could increase the global proliferation problem in key regions such as the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia. So it is not in U.S. interests to cut off ties with China or to isolate it. The United States should continue to pursue economic relations with China and encourage its integration in the global economic, political, and security regimes. The leverage of economic relations, which are important to the Chinese, is a tool that should be used continually to ensure cooperation on the goal of restraining nuclear and missile proliferation in places like Korea and Iran. But Chinese cooperation is likely to remain limited. As economic relations develop with China, the United States should be cautious about transferring technologies that can have important military implications. It should ensure that Chinese neighbors such as Taiwan and the ASEAN states have the means to defend themselves, and also encourage regional cooperation among the ASEAN states. These steps can discourage possible Chinese expansionism. The United States should also support moves to reduce Taiwanese international political isolation. Working with other powers, especially Japan, Korea, and Indonesia, the United States should preclude Chinese regional hegemony by maintaining adequate forces in the region. Without U.S. presence in the region, as Chinese power grows, some states in the region are likely to appease China and move closer to it, while others, such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Japan, would seek to balance it.

Preserve American Military Preeminence

A global rival could emerge for several reasons. Since the main deterrent to the rise of another global rival is the military power of the United States, an inadequate level of U.S. military strength could facilitate such a development. Military strength should be measured not just in terms of the strength of other countries, but in terms of the U.S. ability to carry out the strategy outlined here. The danger that military capability could be cut to below this level is real: historically, the United States has made this error on several occasions by excessive downsizing. It faces the same danger again for the longer term. Already there is a serious question as to whether the United States will indeed have the necessary force structure to fight and win two major regional wars (Korea and the Persian Gulf) nearly simultaneously—the core requirement of current military strategy.

The issue is not only how much resources are spent on defense but on what, for what, and how they are spent. For America to maintain its military preeminence, in addition to meeting possible major regional challenges, it needs specific capability in three areas.

First, besides maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent because of concerns about Russian and Chinese nuclear attack capabilities, the United States needs to acquire increased capability to deter, prevent, and defend against the use of biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons in major conflicts in critical regions. The deterrence requirements might well be different from those with regard to the Soviet Union during the Cold War, owing to the distinct character and motivations of different regional powers. U.S. ability to prevent use and defend against use is currently very limited. In the near term, therefore, to deter use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against U.S. forces and allies, the United States may have to threaten nuclear retaliation. It is questionable whether such a posture is desirable. It may well lack credibility. But the United States may have no choice.

To counter the spread of WMDs and ballistic and cruise missiles, the United States should seek to develop increased capability for locating and destroying even well-protected facilities related to biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. It will be equally important to have greater capability to de-

fend against the use of these weapons, including both active and passive defense. Deploying robust, multilayered ballistic and cruise missile defenses is important for protecting the United States, its forward-deployed forces, and its allies, the last task helpful in gaining allied participation and cooperation in defeating aggression in critical regions. There is bipartisan support for increasing U.S. defense against missiles.⁹

Second, the United States needs improved capability to have a decisive impact in lesser regional crises (LRCs)—internal conflicts, small wars, humanitarian relief, peacekeeping or peacemaking, punitive strikes, restoring civil order, evacuation of Americans, providing security zones, and monitoring and enforcement of sanctions.¹⁰ Given the end of the Cold War, the United States can be more selective in its military involvement around the world. It has not been selective enough during the past few years, and those involvements have dominated the actual use of U.S. forces. Getting involved in too many LRCs can erode U.S. capabilities for dealing with bigger and more important conflicts. The country needs clearer guidelines for engagement in LRCs. Nevertheless, some LRCs may occur in areas of vital importance—e.g., in Mexico or Saudi Arabia—and others might so challenge American values as to produce U.S. military involvement. The United States might also consider participating with allies in some LRCs because of a desire to either extend the zone of peace or prevent chaos from spreading to and destabilizing critical regions.

At present, LRCs are treated as lesser included cases of major regional conflict—much in the way that some thought about regional conflicts in relation to a global conflict during the Cold War. The United States “underestimated and misestimated [regional conflict]

⁹However, the Clinton administration has reduced significantly resources for both theater missile defense (TMD) and national missile defense (NMD)—the former by 1/3 and the latter by 4/5 compared to that planned by the previous administration. More resources need to be dedicated to TMD and NMD if we are to reduce our vulnerability in the near future.

¹⁰Carl Builder, “Nontraditional Military Missions,” *American Defense Annual*, 1994 edition, New York: Lexington Books, 1994, pp. 225–237; David Kassing, *Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994; R. Lempert et al., *Air Force Noncombat Operations: Lessons From the Past, Thoughts for the Future*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992.

requirements during the Cold War."¹¹ Now it would be a mistake to treat LRCs the same way, especially since future U.S. forces will be much smaller than in the past and provide far less slack. Even small LRCs can impose substantial and disproportionate demands on the support elements of U.S. forces—such as AWACS, SEAD, airlift, and communications. To be prepared for MRC commitments and some increased LRC capability, the United States needs more airlift and changes in the training and organization of the forces relevant for LRCs.

Third, it is essential to retain a mobilization base to "reconstitute" additional capability in a timely fashion if things go badly in any major region. Without such a capability the United States is unlikely to be able to take timely action, given the probability of little strategic warning.

However, to discourage the rise of another global rival or to be in a strong position to deal with the problem should one arise, the current Korea-and-Gulf-focused approach, plus increased ability for LRC and counterproliferation operations, is inadequate for force sizing. Over time, North Korea will probably disappear and other larger threats may emerge. As an alternative, the United States should size its forces by requiring them to have the capability to defeat nearly simultaneously the most plausible military challenges to critical U.S. interests from the *two* next most powerful military forces in the world—who are not allied with the United States. Such a force should allow the United States to protect its interests in Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf—i.e., provide the United States with capability to successfully deal with a European and Asian, or Asian and Middle Eastern, or European and Middle Eastern major regional conflict. Such a force-sizing principle does not mean that U.S. forces have to be numerically as large as the combined forces of these two powers. It does mean that the forces should be capable of defeating the enemy in relatively specific areas and in nearly simultaneous scenarios of great importance to the United States. Such an approach would

¹¹ Kevin N. Lewis, "The Discipline Gap and Other Reasons for Humility and Realism in Defense Planning," in Davis (ed.), *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, op. cit., p. 103.

give the United States a flexible global capability for substantial operations.¹²

To attain the desired capability, U.S. superiority in new weapons and their use would be critical. Therefore, the higher priority should go to research on new technologies, new concepts of operation, and changes in organization—with the aim of U.S. dominance in the military revolution that may be emerging. The Gulf War gave a glimpse of what is likely to come. The character of warfare will change because of advances in military technology, a realm in which the United States has the lead, including the related concepts of operation and organization structure. The challenge is to sustain this lead and not fall into complacency. Would-be rivals are likely to be very motivated to explore new technologies and ways to use them against the United States. A determined nation making the right choices, even one with a much smaller economy, could pose an enormous challenge by using technology to erode the effectiveness of more traditional U.S. military methods.

For example, post-World War I Germany made astute technical choices and adopted innovative employment concepts, and thereby was able to make a serious bid for world domination. At the same time, Japan, with its relatively small GNP, was at the forefront in the development of naval aviation and aircraft carriers. These examples indicate that a major innovation in warfare provides ambitious nations an opportunity to become dominant or near-dominant powers. U.S. domination of the emerging military-technological revolution, combined with the maintenance of an adequately sized force, can help discourage the rise of a rival power, as long as potential rivals believe that catching up with America is a hopeless proposition, and that if they try they will suffer the same economic wreck that befell the Soviet Union.

Although, based on the strategy proposed here, the United States needs more capabilities in some areas, it can cut back elsewhere and do things differently to free up resources for them. The country still has too many bases. Nor does it have the most effective process for making informed decisions on resource allocation for various types

¹²Some of the points here regarding military challenges of the new era are also discussed in Davis (ed.), *New Challenges for Defense Planning*, op. cit., 1994.

of force elements—i.e., forces required for current and future objectives and operational requirements. As things currently stand, there is too much duplication in some key areas, as well as capabilities that are not as relevant now as they once were. This is especially true in the maintenance and support area. For example, the Navy, the Air Force, and industry all provide maintenance for military aircraft engines. Greater centralization here could save significant resources. The Department of Defense is still being forced to buy weapon systems that it says it does not need and will not need under the proposed strategy. The current acquisition system is very costly, and streamlining it could save resources.

Preserve American Economic Strength

The United States is unlikely to preserve its military and technological dominance if its economy declines seriously. In such an environment, the domestic economic and political base for global leadership would diminish and the country would probably incrementally withdraw from the world, become inward looking, and abandon more and more of its external interests. As the United States weakened, others would try to fill the vacuum.

To sustain and improve its economic strength, the United States must maintain its technological lead in the economic realm. This will depend on the choices the nation makes. Such world historical developments as the agricultural and industrial revolutions produced fundamental changes, enhancing the relative position of nations that were able to take advantage of them and damaging those that did not.¹³ Some argue that the world might be at the beginning of another transformation, shifting the sources of wealth and the relative position of classes and nations. If the United States fails to recognize the change and adapt its institutions, its relative position will necessarily worsen.

To remain the preponderant world power, U.S. economic strength must be enhanced; components of this goal include further improvement in productivity, thus increasing real per-capita income; strengthening education and training; and generating and using su-

¹³Joel Mokyr, *The Lever of Riches*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

perior science and technology. In the long run, the economic future will be affected by two other factors. One is the imbalance between government revenues and government expenditure. The other, even more important to long-run economic well-being, may be the overall rate of investment. Although the government cannot imbue Americans with a Japanese-style propensity to invest, it can use tax policy to encourage such behavior.

Another key factor affecting the global standing of the United States is its social crisis—the high rate of violence in the cities, the unsatisfactory state of race relations, and the breakdown in families. Though the nation faces no global ideological rival, and though movements such as Islamic fundamentalism and East Asian traditionalism are limited in their appeal, social problems are limiting the stature of the United States as a model. If the country's social crisis worsens, it is likely that over the long term a new organizing principle with greater universal appeal might emerge and be adopted by states with the power and the desire to mount a challenge.

Obtain and Maintain Domestic Support for U.S. Leadership

Some might argue that, given the costs of maintaining global leadership, the American people would not support such a role for the United States. It might also be argued that the public might not support the level of defense expenditure required because domestic priorities are competing for the same dollars. Public opinion polls indicate that the American people are focused on domestic concerns. Such a perception discouraged a serious debate on national security issues in the last presidential election.

However, according to a recent poll on American public attitudes, the population appears to support (90 percent) active U.S. involvement in world affairs. At the same time, 84 percent believe that the nation should pay less attention to international problems and concentrate on problems here in the United States. A majority of Americans support peace "through military strength."¹⁴

¹⁴Times Mirror Center for the People and the Press, *The People, The Press & Politics*, Washington D.C., September 21, 1994, p. 37.

Whether the public would in fact support a global strategy—as outlined here—is not known. Support might well be forthcoming if: (a) the strategy was presented by the President and supported by the senior members of both the Democratic and Republican parties and (b) the costs and benefits of such a strategy and some alternatives were debated and understood. A global leadership strategy will entail costs—a greater defense effort in the near term than would be the case under some other grand strategy—but those costs have to be compared with the potential risks of alternatives. The costs of alternative approaches can ultimately be higher. At present the burden imposed by U.S. defense spending, approximately 4 percent of GNP, is lower than at any time since before the Korean War. The burden will decline further as the economy expands, but it can increase if the world situation deteriorates—for example, if China builds up its military capability and becomes expansionist. The costs of leadership can perhaps be kept at a sustainable level by avoiding overextension and by more effective burden sharing among the members of the zone of peace. But should the costs ultimately prove too high, the United States can adopt a different grand strategy.

Overextension is a mistake that some past great powers have made.¹⁵ Such a development can occur if the United States is not judicious in its use of force and gets involved in protracted conflicts in various regions—sapping its energies and undermining support for its global role. U.S. vital interests are engaged in critical regions where it should be prepared to use force if other means fail. And when it uses force, the preference should be to have U.S. allies and friends go in as well—which means pressing those allies and friends to do their fair share. Having the capability to protect U.S. vital interests, unilaterally if necessary, can facilitate getting friends and allies to participate—especially on terms favorable to the United States. It is possible that if the United States cannot protect its interests without large-scale participation by allies, it might not be able to protect them at all. For example, in the run-up to the Gulf War, several allies did not favor the use of force to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. If their military participation had been indispensable to military

¹⁵Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House, 1987.

success against Iraq, Saddam Hussain's forces might still be in Kuwait, and Iraq might now possess nuclear weapons.

When it comes to lesser interests, the United States should rely on nonmilitary options—especially if the military costs do not justify the possible benefits. There are many options here: arming and training the victims of aggression; providing technical assistance and logistic support for peacekeeping by the UN, regional organizations, or other powers; economic instruments such as sanctions and positive incentives; and, of course, diplomacy.

Within these constraints, it is in the U.S. interest and the interests of other members of the zone of peace that the zone ultimately encompass the whole world. The reason for favoring such an evolution is that prosperous democracies are more likely to cooperate with the United States and are less likely to threaten its interests.¹⁶ Unfortunately, this is not a near-term proposition. Many regions and states are not ready. The United States should seek to expand the zone selectively and help others prepare for membership.

The most important step that the United States and the other prosperous democracies can take is to assist others in adopting the economic strategies that have worked in North America, Western Europe, and East Asia and are being successfully implemented in parts of Latin America and elsewhere in Asia. Economic development and education are the most effective instruments for solving the problems of the nations in the zone of conflict.

The members of the zone of peace have a common interest in the stability of Europe, North America, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Japan, for example, imports oil from the Gulf and exports to and invests in the other critical regions. The same is true of Europe. The U.S. global role benefits the United States and these other members. There is a danger that the other members of the zone of peace will not do their fair share and perpetuate free (or cheap) ridership. This was a problem during the Cold War, and it is unlikely to go away. It could become a bigger problem if, because of the absence of the Soviet threat and the lack of a common objective, burden sharing declines. It is clearly an important U.S. political issue, and there is a

¹⁶Clinton, *op. cit.*, p. ii.

real dilemma: as long as the United States is able and willing to protect common interests, others might be happy to rely on that protection, thereby keeping political opposition under control, accepting no risk for their youth, and continuing to focus on their economies. But the United States also should not want Germany and Japan to be able to conduct expeditionary wars on their own. Therefore, although the United States will probably be willing to bear a heavier military burden than its allies, fairness and long-term public support require that this disproportion not be excessive. A balance needs to be struck and a formula has to be found to balance each country's contribution of "blood and treasure." In the Gulf War, a substantial degree of burden sharing was realized. But the allies can do more, although they are likely to resist and argue that they, too, are cutting back their defense budgets. For the long term, one possible solution is to institutionalize burden sharing among the G-7 nations for the security of critical regions, including sharing the financial costs of military operations. Questions of out-of-area responsibility are important in peacetime, both on a day-to-day basis and in times of crisis and war. Effective burden sharing will also place some constraints on U.S. policy. It will mean that the United States would have to pay greater attention to the views and concerns of other nations and be willing to put American lives at risk to protect common interests. Effective burden-sharing steps would not obviate a significant and perhaps disproportionate U.S. military role in major crises in critical regions, but this is a price the United States should be willing to pay.

A global leadership role serves U.S. economic interests. For example, it can facilitate American exports, as in recent U.S. contracts with Saudi Arabia for the sale of aircraft and the modernization of Saudi telecommunication systems. As we have seen, the costs of other stances the United States might take to the world can ultimately be higher. Rather than undermining domestic prosperity, such a role can in fact facilitate it. The economic benefits of U.S. leadership have not been articulated, either analytically or in the statements made to the public.

Global leadership and building a more democratic and peaceful world should also appeal to American idealism, a defining feature of the republic. To sustain domestic political support, this particular appeal might well be as important as the more selfish and material

American interests. In fact, such a lofty goal could be a spur to the kinds of social and educational reforms that the nation needs, rather than an alternative to them.

As a nation, the United States is in a position of unprecedented military and political power, and it enjoys a unique leadership role in the world. The United States should recognize and celebrate this achievement. It should build a national museum that documents the sacrifices of the Cold War, the challenges faced, and the victories achieved. Similarly, a day should be designated to celebrate the "Victory in the Cold War." This would encourage schools, the media, and the national leadership to focus on the momentous challenges of the Cold War and the factors that contributed to its end.

The United States should also resolve to maintain its position of global leadership and preclude the rise of another global rival for the indefinite future. It is an opportunity the nation may never see again.

The question is whether the United States will accept responsibility, for reasons of self-interest and historical need, and meet the challenge of global leadership. Accepting will mean having the vision and the strategy and a willingness to bear the costs. Should the United States fail to seize this historic moment, over time its relative position is likely to decline, and the world is likely to become a balance-of-power multipolar system—and become more dangerous for the United States. The development of a multipolar world is not inevitable. It depends to a significant degree on what this nation wants and does. Even if the development ultimately takes place, the later it happens, the better.

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Document 5

Beyond Stalemate: Deterrence and Nonproliferation in the New World Order

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BEYOND STALEMATE:

DETERRENCE AND NONPROLIFERATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO

DR. WILLIAM C. MARTEL

IN FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIRMENT

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BY

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Beyond Stalemate: Deterrence and Nonproliferation in the New World Order

AUTHOR: Jo Vonnice D. Cole

U.S. deterrence and nonproliferation policies need to be updated to meet the challenges of the new world order. To be effective, these new policies must be based on an understanding of potential proliferators motives for pursuing nuclear weapons, must be realistic, and must be implemented as early in the nuclear program as possible.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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BEYOND STALEMATE: DETERRENCE AND NONPROLIFERATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The fall of the Soviet Union and the concomitant changes in the international environment generate the need to reexamine nuclear deterrence and a plethora of new ideas on the future of nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation. New hypotheses range from declaring that nuclear deterrence is obsolete to positing that nothing has changed -- except that instead of one major opponent there are now several. The truth undoubtedly lies somewhere in the middle. Some evolution in nuclear deterrence theory was inevitable, and occurred during the Cold War. This paper does not focus on classic nuclear balance of terror. Instead, it will consider some aspects of nuclear deterrence against the newer and developing nuclear powers.

For two decades, the U.S.'s proliferation policy has been based on zero tolerance. The formal policy held that all nuclear proliferation was destabilizing, and that all nuclear use was catastrophic. Given these goals, American policy used a uniform approach to all nuclear proliferation issues; using political engagement and dialogue first, then coercion, and, finally economic sanctions, if necessary. This led to mixed results using this method during the Cold War. In the new world order, deterrence and nonproliferation goals must be updated, and the means to achieve those goals must be tailored to current geopolitical realities.

WHAT IS DETERRENCE?

In The Future of Deterrence in U.S. Strategy, Daniel Weiler stated "The essential objective of all deterrence strategies is that of preventing aggression by threat of punishment." As such, deterrence has political and military components. In political terms, deterrence exists when an opposing state's risk-gain calculation shows that the risks from a course of action outweigh the potential gains. Implicit in these definitions, however, is understanding what elements are being weighed and how those elements are valued. Consequently, deterrence is predicated on the capability to hold at risk something the opponent values. As long as the foe believes this risk

exceeds realistic gain, deterrence is effective and stable. Conversely, if the value of the target(s) held at risk is insufficient (or erodes) deterrence will be inadequate (or eroding) and unstable.

In military terms, deterrence means that an opponent's strategic correlation of forces calculation shifts from favorable, where success is likely, to unfavorable, or where military success is questionable or unlikely. While precise formulations vary, most strategic correlations of forces include a combination of hard (manpower, equipment, munitions, etc.) and soft (will to fight, doctrine, training, morale, etc.) factors. Militarily, deterrence is effective when the opponent believes that the risks of failure (or the costs of success) exceed acceptable levels. As noted above, political and military deterrence are neither synonymous nor mutually exclusive. Although stable deterrence can result from either, deterrence will be more stable in a political and military deterrence form.

If deterrence is predicated on the capability to hold at risk something the opponent values, the underpinning of deterrence is the credibility of that threat. If the opponent does not believe that the threat is real, or begins to question the will to carry out the threat, then regardless of one's capability to inflict damage, deterrence will fail.

Finally, for effective deterrence to occur, capability and credibility must be communicated clearly. Communications failures far outnumber any other cause of deterrence failures. While communicating that a specific action will result in a specified reaction may not be necessary, a general classification of responses must be communicated and understood by both parties. Nuclear deterrence includes deterring the use of nuclear weapons current nuclear states, and deterring weapons development or acquisition by non-weapon states.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

While the nuclear arms race began in World War II (WWII), with the initiation of programs by the U.S., Soviet Union, Germany, and Japan, the rate of nuclear proliferation has been surprisingly slow.² There are a number of reasons for this. First, nuclear weapons programs

are astronomically expensive. For example, our Manhattan Project consumed about 10% of the electric power generated in the entire country in 1944.⁴ The Hanford Reactor alone cost about \$347 million dollars in 1943.⁵ These costs represent a primitive program, with rudimentary technology, but generally reflects the expense of nuclear weapons development.

Despite the huge costs of nuclear weapons programs, the political ramifications dwarf the economic costs for most states. The early nuclear states were world powers, and as a consequence, the two terms became synonymous during the height of the Cold War. As proliferation continued, this perception persisted. Nuclear states treat others differently and are themselves treated differently than other states, irrespective of their relative conventional military or regional power. This "nuclear club" is exclusive; its members do not welcome new members with open arms. They use a variety of political, economic, and military hurdles to discourage potential proliferators. When these efforts fail, they finally accept proliferation only when presented with a *fait accompli*.

Proliferation has internal political effects on the gaining state. Resource allocation, economic and political sanctions, and the decision itself to proliferate can affect profoundly a state's internal cohesion. These effects are relative to the openness and affluence of the state, and are most powerful in Western-style democracies.

Forty years after the detonations at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons are still enigmatic. The popular Western interpretation holds that those two detonations ended WWII by forcing Japan's surrender, and, by inference, the use of nuclear weapons could end any war. The facts, however, suggest a different outcome. Japan's resource lifelines were severed, she had been virtually strangled by the naval blockade. Additionally, the Soviet Union was preparing to enter the war in Asia.⁶ Her surrender was a matter of time, with or without nuclear detonations or amphibious invasion. Although fear of additional nuclear attacks may have accelerated the process, it did not, in and of itself, force the surrender.

The weapons effects also belie popular perceptions. The 13-kiloton bomb dropped on Hiroshima created a radius of total destruction of 2300 meters, of which roughly 1000 meters primarily was due to fire. Most of this area was habitable within 75 days, albeit with some risk from radiation⁸.

Further, the legacy of the Cold War clouded current perceptions of nuclear weapons effects. The Cold War amalgamated two factors, the myth that nuclear weapons forced the Japanese surrender and the geometric increases in the size and numbers of weapons, and transformed nuclear warfare into global Armageddon. During the Cold War, the dogma was that nuclear warfare was not survivable -- and nuclear warfare between the U.S. and Soviet Union probably was not. This became the American paradigm for nuclear warfare, regardless of the size of the exchange. Unfortunately, this was an emotional, not rational, construct.

Over the past two decades, these two tenets of nuclear warfare have influenced other states. The conviction that nuclear weapons would win a war made nuclear weapons more appealing to a number of states. States facing, or believing they faced, a nuclear-capable opponent felt they needed a viable deterrent, with either their own nuclear weapons or a "nuclear umbrella" from one of the major powers. The belief in exaggerated weapons effects gave nuclear weapons a reverential aura. The expectation was not that a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon would destroy about a square mile, but that it would destroy an entire city, and with it the will to resist. While these two judgments had some positive results, such as increasing political restraint in some cases, they generated hopelessness in others.⁹

DEVELOPMENT RATIONALES

Nuclear weapons programs require a massive investment of national treasure, that no state takes lightly. The number of states willing to make this commitment has increased dramatically over the past decade. The perceptions nuclear weapons are the *sine qua non* of modern warfare, and that nuclear arsenals are the distinguishing feature of great powers, have made nuclear

weapons more appealing to many states. Given the costs of nuclear weapons development, however, this attraction alone is insufficient. States need another impetus to embark on nuclear weapons programs.

One of the major differences between states is the motivation for nuclear weapons acquisition. Generally, such rationales can be described in three conceptual frameworks:

- 1) states acquire nuclear weapons to substantiate or balance international and regional power;
- 2) states procure nuclear weapons in response to specific security considerations; or
- 3) nuclear weapons are secured as the ultimate guarantor of national, or regime, survival.

These three reasons are not mutually exclusive for, in fact, the last two form a continuum, and the variances in weightings of these motivations, however, have major implications for deterrent policy. While relating motivations to policy can become problematic, unless the relative weights of a state's incentives for nuclear weapons development are understood, deterrent programs may be ineffective because they lack focus and perspective.

If the primary impetus for a state pursuing nuclear weapons is legitimation of its regional or international power, and security or survival considerations are a secondary cause, then the efficacy of deterrent programs will hinge on whether a state is an aspiring power or a *status quo* state.* In these terms, most states that develop nuclear weapons primarily to legitimate their power are likely to be aspiring powers. As such, any attempts to deter nuclear weapons development directly conflict with their national interests. The success of nonproliferation programs against these states may rest on whether the expansionist aspirations are a core value of the society, or whether they are an elite value. For example, more than a hundred years ago it was unlikely that the U.S., as a nation, could have been disabused of its "manifest destiny." If the genesis of nuclear weapons development is a consequence of a core value drive for regional hegemony, it is unlikely that international pressure can force an cancellation of nuclear aspirations. In this case, even if the government would prefer to compromise with regard to the nuclear program, it may not be a viable, or survivable, option. Should a state in these circumstances be

forced to compromise its nuclear programs, it may regard the compromise as a temporary setback, develop deep-rooted enmity and distrust for the major power(s) it holds responsible, and may attempt to continue at least the research effort, if not major aspects of the program. Conversely, if the state's aspirations result from the power elite's perception, it may be possible to coerce the cessation of the program with economic "carrots and sticks". For this to successfully negate a nuclear program, both the program and the carrots and sticks have to be debated within the domestic political forum. This debate, however, risks solidifying the society behind the program, or bringing down the existing government.

The second major rationale for nuclear weapons procurement is to respond directly to a specific security situation. While in some cases, this results from the presence of an overwhelming conventional threat, in most cases, it results from the development of nuclear weapons by a state perceived as hostile, or by the presence of a third party "nuclear umbrella" over a neighboring state. These states, whether aspiring powers or status-quo states, will be attracted to nuclear weapons by the fiscal, social, or economic advantages over conventional forces. In short, they perceive that their security concerns can be most effectively addressed with nuclear weapons, although such weapons are not the only viable means available. Consequently, if this represents the primary motivation for a state to acquire a nuclear capability, and then if the underlying security concerns can be adequately addressed, the state unilaterally may halt its weapons program. If the crucial security concern, however, is not, or cannot be, addressed adequately, these states will maintain their nuclear programs until the costs far outweigh the perceived advantages. States that fall into this category, and face increasing international pressure to cancel their weapons programs, may believe that their national survival relies on their possession of nuclear weapons, which is the third category of motivation.

States with the third motivation for nuclear proliferation are probably the most difficult to dissuade. These states generally are isolated internationally, and may function with a fortress state mentality. They perceive any attempt to dissuade them from nuclear proliferation as a direct threat to their national security, regardless of whether the dissuasion is a carrot or a stick. These

states will usually be omnibalancing, meaning that they will attempt to achieve stability by balancing internal and external forces and interests. Like Iran and North Korea, these states are totalitarian, and tend to be xenophobic. Consequently, the potential for public debate on policies is low, and the public perception that external parties are operating with hostile intentions is high. As such, external pressure tends to coalesce, rather than fracture, the population, by providing a common enemy. As a result, states operating in this framework are extremely difficult to influence in the short term.

PROLIFERATION TIERS

Considering the development of nuclear weapons in time sequence¹², or tiers, clarifies this analytic construct. The first tier consists of states that developed or deployed nuclear weapons between 1945 and 1965,¹³ states that developed or deployed nuclear weapons between 1965 and 1985 as second tier, states that are currently developing nuclear weapons (1985 through 2005) as third tier, and states that have the potential, but have not yet resolved to develop nuclear weapons as fourth tier.¹⁴

Table 1. Proliferation Tiers

First Tier	Second Tier	Third Tier	Fourth Tier
United States	Israel	Pakistan	South Korea
Soviet Union	India	North Korea	Japan
United Kingdom	South Africa ¹⁵	Iraq	Taiwan
France		Iran	Brazil
China		Libya	Argentina
		Algeria	

First Tier Proliferators

The nuclear arms race had its genesis in the drive for more effective weapons in WWII. Most of the first tier of proliferators were the victors. In the political aftermath of WWII, Europe essentially became bipolar -- an infrequent, and generally unstable, condition in European history. The U.S. and Soviet Union were based on two political ideologies, democracy and communism, which competed for the hearts and minds of liberated Europe. The urgency of the Soviet drive in the mid-to-late 1940's for nuclear weapons was a reactive development to the U.S. possession (and use) of nuclear weapons. Viewing the world as a bipolar arena, and their rightful place in it as one of the two major powers, the Soviet Union chose between developing and deploying nuclear weapons, or ceding their role as a major power.

Although the same factors undoubtedly influenced Great Britain and France, another element that influenced their pursuit of nuclear weapons was their perception of America's reliability as an ally*. Although more a factor for France than for Britain, from a historical perspective, their concern was warranted. The U.S. had come into WWII late, after France had fallen and Britain was in desperate straits. They viewed American military policies from 1945 through the early 1960's as chaotic, and were seriously concerned about America's ability to fight and win a war.¹⁷ Consequently, facing Soviet nuclear weapons development and deployment, and questioning American reliability, Britain and France saw the development and deployment of their own nuclear weapons as paramount to their national security and crucial to maintaining their international position. China's pursuit of nuclear weapons was based on similar motivations. Ravaged by the Japanese in WWII, drawn into a confrontation with the U.S. in Korea, and on poor terms with the Soviet Union, China saw nuclear weapons as an answer to valid security concerns and as a legitimization of regional (and global) power.

The first tier proliferators have some features in common. All see themselves as world powers, and all see the maintenance of their power as dependent, to some degree, on maintaining a nuclear capability. All have comparatively large programs, with sizable stockpiles of nuclear weapons-(somewhere in the 300 to over 25,000 range.*) All have at least two viable delivery

means (aircraft and missiles), and most have triads (aircraft, ground-based missile systems, and submarine-based missile systems.¹⁹) Finally, all are operating primarily on the first motivation, that is, substantiating or balancing international or regional power, and secondarily, in response to specific security concerns.

When the primary motivation for nuclear weapons development and deployment is the balance of power, the primary function of nuclear weapons is deterrence. This does not mean that they can not nor will not be used. It does not mean that targeting theories will not be developed, debated, modified, and misconstrued. Quite the contrary, it means that there can be no doubt that nuclear weapons can be delivered and detonated with calamitous effects. Otherwise deterrence would not be credible. Nuclear weapons generate uncertainty, alter balance of power calculations and transform risk-gains analyses. If used, however, nuclear weapons will have failed in their primary function as deterrents.

Second Tier Proliferators

While deterrence with first tier proliferators essentially is a bilateral function, a direct face-off between the U.S. (and its allies) and the Soviet Union, or the Soviet Union and China, the emergence of the second tier of proliferators modified the concept. These second tier nuclear programs illustrate some of the major consistencies in the second and third tier proliferators. Both the Indian and Israeli programs are aimed at regional, not international, power balances. These programs, modest in comparison to the earlier programs, are as large as can be sustained reasonably. India, for example, has a maximum weapons production rate probably of less than ten per year, given the size of the facilities. The stockpile of either state is not likely to exceed 300 weapons,²⁰ although Israel probably will have the largest stockpile outside the first tier proliferators. Unlike the other second and third tier proliferators, Israel appears to have considered targeting in the early stages of its program. For most of the other proliferators, the internal nuclear debate has centered on whether to become a nuclear power or when to become a nuclear power, and on the political effects of becoming a nuclear power. Significantly, these debates have not focused on how, why, or where to use nuclear weapons, or even how many to

build. India was so focused on breaking the nuclear threshold that viable delivery systems are only now being produced, some 20 years later.²¹

While India made a major show of crossing the nuclear threshold, Israel did not. Given its international situation, Israel probably believed that the international repercussions would have been too severe to risk open testing or declaration of its nuclear capability. As long as the capability was undetected, however, it did not improve Israel's deterrence posture. Consequently, as Israel's nuclear capability became inferred through a series of leaks, it altered the balance of power in the region and improved Israel's ability to deter the Arab states. These extreme behaviors are more common among later proliferators, although few are likely to be as subtle as Israel. Generally, the later proliferators fall into two extremes. They will either, like India, test a device as soon as possible, before they have a deliverable weapon, or they will declare nuclear capability at some point in their program. This choice may relate to the underlying rationale for procuring nuclear weapons. If the predominant cause is regional power balance, and a drive for regional hegemony, then the state may test early. On the other hand, if the root rationale is survival, then the state simply may declare the capability, preferring to retain all its weapons in its battle for survival.

Israel and India initially focused on air-deliverable fission weapons, and only later began work on missile deliverable warheads.²² These munitions were generally under 25 kilotons, with the bulk probably around 10-15 kilotons.²³ The size of the weapons and the delivery means available are both indicative of programs targeted at the regional balance of power.

These programs have had a marked effect on regional balance of power. For example, Israel, after being attacked by the Arab states four times in 25 years, has not been attacked by another state in more than 20 years.²⁴ Although border problems and crises still arise, India has not gone to war with China (or Pakistan) during that time frame.²⁵ These developments have given rise to a body of thought, generally outside the U.S., that nuclear proliferation may be a stabilizing factor in some cases. This theory holds that just as nuclear weapons made it impossible for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to go to war, even conventionally, nuclear weapons may make

regional conflicts untenable by radically altering the cost-gain analysis. India and Pakistan frequently are used as a case in point, although some analysts point to the Mid-East peace accords as a logical consequence of Israeli possession of nuclear weapons (regardless of their relative level of assembly.)

The second tier proliferators modified the U.S. deterrence paradigm. These states were not hostile toward the U.S, or lacked the ability or intent to deliver nuclear weapons to U.S. targets. In either case, direct and immediate threats were absent. With the second tier proliferators, the U.S. took active steps to improve relations and increase influence with them. These reactions to the development of nuclear weapons reinforced the precedent for treating nuclear states differently than non-nuclear powers, and may have exaggerated the influence of the second tier nuclear states within regional balance of power. Deterrence remained essentially bilateral in a regional setting, as exemplified by the case of China and the India.

Third Tier Proliferators

One of the hallmarks of the first and second tier proliferators is that they were stable states when they embarked on nuclear weapons. Although the leadership and the societies changed, the change was evolutionary not revolutionary. The third tier of proliferators, however, differs markedly in political content. Most of these states are openly hostile toward at least one of the earlier proliferators, usually the U.S. They generally are oligarchies or dictatorships. Most are omnibalancing, and serious questions exist about their long-term stability. Generally, these states will cross the nuclear threshold within the next decade. Some, like Pakistan, already have the components for nuclear weapons, while others, like Algeria, have nascent programs. Like many earlier proliferators, some point to regional enemies that either are nuclear powers or fall under an extraregional power's nuclear umbrella to legitimize their programs. These programs generally are regime driven, however, and are fostered by a combination of the first and third development rationale, regional power and survival.

Third tier nuclear programs are smaller than the earlier programs, and are unlikely to expand given the costs involved. In fact, most of these states would not be able to sustain the capital outlay for their current nuclear programs if their budgets were open to internal public debate. In almost all cases, these are long-term developmental programs, although the availability of technical expertise and proven design can reduce the time required for development.²⁶ The sunk costs of nuclear weapons development²⁷ are generally greater in the early years of a nuclear program, when facilities are being constructed and staffs are being educated, than in the later years when the prototypes are being produced. Since the bulk of the economic cost is incurred early in the program, the primary economic benefits of halting a program diminish as the program matures, and may become negligible as weapons production begins. Consequently, the ability to influence third tier programs generally decreases as the program matures.

Another commonality for most third tier proliferators is their focus on breaking the nuclear threshold, versus on acquiring the ability to destroy an enemy state. The goal is to acquire a small stockpile, or the ability to produce a small stockpile of relatively low-yield munitions. The constraint on the size of the stockpile and the sizes of the munitions is very real for most of these states. For example, although exact production varies depending on reactor design, a 70-kilowatt reactor generally produces enough plutonium for three 10-15 kiloton weapons a year, and costs over \$100 million to build.²⁸ Consequently, the third tier proliferator's resources are stressed to cover programs large enough to produce a few weapons a year; they also lack the resources to expand the programs much beyond their current level. Most will produce less than 10 weapons per year; all will produce less than 20.²⁹ This will result in small stockpiles for the near term, since to build a 300 weapon stockpile will take over 15 years.

If used, these states are more likely to use nuclear weapons as terror weapons to target civilian populations rather than military or counterforce targets. This results from a number of factors including range and (in)accuracy of delivery systems, limited numbers and yields of warheads, and limitations on accurate, timely targeting information.

The primary objective of almost all the third tier proliferators is a missile deliverable warhead, in contrast to the air deliverable weapons initially sought by first and second tier proliferators. Delivery platforms survivability factored in these decisions. All of these states face a foe with at least a rudimentary air defense structure, and few have the assets to degrade that structure to the point where air delivery is viable. Since missile technology was available and a missile was more likely to reach its target, missile deliverables are the preferred option.

The missile technology available to these proliferators is rudimentary and quite restrictive, however. For the near term, most of the missile systems will be capable of only delivering a 500-1000 kilogram warhead,³⁰ which roughly equates to a 10-25 kiloton warhead. Further, the current missile guidance systems available to these states are inaccurate.³¹ Consequently, these systems are designed be used on area targets. Many of the area targets a military presents in the course of a war -- for example second echelon troops -- are transitory, lasting from minutes to hours. To strike this kind of targets requires identification, location, decision, and engagement before the target moves. This is difficult for first tier proliferators, and given the resources available to the third tier proliferators becomes even more problematic. Furthermore, even though fixed military targets, like airfields and production facilities, abound the WWII experience comes into play: the belief that American use of nuclear weapons on Japanese cities ended the war by destroying the Japanese will to fight. Such a belief is pervasive and persuasive. This results in a Douhetian campaign to destroy the will of the foe, by the most viable method, targeting the cities.

Even with total use on civilian populations, this employment will fall far short of the devastation envisioned in the Cold War. As earlier mentioned, the 13-kiloton weapon used on Hiroshima totally destroyed an area of roughly four nautical miles square. If this model is applied directly to potential target cities, for example Seoul or Tel Aviv, to destroy those urban areas would take at least 60 or 15 weapons respectively.³² However, Tel Aviv and Seoul are fundamentally different from Hiroshima. Hiroshima was a low, wooden city, while Tel Aviv and Seoul -- in fact most potential target cities -- are larger with buildings that are taller and

constructed of concrete and steel. Such construction is less vulnerable to fire, which accounted for almost half the destruction in Hiroshima.³³ Further, large concrete and steel buildings dampen and duct blast effects,³⁴ as will some terrain features. Consequently, a 10-15 kiloton weapon detonated on a modern city will have less destructive effect than the weapon used on Hiroshima. In short, it will not destroy the city, may not destroy the will to fight.

As a result, the political implications far outweigh the military significance of nuclear weapons for these states. The overall objective of these programs is to change the power calculus in the region, to alter any potential adversaries cost-risk-gain equation, and that those equations are altered short of assured destruction. This perception lends an interesting twist to the nuclear deterrence paradigm. If the objective for these states is to change the regional power calculus, not to annihilate the enemy, and international implications of nuclear weapons use, a mutually deterred status becomes a win-win situation, and the use of nuclear weapons becomes a major political failure.

Fourth Tier Proliferators

The fourth tier consists of states that have decided not to produce nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon components, or have deferred their programs in response to an amelioration of their security concerns. In short, they primarily were operating in the second rationale. That is, the underlying security concerns that were or would have caused them to develop nuclear weapons were addressed adequately, and consequently, the nuclear weapons program was suspended. This suspension of weapons development is contingent on the maintenance of the status quo. Should a major shift in the regional balance of power occur, or should the security assurances they have received become suspect, any of these countries could resume or initiate weapons programs. With the fourth tier proliferators, especially states like Japan, who have well developed nuclear power infrastructures, the overall capital investment required could be smaller, and the overall length of time required to develop nuclear weapons would be shorter. Should these states resume weapons programs, several of them could become nuclear powers within twenty-four months.

What Are American Interests?

The U.S.'s national policy on non-proliferation was articulated in the National Security Strategy of the United States²⁸. This document states, in part:

In the post-Cold War era, one of our most threatening national security challenges is the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them...

U.S. nonproliferation policy is guided by four principles:

- Build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.
- Focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, Southwest Asia, South Asia and the Korean peninsula.
- Seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while reserving the capability for unilateral action.
- Address the underlying security concerns that motivate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, relying on the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, security assistance, and other available tools.

Although these statements date from the Bush administration, the emphasis has been reiterated by the Clinton administration, including Secretary of Defense Perry and former Secretary Aspin.

While there is no doubt that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear weapons in particular is a valid and enduring security concern for the U.S., it is not a matter of national survival yet. As previously mentioned, the new nuclear states' aspirations do not rest on securing nuclear stockpiles large enough to annihilate an opponent or the U.S., and in many cases, they do not even include the ability to target the continental U.S. In those cases where targeting the U.S. is an objective, most of these states are decades away from having the ability to deliver warheads against the U.S. mainland.²⁹ Despite these very real limitations for most of the emerging nuclear states, however, the U.S.'s nuclear paradigm tends to be an emotional construct, leaning toward visions of holocaust, rather than Hiroshima. This is a perilous perception, and can cause extremism and disunity in nonproliferation and deterrence policy.

Consequently, the need to modify the deterrence paradigm to accommodate changing proliferation issues is critical. Several areas are pivotal in this modification. First, U.S. perceptions of the threat must become more realistic. If emerging nuclear powers do use their weapons in the near term, they will use them against neighboring countries, although some indeed may target U.S. economic interests or forward presence in those states. Many of these states so targeted are U.S. allies, and some have U.S. security assurances. While any use of nuclear weapons would be regrettable, and, given global economic linkages, targeting of the population or economic base of any country could have cascade effects in the world economy, these strikes would not threaten U.S. national survival per se. Furthermore, a nuclear strike, even against an ally, will not inevitably escalate into full scale nuclear exchanges between first tier proliferators. This is a major change from the Cold War mindset.

NONPROLIFERATION -- IMPLEMENTATION

Tools that can be used to delay a nuclear program are international export controls, persuasion, incentives, and international economic sanctions. International export controls on technology -- including controls on dual use technology -- with weapons applications need to be broadened and better enforced in the international community to be effective. For some states depending on the level of access to their peaceful nuclear programs, these controls should not pose significant problems. For states with suspect programs, these controls need to be expanded. Additionally, mandatory public announcement of transfer of specific classes of equipment, regardless of destination, should be considered. Admittedly, there is legitimate cause for pessimism concerning the effects of economic sanctions as a non-proliferation tool. Nonetheless, sanctions have been effective in delaying, although not discontinuing, nuclear programs.

While broad-based economic sanctions are viable against some states, they are not effective against all states. Therefore, economic sanctions should be considered as a last resort. In strict legal interpretations they are an act of war, and empirically, they affect the civilian

population significantly more than they do the military or power elite. Further, many of these countries may be able to survive in the face of broad-based economic sanctions unless those sanctions deny "humanitarian" goods (food, medicine, heating fuel, etc.). Current international sanctions on humanitarian goods are untenable politically in the international and U.S. domestic environment."

Some circumstances may warrant U.S. or other third party assurances to ameliorate the underlying security concerns generating the nuclear program. Since these assurances carry with them the potential to draw the U.S. into a confrontation not of its own making, as a rule security assurances should not be provided to aspiring powers. Security assurances frequently have a secondary effect. In some cases, the provision of U.S. security assurances may have a cascading effect on regional nuclear proliferation; that is, by providing security assurances to a state, the regional power balance is altered sufficiently to foster nuclear weapons development by other states in the region.

An alternative to the U.S. or third party providing a direct "nuclear umbrella," may be denial programs, including missile defenses. Missile defenses, even global missile defenses under international control, should not be regarded as a panacea. Current treaty obligations should not be the sole rationale for dismissing missile defenses, despite reservations about the impact on deterrence, particularly secure second strike capability. These issues, including the treaty, could be overcome. The more critical issue is that the static deployment and employment of missile defense systems simply would force a change in the preferred delivery systems by the hostile state. Although for the near term, crisis deployment of ballistic missile defenses probably will continue to be effective, deploying of static missile defenses will contribute to the development of delivery systems that are harder to detect and destroy.

The record clearly shows that the U.S. has used its influence effectively to secure nonproliferation agreements from its allies and friends. The combination of incentives and persuasion should continue to be effective with friendly states, provided they are operating in the second category. If they are actively pursuing regional hegemony, or their security concerns have

reached a point where they believe that without nuclear weapons they will cease to exist as a state, then restraining the program will be problematic. If they are in the third category, however, and they believe their security situation to be so precarious that their survival is in jeopardy, it is unlikely that pressure to stop the program would be successful in the near term. On the other hand, attempting to slow the program, while simultaneously beginning to address the security situation may result in success in over the long term. As the state becomes more confident of its survival, and the original rationale begins to erode, cessation of the nuclear program should become viable.

One of the critical factors that the U.S. must consider regarding the third category of proliferators is the level of uncertainty. For example, some proliferators may be willing to cancel their programs after they produce one or two (or ten) nuclear weapons, and are confident of their survival with this small stockpile. In these cases, the U.S. must decide whether it can accept this level of uncertainty and risk.

Non-proliferation must be played out in the international forum to be successful. In addition to the U.S., major regional powers will exercise pivotal influence on proliferation activities in their area. In some cases, the influence of the major regional power may outweigh U.S. influence. While the U.S. presence and interest may fluctuate, major regional powers are enduring local factors in the balance of power. Consequently, the U.S. must work cohesively and constructively with regional powers on nonproliferation issues. Although not intended as a checklist, table 2 contains a matrix of objectives, tools and risks for nonproliferation policies. The earlier in the nuclear program these actions are taken, the more effective they are likely to be. In fact, nonproliferation actions initiated before major capital investment occurs will be significantly more effective than like actions taken when weapons fabrication is imminent.

TABLE 2. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY ALTERNATIVES

Rationale	Classification	Realistic Objective	Tools	Potential Success	Risks
Legitimate Power/ Regional Hegemony	Aspiring (core value)	Delay	Economic Sanctions; Military Action	Low	Enmity; Bring down government
	Aspiring (elite value)	Stop	Economic Sanctions; Incentives	Mod	Coalesce population; Bring down Government
Security Concerns	Aspiring (hostile)	Delay	Sanctions; Incentives;	Low	Isolate; Move to third Rationale
	Aspiring (friendly)	Stop	Persuasion; Incentives; Sanctions	Mod	Alienate; Move to third rationale
	Status-quo (hostile)	Delay	Third party Security Assurances? Incentives	Mod	Move to third Rationale
	Status-quo (friendly)	Stop	Security Assurances	High	Drawn into conflict
Survival Concerns	Aspiring (hostile)	Delay	Sanctions; Incentives;	Low	Isolate; Radicalize
	Aspiring (friendly)	Delay/Stop	Persuasion; Incentives; Sanctions	Mod	Ability to influence may decline over time
	Status-quo (hostile)	Delay	Third party Security Assurances? Incentives	Mod	Isolate; Radicalize
	Status-quo (friendly)	Delay/Stop	Security assurances	High	Ability to influence may decline over time

IS THE THIRD TIER DETERRABLE?

As noted earlier, deterrence is predicated on the capability to hold at risk something the foe values, thereby creating an unacceptable consequence for the opponent. By extrapolation, then, if the opponent has nothing of value, or if what he values is not at risk, deterrence cannot be effective. For Western societies and the former Soviet Union, deterrence was strongest when population and infrastructure were held at risk. For third tier proliferators, however, it is not clear that this will be the case.

With third tier proliferators, understanding each state's values and cost-gains analysis is crucial for effective deterrence. Because values vary, what deters Iran may not deter Libya or North Korea. In short, a uniform approach to deterrence, cookie-cutter style, probably will not work with the third tier proliferators because their values vary. In some cases, even when the values and factors in the cost-gains analysis can be discerned, the result may not be targetable in the classic military sense. This may be true of emotional values; for example, a state involved in a jihad, especially one that places high value on sacrifice, may not be deterrable. Finally, deterring with these states will be effective only as long as they believe that they have something valuable to lose. A state that believes it has nothing left to lose cannot be coerced.

While deterrence may erode in the future, most of these states are deterrable now. They are deterrable from using weapons, however, not from acquiring them for three reasons. First, their nuclear programs are linked too closely to their perceptions of survival to be negotiable. Second, almost all of them deem the U.S. to be one of their principal opponents, if not the principal opponent. Consequently, American actions to force cessation of these programs are counterproductive. Finally, since the bulk of the capital investments for these programs already have been made, the net economic effects realized by canceling the programs are insufficient relative to political costs.

On the positive side, the levels of these programs and their small size, translates into time to engage these states. While these states are operating on the basis of survival motivations, they are not yet hopeless. American constructive engagement, working on improving relations with

these states, over time, may minimize the threat that they pose. While dogmatic policies may make these states intractable, appeasement may make them overconfident. To be effective, American policy will have to walk a very fine line between the two.

CONCLUSION

Effective deterrence, of course, is based on the triad of capabilities, credibility, and communication. While there is no question about U.S. capability, its credibility and communications are more fragile. Accurate communications can be complex, especially with the more hostile proliferators. Further, any perception of a lack of resolve by the U.S. will amplify security concerns of states on the margins or of states relying on U.S. security assurances, and could possibly reach a point where security assurances would not be effective.

The U.S. (and international) ability to influence third tier proliferators to halt their weapons programs have been ineffective so far. No reason exists to expect an improved ability to influence these states. This does not mean, however, that the prospect of failure negates U.S. policy. On the contrary, nonproliferation is clearly in U.S. national interests, and despite low potential for success in some cases, the U.S. must continue to try to deter both nuclear proliferation and the use of existing nuclear weapons.

Deterrence and nonproliferation policies must be tailored to individual proliferators. The policies, and policy implementation, should vary, depending on the core values of the state, and the underlying rationale for nuclear weapons development.

Notes

¹ Security Studies Project, University of California, Los Angeles, 1968, Bernard Brodie, Editor, page 91.

² For a detailed discussion of deterrence failures, see Barry Wolf, *When the Weak Attack the Strong*, Rand, Santa Monica, 1991.

³ For more information on the status of the WWII programs, see Steven J. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, page 167.

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⁵ Joseph Nathan Kane, *Famous First Facts*, H.W. Wilson Company, New York, 1981, page 47. Bernard Brodie, *The Atomic Bomb and American Security*, Yale Institute of International Studies, 1945, gives the overall costs of the nuclear weapons program at two billion dollars, but points out that the costs were higher because the program was accelerated due to wartime requirements (page 20).

⁶ This point was articulated in Michael J. Lyons, *World War II: A Short History*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1989, pages 300-317.

⁷ *United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War)*; Washington, D.C.; 1946; page 26.

⁸ These figures were extracted from Averril A. Leibow, *Encounter with Disaster: A Medical Diary of Hiroshima*, 1945; Norton; New York; 1970; page 23.

⁹ For more details, see Michael Mandelbaum, *The Bomb, Dread, and Eternity*; *International Security*; Vol. 5, No.2 (Fall 1980); pages 3-23.

¹⁰ As used in this paper, an aspiring power is a state that is willing to incur costs or risks for nonsecurity expansion, while status quo state refers to a state that is unwilling to run risks for nonsecurity expansion.

¹¹ Manifest destiny was the name given to the American belief that it was America's right to control the territory between Canada and Mexico from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific Ocean (and perhaps beyond.)

¹² For a more detailed discussion of the decisions and timeframes for nuclear development, see Steven M. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation*, Steven M. Meyer, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, Appendix A, pages 167-172.

¹³ Since the intent here is to show the changes in the types of states involved in nuclear proliferation, I have used the Soviet Union as a developing state. For the terms of this construct, the later increase in states, and corresponding increase in nuclear powers, caused by the dissolution of the Soviet Union was not a factor in the decision to develop and deploy nuclear weapons. The motives for these new states to or return their nuclear weapons, however, are similar to the other potential proliferators. retain

¹⁴ The designation of these tiers of nuclear development is arbitrary. These states are roughly grouped by time of development. Some of the states listed in the second tier have completed development, but may not have assembled or deployed nuclear weapons. Several of the states listed in the fourth tier have extensive nuclear research programs ongoing. Some of these efforts may have weapons applications, but so far none of these states decided to fabricate nuclear weapons.

¹⁵ South Africa initiated a nuclear program in the early 1970's. This program, initiated as a result of security concerns, was canceled when those concerns were negated.

¹⁶ For more detailed discussions of the early French and British programs, see Bertrand Goldschmidt, *Atomic Rivals*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1990, and Ronald W. Clark, *The Birth of the Bomb*, Horizon Press, New York, 1961, respectively.

¹⁷ For a more detailed discussion of U.S. capabilities and French and British concerns see Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Harper, New York, 1957.

¹⁸ Rodman D. Griffin; Nuclear Proliferation; *The CQ Researcher*; Vol. 2; No 21 (June 5, 1992); pages 483-500.

¹⁹ For a more detailed discussion of available delivery systems and future developments see Robbin F. Laird; *The Soviet Union, The West, and the Nuclear Arms Race*; New York University Press; especially pages 85-165.

²⁰ Rodman D. Griffin; Nuclear Proliferation; *The CQ Researcher*; Vol. 2; No 21 (June 5, 1992); pages 483-500.

²¹ Leonard S. Spector; *Going Nuclear*; Ballinger; Cambridge, Mass; 1987, page 99.

²² *Ibid.*, pages 99 and 144.

²³ In *Guide to Nuclear Weapons*; Berg, Oxford; 1988; Paul Rogers reports the Jericho II, with a warhead weight of 1000 kilograms, can deliver a 20 kiloton warhead. Additionally, Leonard Spector, in *Going Nuclear* (Ballinger; Cambridge, Mass; 1987) lists a variety of potential delivery systems for both countries, assuming a bomb weight of 1300 pounds (under 700 kilograms). The Agni, the Indian missile system is assessed (Jane's Strategic Weapons) to have a comparable warhead weight. Given these constraints, potential fission bomb and warhead sizes will remain in the 10-25 kiloton range for some time.

²⁴ Of note, in the most recent external conflicts involving Israel, Israel has attacked (Lebanon in 1978 and 1982. For more details see *The Middle East*; Seventh Edition; Congressional Quarterly; 1991.

²⁵ Although tensions along the Indian-Pakistani border have been high for an extended period, and almost erupted into full scale war in early 1990, both sides consistently have stopped short of war. War has not broken out between the PRC and India since 1962.

²⁶ For a detailed discussion, see Steven M. Meyer, *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984, pages 173-203.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ These figures are synthesized from multiple sources, including David Albright, *A Proliferation Primer*, *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (June 1993), pages 15-23; Lt Colonel Fredrick R. Strain, *Confronting Nuclear Addiction: The Challenge of Proliferation*; HQ United States Air Force, Directorate of Plans (DCS/P&O) Number 1, 1992; as well as the previously cited Spector, Griffin, and Meyer references. The basic underlying assumptions include that the goal will be a deliverable warhead (under 25 kilotons), and that the rate of fissile material production will be the limiting factor.

³⁰ Details on specific missile systems can be found in *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems*, 1992, Edited by Duncan Lennox, Jane's Information Group Limited, Surrey. Of the missile systems under development or deployed with the third tier proliferators, none have warhead weights over 1000kg, North Korea, and Iran have or are developing missiles with warhead weights of 1000kg, and the remaining missile programs are in the 500kg range. For comparison, Israel's Jericho 2 has a warhead weight of 1000kg, reportedly correlating to a 20 kiloton weapon.

³¹ Ibid. The prevalent guidance system for these missiles is inertial. Unless inertial guidance is augmented by some type of terminal guidance, these missiles will remain inaccurate.

³² John T. Marlin, Immanuel Ness, and Steven T. Colling, *Book of World City Rankings*, Free Press, New York, 1986, give the areas for Seoul and Tel Aviv as 234 square miles, and 66 square miles respectively. Although the direct template use here is Hirshima, due to the size of the detonation, it is significant to note that at Nagasaki, a more powerful detonation did less damage, due to the city's configuration (for more information on these detonations see the *United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (Pacific War)*, No. 1, Washington D. C., 1946.) Of equal import, the same document refers to similar damage inflicted on Tokyo in single nights of firebombing.

³³ Averill A. Leibow, *Encounter with Disaster: A medical Diary of Hiroshima*, 1945; Norton; New York, 1970; page 23.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Issued by the White House, dated January 1993.

³⁶ I am intentionally excluding the potential for a group or state to deliver nuclear devices or weapons by unconventional means to targets in the U.S.

³⁷ For more details on the effects of sanctions, and the legal basis see Kimberly Ann Elliott; *Sanctions: A Look at the Record*; and Drew Christianson and Gerard F. Powers; *Sanctions: Unintended Consequences* both in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, (November 1993)

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* Note: Refer to the order form following the bibliographies for ordering information.

AD-A294 447

INDUSTRIAL COLL OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON DC(U) Paradigms and Policy Observation and Assumptions
Underlying U. S. National Security Policy After the Cold War.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Research rept, Aug 94-Aug 95

APR 95 28P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Frizzell, Joseph P. ; Schandler,
Herbert Y.

REPORT NO: NOU-ICAF-95-S9

MONITOR: XD
ICAF

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) Most foreign policy observers agree that the end of the Cold War will require the United States to develop a new general foreign policy to take the plan of containment. Containment policy served as the organizing concept for U.S. national security policy. It established a set of broad goals for the United States deterring or, if necessary, defeating Soviet expansion. U.S. leaders used containment to explain and justify year to year and day to day decisions. The goals of containment also served as a reference point for planning within the government itself, and as the basis for policy debates in public arenas. So, in the Cold War, it was reasonable to assume that two nation-states, the United States and the Soviet Union, were the primary actors, and that they used the traditional resources of military, economic, and diplomatic power to implement their policies. This concept is no longer valid and thus cannot serve as the basis of a general foreign policy. This paper outlines an Alternate Candidate Paradigm for World Politics in the Post-Cold War Era.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *FOREIGN POLICY, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *COLD WAR, USSR, UNITED STATES, POLICIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, DECISION MAKING, MODELS, RUSSIA, EXPANSION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, DETERRENCE, DEMOCRACY.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, CONTAINMENT (FOREIGN POLICY), POST COLD WAR ERA, ALTERNATE CANDIDATE PARADIGM, PARADIGMS, NEW WORLD ORDER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.

AD-A293 704

NAVAL WAR BOLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF
OPERATIONS SUBMARINES, NAVAL(U) The Attack Submarine (SSN) in the Post-Cold War
Environment. Operational Art Implications for the
Operational Commander.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.,

MAR 95 22P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Mack, Daniel P.

MONITOR: XB
NWC/ DO

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The end of the Cold War requires a reassessment of the strategic and operational environment. Some strategists argue that platforms like the attack submarine (SSN), though instrumental in an antisubmarine (ASW) role against the Soviets, are redundant and not essential in the changing world order. The utility of the SSN is readily apparent when viewed from the perspective of the combatant Commander in Chief (CINC). The CINC practices the operational art, and the SSN contributes significantly to the CINC's operational tool kit. When examined through the lens of the principles of war, the SSN's versatility and relative invulnerability bring a great deal to the CINC's table, where the true operational value of a platform is most important. Focusing on three principles of war--the offensive, security, and economy of force--reveals numerous tasks the SSN can accomplish (often simultaneously) for the operational commander in the joint littoral environment. Instead of looking backward at traditional Cold-War missions, operational thinking should look forward and apply the unique capabilities of the SSN to tasking as diverse as conventional deterrence, strike warfare, surveillance, and integrated ASW against the diesel threat.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *NAVAL WARFARE, *NAVAL PLANNING, *ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), USSR, DIESEL ENGINES, GLOBAL, INTEGRATED SYSTEMS, STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, MILITARY FORCES (FOREIGN), THREATS, MISSIONS, COLD WAR, RUSSIA, LITTORIAL ZONES, SURVEILLANCE, STRIKE WARFARE, ATTACK SUBMARINES, NAVAL INTELLIGENCE, DETERRENCE.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) ASW (ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE), FSU (FORMER SOVIET UNION), POST COLD WAR ERA, NEW WORLD ORDER, CINC (COMMANDER IN CHIEF), OPERATIONAL ART, ECONOMY OF FORCE, OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS, DIESEL SUBMARINES, SOF (SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES), I&W (INDICATION AND WARNING)

AD-A293 102

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA

(U) No-First-Use Implications for Deterrence, Alliance Cohesion, and Nonproliferation

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Master's thesis,

DEC 94 100P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Espinosa, Paul E.

MONITOR: XB
NPS

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) While a U.S. no-first-use declaration might help promote some nuclear nonproliferation goals (for example gaining a larger international consensus to support an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty), it could also undermine the credibility of U.S. security commitments and erode alliance cohesion. These developments could, in turn, increase the risk of nuclear proliferation. This thesis identifies and examines the relevant competing arguments and discusses the implications of a U.S. no-first-use pledge regarding three issues: deterrence, alliance cohesion, and nuclear nonproliferation. The thesis concludes that adapting a no first use policy would probably prove beneficial only in the short term and only in one respect. The policy might help the United States meet its stated objectives for the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The arguments in favor of adopting a no first use pledge fail to adequately consider the possible long term implications, in particular, the risk that this policy could undermine stability in Europe and the integrity of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The potential shortcomings of the arguments on both sides of the no first use debate are highlighted. In view of these shortcomings, recommendations are given to help minimize possible negative political and nectary effects. (RWJ)

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *NATIONAL SECURITY, * MILITARY DOCTRINE, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, MILITARY FORCES (UNITED STATES), FOREIGN POLICY, NUCLEAR FORCES (MILITARY), EUROPE, POLICIES, POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, RISK, POLITICAL ALLIANCES, THESES, ARMS CONTROL, TREATIES, BALANCE OF POWER, DETERRENCE.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, NPT(NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY)

AD-A285 251

AIR UNIV MAXWELL AFB AL

(U) Of Carrots and Sticks or Air Power as a Nonproliferation Tool,

JUL 94 60P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Wolf, Franklin R.

MONITOR: XC
AU

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The proliferation of nuclear weapons has become one of the principal threats to international peace and security. Postwar revelations from Iraq demonstrate how close a determined nation can come to covertly developing nuclear weapons without detection. In the past two years the issue of nonproliferation has increased in importance and the regime is becoming more intrusive. On the other hand, a number of nations hostile to the international order are attempting to develop or otherwise obtain nuclear weapons. These states include North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. This paper argues that the use or threat of force must be incorporated into the nonproliferation regime. When properly integrated into nonproliferation strategy, force offers positive effects in terms of deterrence, compellence, and defense. Thus, the paper calls for the institutionalization of force options into the nonproliferation tool kit, ideally as part of chapter 7 enforcement actions under the authority of the UN Security Council.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *ARMS CONTROL, *NATIONAL SECURITY, *UNITED NATIONS, *JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, DETECTION, DETERRENCE, INTERNATIONAL, IRAN, THREAT EVALUATION, IRAQ, KOREA, NORTH KOREA, MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS, SECURITY, STRATEGY, THREATS, TOOL KITS, WESTERN SECURITY (INTERNATIONAL), TOOLS, WEAPONS, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COERCIVE FORCE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, DISARMAMENT, FOREIGN POLICY, TERRORISM.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) NONPROLIFERATION TREATY, FORCE OPTIONS, COMPELLENCE, PEACEMAKING

AD-A280 018

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE WASHINGTON DC
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS DIV

(U) Nuclear Nonproliferation. Export Licensing Procedures
for Dual-Use Items Need to be Strengthened.

APR 94 71P
REPORT NO. GAO/NSIAD-94-119
MONITOR: X1
XD

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE: Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate.

ABSTRACT: (U) Iraq's extensive use of so-called dual-use
equipment in its nuclear weapons program has raised
concerns about the effectiveness of export controls over these
items. At the request of the Chairman, Senate Committee on
Government Affairs, GAO (1) determined the nature and
extent of U.S. nuclear-related dual-use exports to countries of
proliferation concern, (2) assessed U.S. policies and
procedures for reviewing license applications for items that
pose a proliferation risk, and (3) examined some U.S.
methods used to deter and detect at the diversion of exports to
foreign nuclear proliferation programs.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, *NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION, *ARMS CONTROL, DETERRENCE,
FOREIGN POLICY, COMPUTERS, EXPORTS.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) DUAL USE TECHNOLOGY.

AD-A276 675

INDUSTRIAL COLL OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON DC

(U) Post Cold War U.S. Nuclear Weapons Requirements.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Research rept. Aug 91-Apr 92,
APR 92 53P
PERSONAL AUTHORS: Pailles, William A.
REPORT NO. NDU-ICAF-92-S72
MONITOR: XD
NDU

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The end of the Cold War does not mean
the end of the requirement for the U.S. to maintain nuclear
weapons. Despite much improved relations between the U.S.
and the countries of the former Soviet Union, and despite
encouraging progress in nuclear arms reductions agreements,
the Russian nuclear arsenal retains a potential threat to the
U.S. Therefore, even as weapons are eliminated, the U.S. will
have to maintain a nuclear arsenal comparable to that of the
Republic of Russia for many years. In addition to offensive
weapons, the emergence of new Third World nuclear threats,
which are not completely deterrable by threats of U.S.
retaliation, may necessitate an antiballistic missile system to
protect both U.S. territory and its forces deployed overseas.
Finally, these new Third World threats will require new U.S.
nuclear weapons doctrines. Doctrines developed during the
Cold War to deter or conduct a massive nuclear exchange
with the former soviet union are not directly applicable to the
employment of nuclear weapons in a limited conflict with a
relatively minor adversary.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
*REQUIREMENTS, AGREEMENTS, COLD WAR,
CONFLICT, DOCTRINE, EMPLOYMENT,
EXCHANGE, MEAN, OVERSEAS, REDUCTION,
THREATS, USSR, WEAPONS.

AD-A25S 115NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI DEPT OF
OPERATIONS(U) Strategic Nuclear Deterrence in the 90's and Beyond:
Where Do We Go From Here?DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Final rept.,
MAY 92 34P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Knowles, Stephen V.

MONITOR: XN
NWC/DO

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) With the end of the Cold War, the defense landscape has been substantially changed. But it has not been so dramatically altered as to eliminate the Russian need for a nuclear deterrent or to justify completely ignoring them as potential competitors on the world stage. The nuclear stalemate which characterized relations with the former Soviet Union has been replaced with an unpredictably which presents both danger and promise, prompting the question, 'where do we go from here?'. The alternatives of defense dominance, U.S. nuclear superiority, or nuclear disarmament/near-disarmament have all been suggested as possible replacements to the strategy of deterrence through assured destruction. A closer examination of these proposed strategies finds that all have the potential to leave us less secure than we might have otherwise believed. Before we try to escape from the mutual balance of terror which has dominated most of the nuclear age, we should have a firm idea of where the strategy will lead. This includes taking into consideration the legitimate security concerns of Russia and the other commonwealth states.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *DETERRENCE, *STRATEGY, ASSURED DESTRUCTION, COLD WAR, DESTRUCTION, DISARMAMENT, REPLACEMENT, SECURITY, USSR, BALANCE OF POWER.

AD-A250 844

ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) The Future of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence.

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Study project,
APR 92 57P

PERSONAL AUTHORS: Floris, John

MONITOR: XA
AWC

UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The evolving role of our Strategic Nuclear Forces and the deterrent requirement of that force in a changing and volatile world are two of the most contentious issues facing this country's leadership. The debate surrounding these forces has been brought about by many diverse factors that include the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the resultant end of the Cold War, bilateral arms control agreements and unilateral reductions which have reduced the number and operational status of nuclear forces, and a perceived reduction in the threat facing the U.S. and its allies. Additionally, the success of U.S. technology as seen in the effects of modern conventional munitions in the Gulf War and the proliferation of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology into Third World countries have further compounded the complexity of the issue. The concomitant changes in the focus and structure of U.S. and allied military forces have further fueled the debate. As the National Security Strategy and supporting National Military Strategy are evolving to meet new threats, it is essential to provide an analysis of the continued deterrent role of our Strategic Nuclear Force in this changing world.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *MILITARY STRATEGY, *NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AGREEMENTS, ARMS CONTROL, BALLISTICS, COLD WAR, CONTROL, FACINGS, GUIDED MISSILES, GULFS, LEADERSHIP, NATIONAL SECURITY, NUMBERS, REDUCTION, REQUIREMENTS, SECURITY, STRATEGY, STRUCTURES, THREATS, USSR, WEAPONS.

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ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

(U) Deterrence for World Peace: A New World Order Option?

DESCRIPTIVE NOTE: Study project,

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UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

ABSTRACT: (U) The recent collapse of the former Soviet Union has brought an end to the Cold War and a beginning to change and uncertainty. The shift from a bi-polar to a multi-polar world has uncovered trends that make the future of the new world order complex and dangerous. The rise in regional conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, accelerated worldwide technology transfer, and the disposition of some 30,000 nuclear warheads in the Commonwealth of Independent States are but a few of the major trends that can have a profound effect on world peace if not controlled. To solve this problem of control will bring a new emphasis to the word 'deterrence'. For 45 years the word 'deterrence' has been most commonly used to describe the justification for a nuclear arms race between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Now, the global community of nations can 'deter' further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by using the recommended three-part solution of a global nuclear test ban, worldwide acceptance of the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) system, and arms control enforcement using embargoes and economic sanctions by an international system like the United Nations.

DESCRIPTORS: (U) *ARMS CONTROL, *NUCLEAR WARHEADS, *FOREIGN POLICY, COLD WAR, DESTRUCTION, ECONOMICS, GLOBAL, INTERNATIONAL, MASS, NATIONS, PROTECTION, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, USSR, UNCERTAINTY, UNITED NATIONS, UNITED STATES.

IDENTIFIERS: (U) EMBARGOES, GLOBAL NUCLEAR TEST BAN.

Additional References - *GAO Reports

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CONCLUSION

The emerging new world order resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact is very different from what existed during the Cold War. The death of Communism in the former Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War provides the world community with an opportunity for real progress in the reduction of tension and hostility through cooperation and common security.

Political, military and economic interests among nations are undergoing significant change. A primary potential enemy has yet to emerge in the post-cold war era. However, the realities of life in a nuclearized world make it probable that threats to U.S. global security interests are significant. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is rampant in third world countries. The resulting increased access to nuclear weapons and associated technology threatens the survival interests of the U.S.

General Colin Powell expressed it this way, "Recent arms control agreements and unilateral initiatives provide for real reductions in arsenals of nuclear powers."¹ However, the necessity for nuclear deterrence, as a part of the U.S. national military strategy, remains.

Despite a shift in nuclear concept, the United States must ensure the visibility and credibility of its military strength and security interests and still meet the expectations of the international community. The primary difference between what has come before and what is yet to be might well be the level of direct risk to the United States in terms of strategic nuclear devastation.

Thus a new posture of the U.S. military exists. The new strategies include strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution. These strategies each have validity in the new world order. However, they also have shortfalls that inhibit the effective implementation.

The United States must retain an arsenal of nuclear weapons capable of providing a credible deterrent to all current and emerging nuclear nations.

¹ U.S. Army Materiel Command, Strength Through Technology; 50 Years of Technical Progress (Adelphi, Md.: U.S. Army Laboratory Command) p. 18-20.

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